“According to the Pali Canon, the Buddha remained quiet about the metaphysics of the self. Therefore, to interpret the anatta doctrine as an ontological assertion would be unjustified. In fact, I argue that it is not only unjustified, but also nonsensical and incompatible with many other Buddhist teachings.”_______________________
by Hane Htut Maung
(May 18, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) Among the most poorly understood of the Buddhist teachings is the anatta doctrine, often translated, perhaps misguidedly, as ‘no-self’. There are several reasons why this doctrine causes so much difficulty. Firstly, discourses in the Pali Canon, the earliest records of the Buddha’s teachings, show the Buddha to have been vague about what this doctrine actually asserts, and so there is much uncertainty about how it should be interpreted.
Secondly, the interpretation of this doctrine as the metaphysical assertion that there is no self appears nonsensical and incompatible with many other Buddhist teachings. Thirdly, the interpretation of this doctrine, not as a metaphysical assertion, but as a practical strategy to free oneself from attachment, appears to be in conflict with the emphasis that is placed on the ego in Western psychology. In this essay, I aim to confront some of these issues. I shall defend the view, as put forward by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that the Buddha taught the anatta doctrine as a practical strategy, rather than as a metaphysical assertion, and that it ought to be translated as ‘not-self’, rather than ‘no-self’. Furthermore, I shall give my arguments against the interpretation of this doctrine as a metaphysical assertion, and propose, in line with Dr Edmond Holmes, that the belief in the self is, in fact, justified in Buddhism.
As I have mentioned, there is much uncertainty about how the doctrine of anatta should be interpreted. This owes itself to the fact that the Pali Canon itself does not address how it ought to be interpreted. In fact, it is significant that when asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer whether there is a self, the Buddha refused to answer. Despite this, many writers, including the Orientalist Dr Rhys Davids, have treated the anatta doctrine as a metaphysical assertion that there is no such thing as the self, but I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. Rather, I follow the view, as proposed by Thanissaro Bhikkhu in his article, “No-self or Not-self?” (1996), that the anatta doctrine is no more than a practical strategy to free oneself from attachment.
When asked by the Venerable Ânanda why he did not answer Vacchagotta’s question, the Buddha stated that answering such a metaphysical query would not be conducive to Vacchagotta’s quest for liberation. Perhaps the Buddha thought that Vacchagotta’s spiritual immaturity would lead him to misinterpret the answer in a way that would bring him further attachment. After all, the Buddha emphasised that one must not blindly believe the words of another to be fact, but should experience the phenomena oneself to discover what is fact. Dr Edmond Holmes likens this attitude to that of Socrates in Plato’s Phædo, when he takes the view that the soul is immortal, but emphasises that one must realise this oneself, instead of accepting the words blindly. It is apparent, from the plain fact that he was asking the Buddha such a naïve question, that Vacchagotta himself had not discovered the nature of the self, and so, seeing this, the Buddha refused to give an answer. He later explained to the Venerable Ânanda that giving an answer to his question would only bring Vacchagotta confusion, since his naïve mind would misunderstand the answer, and this, in turn, would have adverse effects on his struggle for liberation.
In contrast, when asked by Mogharaja how one must view the world if one is to go beyond death, the Buddha does not hesitate to answer. He tells Mogharaja that one must not identify oneself with or be attached to phenomena that are not self. Here, the Buddha is not making an ontological assertion, but is teaching a technique of perception aimed at liberating oneself from the attachment to conditioned phenomena, by learning that they are not self. The fact that the Buddha gave a very clear answer to Mogharaja’s practical question but refused to answer Vacchagotta’s metaphysical question suggests that the anatta doctrine is not an ontological assertion, but a practical strategy for the attainment of liberation.
According to the Pali Canon, the Buddha remained quiet about the metaphysics of the self. Therefore, to interpret the anatta doctrine as an ontological assertion would be unjustified. In fact, I argue that it is not only unjustified, but also nonsensical and incompatible with many other Buddhist teachings. For example, Thanissaro Bhikkhu notes that the denial of the self is incompatible with the doctrine of rebirth: what is it that experiences rebirth? By the same token, I argue that the denial of the self is incompatible with the doctrine of nibbana: what is it that realises nibbana? Furthermore, Thanissaro Bhikkhu argues that to deny the self is to devalue the purpose of a spiritual life altogether: in the struggle for liberation, what is it that is being liberated?
It has often been said that a personality is made up of several impermanent khandhas, and that these are ever-changing in a perpetual state of flux. This idea is not unique to Buddhism, but has also been expressed in Western philosophy. For example, Richard Swinburne (1984) notes that one’s body is in a continual state of material flux, for cells inevitably die and are continually replaced by new ones. David Hume, in his Treatise of Human Nature, notes that one’s mental state is no more than a bundle of different perceptions that are always changing. Hence, it has been argued that a person at one point in time is neither exactly the same nor completely different from what the person was at another point in time, regardless of whether these two points in time are both in the same life or each in different lives. Some have interpreted this idea as removing the need for a self in the Buddhist metaphysical picture, and have attempted to explain rebirth along these lines, but I argue that this proposal is flawed. I do not dispute that one’s personality is made up of several factors that are in a perpetual state of flux. After all, the physical matter of one’s body is always being lost and replaced, and one’s mental state is always changing. However, there is the question of what is subjectively experiencing this physical body and these mental contents. What is experiencing the rebirth? This question becomes even more necessary when one’s physical body and mental contents are no longer present, namely in nibbana. If the impermanent factors that constitute a personality no longer subsist, what is left to experience nibbana?
Some have also claimed that the concept of the self is an illusion, but I argue that this, too, is fallacious. Again, one may ask: what experiences the illusion? Some readers may bring to mind Descartes, who argued in his Meditations that one can doubt the reality of the external world on the grounds that it may be no more than an illusion, but one cannot possibly doubt one’s own existence as a thinking being, for the fact that one is doubting inevitably implies that one exists. Indeed, it is conceivable that the phenomena that manifest in one’s experience are illusions, but to dismiss the self as an illusion is senseless, for a subjective self is what is needed to experience the illusion.
What is made apparent by these issues is that for phenomena to be realised, it is implied that they are realised in some kind of existence. This, I argue, is what the self is: the unconditioned subjective existence by which phenomena are experienced, or, in other words, consciousness. In line with an earlier work by the author (Maung, 2006), I argue that this is what Hume’s bundle of perceptions, the experience of the body’s material flux, and the experience of nibbana exist in. I have hoped to show, in this section, that the denial of the self is metaphysically fallacious. Furthermore, I argue that its incompatibility with other Buddhist teachings not only emphasises the interpretation of the anatta doctrine only as a practical strategy, but also justifies the belief in the self in Buddhism.
In fact, there may be more to justify the belief in the self in Buddhism. Although the Buddha refused to answer Vacchagotta’s question about the self, Dr Edmond Holmes, in The Creed of Buddha, proposes that it can be inferred, from his silence, that the Buddha knew that the self exists. Holmes’ reasons for why the Buddha remained silent are the same as mine: Vacchagotta was spiritually immature and had not fully grasped the concept of the self, and so he would have misinterpreted the answer if the Buddha had told him that there is a self, and become bewildered as a consequence. Furthermore, Holmes argues that if the Buddha had not believed in the self, he would have answered Vacchagotta’s question uncompromisingly and without hesitation, for the materialistic implications of such an answer are simple to interpret, but the fact that the Buddha did not answer the question shows that this could not be the case. Holmes argues, therefore, that the Buddha’s silence was an indicator that he believed in the self and considered its transcendental nature to be beyond the comprehension of Vacchagotta’s naïve mind at that stage in his spiritual development.
It is also significant that a tenet of Northern Buddhism, which is said to be the teaching given by the Buddha to his arahants, is that of the existence of an unconditioned self, or Tathagatagarbha, within all beings, which is fundamentally eternal. Furthermore, it is taught that the rejection of the Tathagatagarbha doctrine is metaphysically wrong, and linked to adverse kammic consequences. This, again, validates the belief in the self in Buddhism, and suggests that the anatta doctrine is only a practical strategy to achieve liberation.
In conclusion, it appears that Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s proposal that the anatta doctrine is not meant to be interpreted as a metaphysical assertion is entirely reasonable, for not only is the denial of the self metaphysically fallacious, but, as I have alluded to in the preceding paragraph, metaphysical assertions affirming the existence of the self are also present in Buddhism. Instead, I advocate the idea that the anatta doctrine is a practical strategy that involves letting go of one’s attachment to the conditioned khandhas, through realising that they are impermanent, and, therefore, not self. As the Buddha told Mogharaja, if one is to be liberated, one must not identify oneself with or be attached to phenomena that are not self. Under this view, it would be wrong to construe the self as something tangible, comprised of the conditioned khandhas, for these are mundane: the truth would be to identify the self as unconditioned, eternal, and irreducible, for this is the existence within which phenomena are realised.
REFERENCES
Bhikkhu T. (1993). “The Not-Self Strategy”. Insight, 1994.
Bhikkhu T. (1996). “No-Self or Not-Self?” in Bhikkhu T (1999), Noble Strategy: Essays on the Buddhist Path. Metta Forest Monastery.
Davids CAFR. (1912). Buddhism: A Study of the Buddhist Norm. London: Williams and Norgate.
Descartes R. (1641). Meditations.
Holmes E. (1908). The Creed of Buddha. New York: John Lane.
Hume D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature.
Maung HH. (2006). Consciousness: An Enquiry into the Nature of the Self. North Carolina: Lulu Press.
Plato. Phædo.
Shoemaker S, Swinburne R. (1984). Personal Identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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