(May 13, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) There is something inexplicable in India’s interface with China that seems to keep us on tenterhooks all the time. Let us look at this new base at Hainan. Such complexes, even much smaller ones, are not built in a day; to build them in secrecy is impossible. The fact that the Chinese were doing this at Hainan has been known for some time so it is not something that has come as a bolt from the blue.
Since the Chinese are the hare and we the tortoise, their work has been done very much faster but when our own new base at Karwar is fully done, its facilities will not be far short of those at Hainan. As for submarine berths constructed in sheltered pens, the Germans were doing this as far back as during the days of World War II.
Similarly, the facility may be closer to the Bay of Bengal than other Chinese naval bases but their nuclear submarines do no need to come to our waters to target cities in India. They can hit every single Indian town, sitting just where they are. And, if they want to deploy in our waters they can do so quite easily from other bases as well.
The more important thing is that Hainan is part of the rapid modernisation of the Chinese Navy and that is the totality we must focus on.
At present, India is the most credible regional maritime power in the Indian Ocean (IO) littoral. The Americans, including their embedded and supporting allies are, of course, here too and in quite large numbers, but the local big player at sea is India. In the emerging security environment in which attention has shifted from Europe to Asia, the Indian Ocean has become a very important theatre.
First, most of the so-called trouble or troubled spots are here, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, to name a few. Second, energy has become a very important resource for everyone. As its consumption grows, and India and China will be the main growth countries, there will be a degree of uncertainty and concern as resources will not grow in conformity with the need.
Nearly half of this energy is located in the IO littoral, almost all of it in the Gulf region. Even more important, much of this oil and gas has to be moved in ships through the shipping lanes of this region which pass through very narrow choke points both in the East viz the Straits of Malacca and the West, Gulf of Aden.
Even miscreants with limited capabilities can interdict such traffic to the serious detriment of global commerce. Then, there is the threat from radical and fundamental terrorism. Much of it is spread across the IO belt. Possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of one or more of these groups can not be ruled out. In short, almost all global security concerns are presently focused in the IO region and this position is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
India is located right in the middle of the IO and sitting astride the main shipping routes. It is not only directly affected by the littoral security scenario but also in a position to play an important role. Since the sea is a major component of the concerns, power at sea is a consequent necessity. If we have it, we will be better able to secure our interests; conversely, without it, these will lie exposed.
It is for these reasons that India’s maritime power needs to be credible. As a corollary, it will add to the country’s total power in dealing with issues arising in the region. India must, therefore, do everything to create capabilities which will add to its stature as the preeminent regional maritime power. Completing the nuclear Triad by putting weapons in submarines, is an essential part of this process.
This is where China comes in. Its energy lifeline coming from the Gulf or from Africa must traverse the waters of IO and then the narrow and vulnerable waters of South East Asia before entering the South China Sea. It has no maritime capabilities in the region. It can, of course, send its ships off and on but this can only be cosmetic, not the same thing as having a permanent presence.
That can only be ensured through base facilities offered by countries so disposed. It is for this reason that China has given generous assistance to build ports across the IO region, in Myanmar, in Sri Lanka and in Pakistan. Approaches have also been made in Seychelles and in the Maldives.
This is sometimes referred to as the “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India but the real effect would be to get the Chinese into the IO as a player. This will, inevitably, have an adverse impact on the credibility of Indian maritime power as the dominant regional force. So, our strategy should be to ensure that this does not happen, both through diplomacy and by adding to our own capabilities. This is the core issue, not the base in Hainan.
Two decades from now, India, barring some unimaginable eventuality, is certain to emerge as one of the great Asian players. It will have to have increasing interface with other players, most importantly, with China. We can not afford not to engage with it; at the same time, a competitive relationship, often adversarial, in politics, in economic interfaces and in the energy sector is inescapable.
Add to this brew, the unresolved and festering border dispute, which the Chinese are content to leave in limbo, and the picture becomes clear. As we deal with that country, India must have adequate power of its own with several synergized components e.g. diplomacy through networking with others, economic strength through steady and inclusive growth, technological upgradation with indigenous and bought out mechanisms where the first is not possible, energy and food security, internal stability and societal coherence, soft power and, last but not the least, military capabilities.
As China seeks its own place in the sun striving to equal the USA, it needs two or three decades of peace and tranquility. We must use this same period to get our own act together. In everything that we do in regard to the relationship with China, our eyes must be set on the future, not on the present. As the Mad Hatter said to Alice at the crossroads, you will know which road to take if you know where you want to go.
The writer is a former Director General Defence Planning Staff.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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