“No government or an army can win a war by going against the basic principles of war. It is no use in winning a war when the country is in ruins as a result of war. It is as bad as losing the war. The strategy must be based on the national requirements and not only on the requirement of the major community or the major ethnic group. This nation comprises many ethnic groups, the Sinhalese being the largest. No strategy can be worked out to satisfy everyone equally. Some will gain. Some will lose.”_________________________________
by a Retired General
(April 04, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) In the past two decades in the war against Northern terrorists, successive governments have displayed very poor strategy, resulting protracted war and losing thousands of lives on both sides of the line. This exercise has caused the country irreparable loss in billions of rupees in expenditure in the maintenance of a very large security force. This also has strengthened the terrorists and built them up from a band of insurgents to a ferocious conventional force. One wonders whether any of these governments had the honest intention of defeating the LTTE and solving this national problem.
Let us look back at the strategy during the past 20 years. In the early eighties, when the terrorists were in their infancy, the government did not take the situation seriously thinking that it would offend our neighbouring big brother, from whose lap the insurgents were launching their campaign. Not only India supported and encouraged but also trained and financed them. Towards the end of the cold war, India although proclaimed Non-aligned, but very much aligned to Russia, had an imaginary fear of the Americans getting a foot-hold in Sri Lanka in order to destabilize India. Whether on, invitation or by force, India walked into the Sri Lankan scenario.
The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) landed in Sri Lanka by air and sea to keep peace. But the unexpected happened. They were compelled to fight the LTTE and ultimately made to eat the humble pie. They were unceremonially booted out. Had Sri Lanka stood firm and allowed the IPKF to continue their fight against the LTTE for a few more months, with the massive strength of the Indian Army and its colossal logistic backing, they could have easily wiped out the whole menace forever.
President Premadasa changed the strategy by becoming friendly with the LTTE. He not only backed the LTTE but gave a large assortment of arms and ammunition to them. Our Commanders did not have the guts to advise him not to do it, as arming the enemy is against all conventions of war. What he wanted was to come into power and remain in power even with the help of the enemy. Ultimately he had to sacrifice his own life, apart from putting the country into a chaotic situation. The LTTE took full advantage and destabilized the whole country.
This strategy had very bad repercussions among the security forces. When the government was friendly with the LTTE, they reduced expenditure on improvement and purchase of weaponry, training and recruitment of the security forces whilst the LTTE were strengthening themselves with the help of the government and their supporters abroad. The government policy makers decided on curtailment of expenditure. The Service Commanders did with one better and cut down more. Once again when the hostilities broke out, security forces and the Police were caught unaware and off balance. In such a state debacle after debacle followed for which no one was made accountable.
The present President too came into power with the genuine and firm determination of solving the national problem. Who fashioned the strategy for her? Her confidantes proclaimed themselves as experienced veterans of war. One such officer claimed and announced that the party won the election with a huge majority and using the same strategy he would win the war too. That was the beginning of the loss of war for the present government. He aligned the war strategy with the political agenda and went to the front attired in different uniforms made by the security forces chiefs for different occasions. He made a clown of himself; Together they ruined the service organisations, the chain of command and the dignity of the security forces.
The strategy to win the war must be fashioned on long term basis. It should not change even when the government or the ruling party changes. It is a continuous process.
If we have the correct strategy based on national requirements, probably our forces would not have been fighting at the same place to gain control of the same objective, a number of times as what happened in the Elephant Pass, Kilinochchi and Mankulam. A very good example is the Verugal-Vakarai area in Batticloa - Trincomalee border. The government often changed the strategy of laying emphasis on the stability of the Eastern Province. Due to this change, our security forces have fought the same battle a number of times gaining and losing control of Verugal-Vakarai thereby losing hundreds of precious lives of officers and men.
Once an area is liberated from the terrorist control by the security forces, they must move to uncleared areas leaving the civil authorities to rehabilitate and function the normal activities. This cannot be done unless the government is geared to do so. In Sri Lanka due to the absence of such rehabilitation mechanism, the security forces are compelled to engage themselves in rehabilitation which is not their task. Tying up security forces in rehabilitation is uneconomical and costly. Their task is to fight the terrorists in other uncleared areas. The rehabilitation activities will contribute in winning the people of the area, which is the key to the ultimate victory and the solution to the national problem.
No government or an army can win a war by going against the basic principles of war. It is no use in winning a war when the country is in ruins as a result of war. It is as bad as losing the war. The strategy must be based on the national requirements and not only on the requirement of the major community or the major ethnic group. This nation comprises many ethnic groups, the Sinhalese being the largest. No strategy can be worked out to satisfy everyone equally. Some will gain. Some will lose. At this situation, political interests come to influence the strategy. As I mentioned earlier, it should not be to the detriment of the nation. We have many experienced Generals in the Army.
They are capable of advising the politicians as to what should be the best strategy to win the war and bring peace to our nation provided the political authorities are prepared to listen without bulldozing their way. It is equally important that the Generals must think of the country and not only of themselves and repeating " Yes men" who remain in their positions doing nothing useful. Our politicians and top brass have wrong notions. Whenever there is a rare success in battle, they take it as winning the war. Winning a battle is certainly not winning the war. A case in point is the capture of Jaffna.
Winning the present war is not going to be confined to gaining control of the areas presently under the terrorist. The government must have a firm commitment to decide on the national priorities and crush the military strength of the LTTE first. Our security forces are quite capable and competent to do it . What they require is effective and dynamic leadership without political interference. Yes men are not the answer. The government through the security forces will have to win the hearts and minds of Tamils. Whilst doing so they must not lose the confidence of the major ethnic group, the Sinhalese. This is rather a tall order.
It is high time the people of this country realised that we cannot go on for ever, dragging this war, impoverishing the country and allowing it to fall into economic doldrums. Through the political leadership, all citizens must contribute towards winning the war by supporting the security forces positively.
All efforts of the security forces and the government agencies must be directed towards achieving this goal. Our war strategy must be worked out in order to accomplish this goal. Sometimes, those who are benefiting from the war directly or indirectly may be influencing not to work out such strategy. Those who are in power under this volatile situation may want to remain in power by allowing the struggle to continue. That is where even a good part of the people in the south are in affinity with the LTTE terrorists as their aim is the same.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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