"The Wanni is not a single, massive, formation of bunkers and trenches and a problem faced by soldiers today is that even if they do capture a bunker line, by the time they are allowed to advance again, new fortifications have been built behind what was previously the Tiger's fall back line. New mine fields are also often planted. This crawling advance ensures that the LTTE will always be well dug in and will have prepared defensive positions to retreat to. A major offensive can break both the LTTE's primary and secondary Forward Defensive Lines, or FDLs, and force them to do one of three things, while eliminating the problem of prepared enemy positions." __________________________
Feature Article
(May 24, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sri Lankan public's unwillingness to back a large scale engagement on account of the heavier losses any such battle is expected to result in greatly hampers their military's capacity to defeat the LTTE. A major offensive needs to begin as quickly as possible and the citizens of Sri Lanka need to reconsider their situation. This offensive would, naturally, include the mine clearing tactics that was talked about in the previous article.
It is almost certain that fewer Sri Lankan soldiers will die in the long run if the LTTE is destroyed sooner rather than later. The public needs to come to terms with the fact that casualties are going to increase when this offensive finally occurs, but it is a blessing in disguise. It is generally true that more soldiers die in larger battles in the short term but over time, constant low intensity fighting surpasses the cost of a major battle. To see if this is true, lets consider the losses suffered on each side in this intentional stalemate.
Since, lets say, August of 2007, a few thousand LTTE fighters, most of them conscripts, and many of them drafted after our stated start date, have died in operations in and around the Wanni. No LTTE provoked major battle has ever resulted in so many dead. For the Sri Lankan military, casualty reports that are older than January 1st are difficult to come by, but based various reports of different engagements during this time period, at least 500 Sri Lankan soldiers, police, and Home Guard have been killed. The true death toll is probably much higher, and thousands have been wounded since last August. This would rank among the most costly battles of the war for the Sri Lankan military if it had been paid for up front. The kill ratio for these past many months may be mathematically favorable to Sri Lanka, but the benefits won are no longer worth the time, resources, or lives. They were at one point, but that time has past.
Many people haven't really understood that there is a price to pay in a meat grinder strategy. Military propaganda articles often report their claimed total LTTE deaths over a long period of time while, whenever military deaths are mentioned, only the most recent casualties are talked about, with the exception of the resent report on 2008 casualties. While propaganda can't be soley blamed for the mindset of the Sri Lankan people, many are guilty of looking at these two complementary facts through two different contexts. This gives a false impression that the military is not sacrificing in this campaign, when in reality Sri Lanka continues to pay a heavy price for what is now unclear benefit.
The logic that a favorable kill ratio number is equal to a favorable trade in lives is also questionable. The claim that the body count system is depleting the Wanni's population at anywhere close to a rate that can be of use to this campaign is almost certainly false, and that will be addressed shortly. For now it is enough just to know that it is in question. Given this, what logic is there in trading the lives of soldiers, at any ratio, for the lives of conscripts who were only drafted as a result of the attrition strategy being used to kill them? It is a mathematical fact that the shorter a war is, the fewer people can be drafted into it, so the longer the SLA fights a war of attrition, the more children and other draftees they will have to kill and die trying to kill. In another reality where the SLA took the initiative, many LTTE draftees that are already dead now might have never been drafted in the first place.
This strategy's continued use is no longer beneficial to the overall campaign by itself. It had many beneficial results in the past, but is no longer worth using, unless it is used in conjunction with a major offensive. It has hurt enemy morale, while boosting that of the Sri Lankan military. It has made the LTTE defensive lines chaotic and porous, while the deaths of volunteers and veterans among the LTTE are always positive bonuses. However, the logic of bleeding the Wanni's military age population by killing draftees doesn't seem to work unless the Sri lankan military abandons its hope to capture the Wanni by the end of 2008. In this line of thinking, no one seems to consider the Wanni's birth rate since, say, 1980. It is quite probable that the birth rate is greater than 10 births a day, which is the average number of LTTE soldiers killed each day. Assuming that this is not the case, whatever birth rate has been the case since the war began will be enough to keep the LTTE well stocked with conscripts for years. This is a race against the clock and the longer the SLA spends bleeding off draftees that can and are being easily replaced, the more likely it is that political, economic, or international factors will rescue the LTTE and keep this war going for many years to come.
This attrition is unlikely to be achieving its goal of depleting the LTTE's supply of war materials. If anything, the LTTE is slowly increasing their stocks over time. Shortly after the last big blockade runner had been sunk, they were dealing with material shortfalls that were seen in artillery rationing on their part, but that is long over and artillery duels are pretty common now. Using many smaller craft, the LTTE seems to be enjoying a constant influx of supplies from Tamil Nadu and since the SLA is not inclined to push a major offensive, the LTTE has been able to stockpile munitions, giving them an advantage they should never have had.
The reality of the price being paid by both sides, the high probability of improving LTTE supply stocks, the fact that the objectives that have been met by this attrition strategy were met a long time ago, and the uncertainty about the strategy's success in depleting the Wanni's manpower pool to any significant degree, leads to the conclusion that this strategy is no longer providing benefit to Sri Lanka and should be replaced or coupled with a more aggressive strategy to bring about real tangible progress in concluding this war.
A crtical benefit of a major offensive that attrition does not offer is that it will result in larger battles that will quickly change the strategic situation in the areas where they are fought. In a matter of a few short days, a major engagement can achieve more than months of raids and counter raids. An offensive, if executed with a level of competency expected from the greatly improved Sri Lankan military, will be able to strike the LTTE hard enough to significantly shorten the war.
The Wanni is not a single, massive, formation of bunkers and trenches and a problem faced by soldiers today is that even if they do capture a bunker line, by the time they are allowed to advance again, new fortifications have been built behind what was previously the Tiger's fall back line. New mine fields are also often planted. This crawling advance ensures that the LTTE will always be well dug in and will have prepared defensive positions to retreat to. A major offensive can break both the LTTE's primary and secondary Forward Defensive Lines, or FDLs, and force them to do one of three things, while eliminating the problem of prepared enemy positions. All three of these options would be major successes for Sri Lanka by themselves, but the potential results are even more valuable.
The Tigers can abandon the area, leaving only saboteurs, which while they are problematic, are better than hundreds of dug in Tigers with artillery. They can also decide to counter attack, which would be a gift from God for the SLA, allowing them to use their superior numbers and firepower to butcher the LTTE. The casualties suffered by the LTTE in such a counter attack would cripple their capacity to resist the SLA in the sector in contest, allowing for a rapid advance. Finally, the Tigers may choose to try and contain the breakthrough by standing and defending a suddenly difficult to define front line, from unprepared defenses, without artillery support, or at least with a reduced artillery capacity. Getting the LTTE to stand and fight from a disadvantage, whether they are defending against an SLA attack, or counter attacking, would allow the military to greatly reduce the Tiger population in the area of operations.
There is a general fear among the citizens of Sri Lanka that the LTTE will win a crucial victory if a major battle is fought. This is unlikely to occur, since the factors that allowed the LTTE to win battles in the past have greatly changed. An army that is afraid to fight is ultimately self-defeating and this war will not end without multiple major battles. The sooner these are fought, the sooner the war can be won. The superior numbers, technology, production capacity, and leadership of the Sri Lankan military means that the Tigers will not be able to win battles the way they did in the past. If the Sri Lankan military is truly committed to a battle, then they cannot be defeated. Fears of a repeat of the debacles of Elephant Pass and Mullativu are based on a misunderstanding of the LTTE's strength and fuel a fear of larger battles in the minds of Sri Lankan citizens. While they are a fierce enemy that can cause grievous injury to the military, it was the cutting of supply lines to the Elephant Pass Base and the Mullaitivu relief force that were the killing blows for these battles, not brute force. General Fonseka should concentrate his conservative strategic nature on securing supply lines once a major push is made, not in killing time in the meat grinder of trench warfare. The LTTE's desire to cut these lines, be they by land, or by sea as a result of an amphibious landing, could actually give Sri Lanka the major battle they need. Concentration of force and commitment by the SLA and SLN can turn this weak point into an opportunity to strike a major blow against the LTTE. With Fonseka's conservative style guiding the offensive, the LTTE would be hard pressed to cut off advancing troops for any significant period of time and so long as Sri Lanka maintains superior numbers and firepower, the Tigers will have no way to stop the SLA from marching anywhere in the Wanni.
This offensive must begin soon though because Sri Lanka's economy cannot sustain the war effort forever, while public opinion can easily turn against the government if clear progress is not made. Sri lanka's dependence on international support, or at least neutrality also limits the time they have to end this war. Concerns about the hardships suffered by civilians in this war may cause nations that supply the Sri Lankan military to end their support, which may very well ensure the LTTE's survival for years to come.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
It is almost certain that fewer Sri Lankan soldiers will die in the long run if the LTTE is destroyed sooner rather than later. The public needs to come to terms with the fact that casualties are going to increase when this offensive finally occurs, but it is a blessing in disguise. It is generally true that more soldiers die in larger battles in the short term but over time, constant low intensity fighting surpasses the cost of a major battle. To see if this is true, lets consider the losses suffered on each side in this intentional stalemate.
Since, lets say, August of 2007, a few thousand LTTE fighters, most of them conscripts, and many of them drafted after our stated start date, have died in operations in and around the Wanni. No LTTE provoked major battle has ever resulted in so many dead. For the Sri Lankan military, casualty reports that are older than January 1st are difficult to come by, but based various reports of different engagements during this time period, at least 500 Sri Lankan soldiers, police, and Home Guard have been killed. The true death toll is probably much higher, and thousands have been wounded since last August. This would rank among the most costly battles of the war for the Sri Lankan military if it had been paid for up front. The kill ratio for these past many months may be mathematically favorable to Sri Lanka, but the benefits won are no longer worth the time, resources, or lives. They were at one point, but that time has past.
Many people haven't really understood that there is a price to pay in a meat grinder strategy. Military propaganda articles often report their claimed total LTTE deaths over a long period of time while, whenever military deaths are mentioned, only the most recent casualties are talked about, with the exception of the resent report on 2008 casualties. While propaganda can't be soley blamed for the mindset of the Sri Lankan people, many are guilty of looking at these two complementary facts through two different contexts. This gives a false impression that the military is not sacrificing in this campaign, when in reality Sri Lanka continues to pay a heavy price for what is now unclear benefit.
The logic that a favorable kill ratio number is equal to a favorable trade in lives is also questionable. The claim that the body count system is depleting the Wanni's population at anywhere close to a rate that can be of use to this campaign is almost certainly false, and that will be addressed shortly. For now it is enough just to know that it is in question. Given this, what logic is there in trading the lives of soldiers, at any ratio, for the lives of conscripts who were only drafted as a result of the attrition strategy being used to kill them? It is a mathematical fact that the shorter a war is, the fewer people can be drafted into it, so the longer the SLA fights a war of attrition, the more children and other draftees they will have to kill and die trying to kill. In another reality where the SLA took the initiative, many LTTE draftees that are already dead now might have never been drafted in the first place.
This strategy's continued use is no longer beneficial to the overall campaign by itself. It had many beneficial results in the past, but is no longer worth using, unless it is used in conjunction with a major offensive. It has hurt enemy morale, while boosting that of the Sri Lankan military. It has made the LTTE defensive lines chaotic and porous, while the deaths of volunteers and veterans among the LTTE are always positive bonuses. However, the logic of bleeding the Wanni's military age population by killing draftees doesn't seem to work unless the Sri lankan military abandons its hope to capture the Wanni by the end of 2008. In this line of thinking, no one seems to consider the Wanni's birth rate since, say, 1980. It is quite probable that the birth rate is greater than 10 births a day, which is the average number of LTTE soldiers killed each day. Assuming that this is not the case, whatever birth rate has been the case since the war began will be enough to keep the LTTE well stocked with conscripts for years. This is a race against the clock and the longer the SLA spends bleeding off draftees that can and are being easily replaced, the more likely it is that political, economic, or international factors will rescue the LTTE and keep this war going for many years to come.
This attrition is unlikely to be achieving its goal of depleting the LTTE's supply of war materials. If anything, the LTTE is slowly increasing their stocks over time. Shortly after the last big blockade runner had been sunk, they were dealing with material shortfalls that were seen in artillery rationing on their part, but that is long over and artillery duels are pretty common now. Using many smaller craft, the LTTE seems to be enjoying a constant influx of supplies from Tamil Nadu and since the SLA is not inclined to push a major offensive, the LTTE has been able to stockpile munitions, giving them an advantage they should never have had.
The reality of the price being paid by both sides, the high probability of improving LTTE supply stocks, the fact that the objectives that have been met by this attrition strategy were met a long time ago, and the uncertainty about the strategy's success in depleting the Wanni's manpower pool to any significant degree, leads to the conclusion that this strategy is no longer providing benefit to Sri Lanka and should be replaced or coupled with a more aggressive strategy to bring about real tangible progress in concluding this war.
A crtical benefit of a major offensive that attrition does not offer is that it will result in larger battles that will quickly change the strategic situation in the areas where they are fought. In a matter of a few short days, a major engagement can achieve more than months of raids and counter raids. An offensive, if executed with a level of competency expected from the greatly improved Sri Lankan military, will be able to strike the LTTE hard enough to significantly shorten the war.
The Wanni is not a single, massive, formation of bunkers and trenches and a problem faced by soldiers today is that even if they do capture a bunker line, by the time they are allowed to advance again, new fortifications have been built behind what was previously the Tiger's fall back line. New mine fields are also often planted. This crawling advance ensures that the LTTE will always be well dug in and will have prepared defensive positions to retreat to. A major offensive can break both the LTTE's primary and secondary Forward Defensive Lines, or FDLs, and force them to do one of three things, while eliminating the problem of prepared enemy positions. All three of these options would be major successes for Sri Lanka by themselves, but the potential results are even more valuable.
The Tigers can abandon the area, leaving only saboteurs, which while they are problematic, are better than hundreds of dug in Tigers with artillery. They can also decide to counter attack, which would be a gift from God for the SLA, allowing them to use their superior numbers and firepower to butcher the LTTE. The casualties suffered by the LTTE in such a counter attack would cripple their capacity to resist the SLA in the sector in contest, allowing for a rapid advance. Finally, the Tigers may choose to try and contain the breakthrough by standing and defending a suddenly difficult to define front line, from unprepared defenses, without artillery support, or at least with a reduced artillery capacity. Getting the LTTE to stand and fight from a disadvantage, whether they are defending against an SLA attack, or counter attacking, would allow the military to greatly reduce the Tiger population in the area of operations.
There is a general fear among the citizens of Sri Lanka that the LTTE will win a crucial victory if a major battle is fought. This is unlikely to occur, since the factors that allowed the LTTE to win battles in the past have greatly changed. An army that is afraid to fight is ultimately self-defeating and this war will not end without multiple major battles. The sooner these are fought, the sooner the war can be won. The superior numbers, technology, production capacity, and leadership of the Sri Lankan military means that the Tigers will not be able to win battles the way they did in the past. If the Sri Lankan military is truly committed to a battle, then they cannot be defeated. Fears of a repeat of the debacles of Elephant Pass and Mullativu are based on a misunderstanding of the LTTE's strength and fuel a fear of larger battles in the minds of Sri Lankan citizens. While they are a fierce enemy that can cause grievous injury to the military, it was the cutting of supply lines to the Elephant Pass Base and the Mullaitivu relief force that were the killing blows for these battles, not brute force. General Fonseka should concentrate his conservative strategic nature on securing supply lines once a major push is made, not in killing time in the meat grinder of trench warfare. The LTTE's desire to cut these lines, be they by land, or by sea as a result of an amphibious landing, could actually give Sri Lanka the major battle they need. Concentration of force and commitment by the SLA and SLN can turn this weak point into an opportunity to strike a major blow against the LTTE. With Fonseka's conservative style guiding the offensive, the LTTE would be hard pressed to cut off advancing troops for any significant period of time and so long as Sri Lanka maintains superior numbers and firepower, the Tigers will have no way to stop the SLA from marching anywhere in the Wanni.
This offensive must begin soon though because Sri Lanka's economy cannot sustain the war effort forever, while public opinion can easily turn against the government if clear progress is not made. Sri lanka's dependence on international support, or at least neutrality also limits the time they have to end this war. Concerns about the hardships suffered by civilians in this war may cause nations that supply the Sri Lankan military to end their support, which may very well ensure the LTTE's survival for years to come.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
![](https://pinterest.com/pin/create/button/?url=http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2008/05/logic-of-attrition-warfare-in-sri.html&media=https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_D-Bg9OkfhvB542FjWUUKUx99P-91k2J8C9YBFuBd0_-uU51JrYoxDlN67ux1Um6WjXCD72do16SNuLQSO8ZFo2PvrbVlkkGVAzNQWbQQ1B01Mwf4U2-Uc3qR_-q8-ffsoKq4LCdS1oSY/s72-c/untitled.bmp&description="The Wanni is not a single, massive, formation of bunkers and trenches and a problem faced by soldiers today is that even if they do ca...){kind=link}
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