The foregoing is only a small list from a long trail of blunders, bluff, intrigue, swindles and treachery while the surging war in the country is escalating and the military is fighting blindly without proper intelligence. The million-dollar question is, who is interested in a cheap substitute for this war?______________________
by Tassie Seneviratne
(April 07, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) "A good Intelligence Service is a cheap substitute for large scale war" wrote William Colby, former head of the FBI and CIA in his ‘Letter of the Century’.
The fact that the National Intelligence Bureau of Sri Lanka has been a total failure is clear enough to every one and it needs no further elaboration to stress on the obvious. It is also a futile exercise explaining the causes for its failure and suggesting meaningful steps to a moribund Defence set-up. But, since wake-up calls are being made to the people and ‘people power’ is the need of the hour, I would venture to expose to the people some basic blunders resulting in colossal losses to the country.
Let me first outline that among the duties of Police Officers as laid down in Sec. 56 of the Police Ordinance No.16 of 1865 is : "56 (e) to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace." Specializing in procuring intelligence is traditionally a function performed by the Special Branch of the Police, and that is how it was in Sri Lanka too prior to 1984. Police Officers by the very nature of their duties, frequently interact with society, which provides abundant opportunities to pick up information and cultivate informants for the purpose of procuring intelligence. Intelligence flows not only from ‘sources’ of information but also from investigations. The Police are specialists in this area and therefore should always be the first choice in any network to collect intelligence. De-politicization of the Police Service itself is of course a pre-requisite to regain its lost prestige.
Whatever was the thinking behind forming the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) under the control of the Defence Ministry, there could be no objection to it functioning on whatever lines it was required to function but without demolishing the Special Branch of the Police which was already in place. In 1984 however, the Special Branch which was functioning well was closed down and the Intelligence function taken away from the Police. The NIB functioning under the Defence Ministry, and out of the control of the Inspector General of Police, took over the Special Branch apparatus lock, stock and barrel and also its trained personnel.
The naivety of this move was proved as time went on. Even the trained Police personnel with all the apparatus taken from the Police, were like a first class cricket side with the best of cricketing gear trying to play cricket on a sea beach or at Haggala Gardens. Nor could J R Jayewardene, Lalith Athulathmudali, Merril Guneratne or Zernie Wijesuriya grab the bat of Sir Donald Bradman, Garfield Sobers, or Sanath Jayasuriya and expect to score runs at their level, leave alone scoring centuries.
As for procuring intelligence the Police Service is the appropriate ‘playing field’ and it is police powers and duties that enable one to ‘bat’ on. The only exception is the telephone tapping apparatus which does not require Police powers to operate, and was the only ‘source’ of intelligence left for the NIB. But very soon that too became an open secret and only served to harass political opponents and critics of the government, National Security taking a back seat. At this stage the NIB had to depend on Police reports from the District Intelligence Bureaux (DIBs) which continued to function within the Police Service and reported to the NIB. The DIBs for their part had to obtain information from the local police stations. The NIB soon became a rogue organization. NIB Officers started manipulating information obtained from the local Police through the DIBs, and showing them as obtained from their private sources and to obtain monies on the guise of maintaining these sources. Thus started a ‘carnival’ for NIB officers and Defence Ministry officials too were well looked after. In the course of time the NIB carnival began to reveal its true form and this was detrimental to the intelligence function of the Police in that Police officers lost interest in procuring intelligence.
The current expectations of the Ministry of Defence in regard to the NIB could be judged from a recent selection to head the NIB. He was so debased a person as to propose a ‘Legal Fund’ especially to help Police officers convicted by the Supreme Court for Fundamental Rights violations. A deputation to obtain Presidential approval to set up such a fund was led by the IGP and H.E. the President too had even pledged funds from the Presidents Fund to set up the Legal Fund. It is to the credit of a few right thinking Police officers that this Gestapo type of move was resisted.
By 1991 the need to resurrect the special branch within the Police was badly felt and President Premadasa approved its setting up within the Police Department but the required facilities were not forthcoming. In 1992 The Ministry of Defence instructed the IG Police to set up the Special Branch ‘very early’ with the resources available in the Department on the premise that additional requirements can be made available in the 1993 estimates. Came 1993, 1994 and then 1995, but not the requirements. In 1995, however, an attempt was made to see the Special Branch get off the ground with the available resources. A building was provided and hardly had some furniture been brought in, that the building was taken back for the occupation of a Cabinet Minister.
The newly formed Special Branch had to manage with makeshift arrangements scattered in several places where it was tolerated and moving from place to place like gypsies. A few senior Police Officers were released from the NIB to the Special Branch and the balance personnel available to the Special Branch were those dislodged from their positions for various reasons, in some cases, political.
Also in 1995 apart from setting up the Special Branch, Mr Frank de Silva, the Inspector General of Police, made a strong bid to re-institute the Intelligence function of the Police by his circular titled "A Strategic Direction of the Police Function of the Sri Lanka Police". But with the retirement of Mr Frank de Silva there was no follow up of the guidelines to the strategic objectives outlined therein.
With the formation of the Special Branch in 1995, the DIBs came back under the control of the Special Branch. Much enthusiasm was generated in the DIBs as well as in the Police Divisions, Districts, and Police Stations to feed their own Special Branch with information, mainly because their work was appreciated and recognized appropriately. With the control of the DIBs coming back to the Police, the NIB ‘sources’ ran dry and it had nothing to report. .
In the course of submitting intelligence reports, the Special Branch became privy to some shocking happenings. Certain intelligence reports though highly relevant to National Security were not welcome by the Ministry of Defence. It became apparent that, rather than plan its strategies on the intelligence available, the Ministry of Defence expected intelligence reports to be manipulated to suit political decisions already taken. The Special Branch, however, persisted tabling its intelligence reports without any dilution or adulteration. In September 1995 the newly formed Special Branch was closed down by an order from the Ministry of Defence and the DIBs reverted to the control of the NIB.
The foregoing is only a small list from a long trail of blunders, bluff, intrigue, swindles and treachery while the surging war in the country is escalating and the military is fighting blindly without proper intelligence. The million-dollar question is, who is interested in a cheap substitute for this war?—Certainly not the gun-dealers and other commission agents. But then who is calling the tune?
- Sri Lanka Guardian
Post a Comment