A Referendum, this?

“It was ironic that the moderate Tamil polity and society whose interests India thought it was serving by signing the Agreement, expressed reservations to the Agreement. It was no coincidence that the militant LTTE opposed the Agreement on record but stil initialled proposals aimed at installing its man as the political head of the Provincial Council in the merged Province.”
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by N Sathiya Moorthy

(May 05, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Opposition UNP might have been uncharitable when it charged the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa with “leaking military secrets” to obtain political mileage in native Sri Lanka. Whatever that be, the fact remains that crucial military initiatives targeting the LTTE seem to be coinciding with critical political developments affecting the stability of the ruling combine over the past year and more.

It is possible that the military decisions were based on professional assessment/apprehension, and were aimed at pre-empting possible LTTE strikes. The army actions might even “expend the best fighting cadres of the LTTE”, as SLA chief Sarath Fonseka explained post facto this time round. Yet, ‘body bags’ from the battle-front have had the knack of knocking at the credibility of democratic governments the world over. Sri Lanka’s could not expect to be an exception.

Independent of the ‘SLA reverses’ – which were tactical, if not strategic -- the military situation may have no immediate impact on the evolving political situation, particularly in the East. The Provincial Council poll promises to be a referendum of sorts on the de-merger, and for re-merger. The question could pertain as much to the forgotten ‘eastern-ness’ as the emotiveness still attaching to the ‘traditional Tamil homeland’, conceptualized since the Fifties.

President Rajapaksa kick-started the discourse at his May Day rally at eastern Ampara when he asked the people of the Province to “maintain their separate identity”. However, the TMVP running-mate of his ruling SLFP-UPFA at the national-level seems to be maintaining stoic silence. It needs no reminding that the birth of the ‘Karuna faction’, the forerunner of the TMVP, flagged the eastern-ness issue as none other in recent decades.

The LTTE-sympathetic TNA, officially boycotting the poll, swears by re-merger. So do Sri Lankan Tamil parties that are partners in the ruling alliance at the Centre. The UNP offered to vote in re-merger to rectify the procedural lapse identified by the Supreme Court, but nothing has been heard of since. The Muslim parties, on either side of the political divide, are sympathetic to the cause of re-merger but are unsure on how to assert their own identity.

The ‘Eastern identity’ goes beyond sloganeering. For some in the East otherwise favouring re-merger, it could boil down to the creation of a ‘unitary Province’ under LTTE control within a ‘unitary Sri Lankan State’ that they have opposed. That way, the pro-merger sections in the East identified with the LTTE could send out a strong message even by the mere boycott of the Provincial Council poll – as they did with the presidential election of 2005. Ironically, even the ‘Eastern identity’ does not mean the same thing to all sections of the population, roughly comprising a third each of the Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas – and not necessarily in that order, any more. The concerns and apprehensions of individual identities are different, so are their political loyalties within each of those identities.

It is thus that the creation of an ‘Eastern identity’, possibly based on the commonality of regional development and personal growth that could assume immediate relevance for opposing anything to the contrary. The Government’s promised efforts at developing the ‘liberated East’ could sub-serve the purpose, if taken to its promised conclusion. The means could thus justify the end – or, even lead to the same, whether intended or not.

As is known, the merger-decision flowed from the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987, and provided for a referendum in the East. The Provincial Councils Act that facilitated the merger mandated referendum in the merged Provinces. Neither course of referendum could guarantee merger, and not certainly the latter.

It was ironic that the moderate Tamil polity and society whose interests India thought it was serving by signing the Agreement, expressed reservations to the Agreement. It was no coincidence that the militant LTTE opposed the Agreement on record but stil initialled proposals aimed at installing its man as the political head of the Provincial Council in the merged Province.

In a way, any institutionalization of the Eastern Provincial Council and administration in the post-poll scenario could well lead to a stalemate on the re-merger front and make it that much more difficult on the ground. A relatively free and fair poll, as was the case with the recently-conducted local government elections in the eastern Batticaloa district, too could carry a message. Post-poll, the Eastern Province could be engaged with itself more than with the outside world. It could take the form of the demand for the Sri Lankan Centre to give up Provincial powers taken over by the use of the ‘national interests’ clause in the Thirteenth Amendment – and more powers through the APRC process.

Whoever wins the polls, there would also be demands for more financing powers for the Provinces, particularly after the VAT scheme during the interregnum had denied them the opportunity. Politically, it could involve real powers to rein in armed groups, to increasing the number of Provincial Council Ministers – to even demands for elected representatives having to be ordinary residents of the Provinces concerned.

By ordering Provincial Council poll in the ‘liberated East’, President Rajapaksa may have pushed his political adversaries into a “Heads I win, Tails you lose” kind of situation. For his Government, an SLFP-PA-TMVP victory should be a bonus. The Government is sure to play up even the conduct of a relatively free and fair poll under the trying circumstances of the time as a victory for the President and his policies on the ‘national problem’.

Yet, questions remain. Apart from the charting out of a future path towards a political solution and permanent peace, the Provincial Council poll in the East would put to test the implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which President Rajapaksa has said his Government was keen on implementing. A provincial administration representing the political Opposition could put early pressure on the Centre to devolve all powers promised to the Provinces without delay. This could well include the powers that the Centre has taken over, citing the exceptional clause of ‘national interest’, contained in the Thirteenth Amendment.

Historically-placed to guide the course of the future, it is this President and his Government that are in real facing the referendum. It is not one about the initiatives, but about the intentions behind those initiatives. The former can fail the latter, but it cannot be the other way round.

That way, the success for the President and the Government on this score need not necessarily translate into a success for the political scheme that he promised for the Eastern Province after the LTTE exited the scene. But then, a success for the scheme – and its working -- could well translate into a greater success for the Government and its leader.

( The writer is the Director of the Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF-Chennai), the Indian policy think-tank, headquartered in New Delhi.)
- Sri Lanka Guardian