China will turn its full gaze on the Indian Ocean region once it has resolved its Taiwan problem and also its numerous territorial claims in the South China Sea. India and its Navy have little time, which must be gainfully employed to boost domestic maritime activities across the entire spectrum of sea power — ports, connectivity to ports, shipyards for building and repairing warships, submarines, merchant ships, oil tankers, fishing trawlers, oil rigs, etc. It must be realised that such a plan requires vision, technical expertise and unwavering political support._____________________________
by Arun Kumar Singh
(June 02, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) A couple of months ago, the French admiral of the Indian Ocean Forces ("Al Indien"), a vice-admiral, was expected to visit New Delhi. The admiral has a modest sea command of one tanker, one frigate and one nuclear submarine (SSN) to look after French interests in the 28m sq km of the Indian Ocean, spread from Africa to Polynesia. At the last minute, the visit was cancelled as a French merchant ship had been hijacked by pirates off Somalia, and the tiny French flotilla, under "Al –Indien", was directed to carry out a rescue mission. A fortnight later, the BBC telecast video clippings of a French heliborne commando team from the French Navy landing inside Somalia and capturing the pirates after a successful rescue mission.
In May 2008, the Indian media gave wide publicity to a Jordanian-registered ship, M.V. Victoria, which had sailed from Mumbai with a crew of 21 (of which 10 were Indian citizens). The ship had been hijacked by pirates off Somalia, and was later discovered at anchor near the coast, a few hundred miles north of Mogadishu. It was mentioned that local tribal leaders were trying to get the crew released. India’s D-G Shipping had no record of the 10 Indian crew members. This is really odd, as the ship had entered Mumbai, and current international port security norms should have ensured that D-G Shipping, headed by a bureaucrat whose office is also located in Mumbai, should have been at least aware of the crew list.
This lacuna could prove costly, in this era of global terrorism, since peacetime port security in India is not under the Indian Navy (IN) or the Indian Coast Guard (ICG), but under local port authorities, who are, like the D-G Shipping, come under the ministry of shipping and transport. The incident, and lapse, brings to mind a related issue a few years ago, when a cyclone was expected to hit the Gujarat coast. An urgent call was made to recall all fishermen at sea, many without any radio communication equipment. Unfortunately, neither the local civil administration nor the port authorities had details of the number of boats at sea. A major tragedy was averted only because the cyclone altered course, away from the Gujarat coast. Even then, fishermen, battered by the heavy seas, limped back or were towed back to ports by the ICG over the next fortnight. Casualties were relatively low. In another instance, there were reports that ports in Gujarat had received live ammunition in lieu of scrap metal imported from West Asia.
The need for reforms and tightening security is obvious, considering that in the US, peacetime port security is with the US Coast Guard. The Indian Navy is the largest regional navy, and is stated to be undergoing transition from a brown-water force to a blue-water capability. Notwithstanding a few well-publicised inductions, the fact remains that the Navy is actually shrinking in size, despite talk of quality and "capability-based platforms". After all, the potential adversary too is expected to update his quality and capability.
The 10-year "strategic maritime gap" between India and China will continue to grow, unless some drastic action is taken to upgrade shipbuilding and ports infrastructure, and accountability is introduced in this vital field. The Coast Guard, like the Navy, may be the largest of its kind in the region, but it still has only 30 per cent of the strength it needs to carry out its existing mandate.
Both the Navy and the ICG have been handicapped by lack of legislation to permit them to stop and search suspected terrorist ships before any deadly cargo reaches an Indian port. However, despite their known constraints, both these maritime forces have put in efforts to further India’s maritime interests by spreading goodwill and "friendship across the seas" with overseas deployments to far-off lands, exercising with foreign navies and coast guards, while also conducting various seminars in India.
On the strategic front too, the Chinese have continued to spring surprises, with news about two new classes of Chinese nuclear submarines (Jin and Shang class SSBN and SSN), and a new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island. Some strategic thinkers have a different, more philosophical, view of the growing Chinese threat. They feel the Chinese Navy’s buildup is meant to counter the US Navy, which is the most powerful fleet in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the IN is, therefore, not the intended target. But common sense dictates that though the Chinese Navy is at present "Taiwan and US Navy centric", it would be strategically imprudent to expect the US and its Navy to fight India’s battles at sea, unless of course, there is a direct threat to American national interests.
China will turn its full gaze on the Indian Ocean region once it has resolved its Taiwan problem and also its numerous territorial claims in the South China Sea. India and its Navy have little time, which must be gainfully employed to boost domestic maritime activities across the entire spectrum of sea power — ports, connectivity to ports, shipyards for building and repairing warships, submarines, merchant ships, oil tankers, fishing trawlers, oil rigs, etc. It must be realised that such a plan requires vision, technical expertise and unwavering political support.
So where do Somalia and the rescue act by the French Navy come into this complicated "maritime landscape"? Would India’s growing maritime "blue water capability" have achieved more, and "added to the impact" of the international seminars and strategic talk, had an Indian warship actually rescued the crew of the M.V. Victoria? Or could we have attempted a similar rescue in 2006 of the Indian ship M.V. Bhakti Sagar or a large Indian dhow (M.S.V. Nima Tullah) in 2007, both hijacked off Somalia? Undoubtedly, the Navy has the capability, but would have required timely political clearance from the government in the absence of any legislation or government-approved contingency plans.
A sustained or even periodic Indian naval presence to protect our shipping and maritime interests "from Sakhalin to Venezuela" is a good goal, but it’s definitely beyond the realms of reality in the next 15 to 20 years. However, India can and must protect its seafarers nearer home. After all, the pirate-infested waters off the Horn of Africa (1,300 to 1,900 nautical miles) and the Malacca Straits (1,500 nautical miles from our east coast — and only 500nm from the Andamans) are not far for a nation whose economy is on the upswing.
We cannot afford to become "shockproof" and desensitised to the fast-moving events in today’s world of global terrorism, which has an indirect linkage with piracy, since the funds generated can also be diverted to terrorists. Bomb blasts on land, and threats to ships, must be fought as a war with the full might of the Indian nation.
Both the Navy and the Coast Guard urgently need funding to double their force levels, and legislation and decisiveness to operate in any emergency situation at short notice.
There is also an urgent need for reforms. Some critical ministries — defence, home, agriculture (fishing comes under it), aviation, shipping — need "vertical specialist professionals" to head the civil bureaucratic chain. In case of the MoD, it could be done by completely integrating it with the service headquarters. The peacetime security of our 13 major and 36 minor ports needs to be handed over to the Coast Guard, with the Navy fulfilling that role in wartime. We also need total synergy between these two forces, with their headquarters ideally located in the same building and operating out of a common operations room. Finally, we need to get our seaborne strategic deterrent in place urgently.
( Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam, in April 2007)
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