Need For Increased Alertness Against LTTE

"The LTTE is not yet a failed or a failing non-State actor. It still has considerable biting capacity. It still has a large supply of well-trained and well-motivated cadres. In the Northern Province where the battle lines have shifted, it has much greater local support than it had in the Eastern Province. Its morale, capacity for innovation and determination to continue fighting are intact."
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(March 13, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) An official statement issued by the headquarters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on March 11,2008 (text annexed) on the high-profile visit of Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka, the chief of the Sri Lankan army and the architect of the successful counter-terrorism operations by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, to India in the first week of March,2008, is an indicator of the desperation of the LTTE and its bitterness against the Government of India.

Its desperation arises from its loss of control of the territory administered by it in the Eastern Province during 2006 and 2007, its inability to counter effectively the successful air strikes by the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) against positions held by it in the Northern Province and the steady diminition in its operational capabilities due to the successful disruption of its capability for the replenishment of its stocks of arms and ammunition and explosives by the Sri Lankan Air Force and Navy, with the co-operation of the international community, including India, in the form of timely supply of valuable intelligence.

The LTTE is not yet a failed or a failing non-State actor. It still has considerable biting capacity. It still has a large supply of well-trained and well-motivated cadres. In the Northern Province where the battle lines have shifted, it has much greater local support than it had in the Eastern Province. Its morale, capacity for innovation and determination to continue fighting are intact. But in the absence of material replenishments, its capacity for offensive operations has been eroded and it has been forced to fight a defensive battle to save the territory still under its control. Till now, it has been doing well despite the claims to the contrary by the Sri Lankan defence spokesmen.

India's policy till now has been one of covert assistance to the Sri Lankan intelligence in improving its collection and assessment capabilities, sharing of intelligence collected by the much-better endowed Indian intelligence agencies, strengthening the defence capabilities of Sri Lanka in the matter of anti-aircraft equipment and facilitating the operations of the Sri Lankan Navy for disrupting the overseas supply channels of the LTTE.

Indian public opinion, including public opinion in Tamil Nadu, could not have objected to these measures for co-operation since they remained covert and not brazenly overt and since there was a well-defined Laxman Rekha (dividing line), which our Armed Forces and intelligence agencies were told not to cross. That Laxman Rekha related to co-operation between the two armies, which could have facilitated the Sri Lankan Army's ground operations against the LTTE in the Northern Province.

Independent analysts and reliable sources are agreed that the Sri Lankan Army's successes in the Eastern Province were achieved at a tremendous human cost, with large-scale violation of the human rights of the civilian population. Lt.Gen. Fonseka and Mr. Gothbaya Rajpaksa, the brother of President Mahinda Rajapksa, who is the Defence Secretary, are not models of rectitude in matters concerning respect for the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Sensing what they see as a historic victory in their fight against the LTTE, these two have been contemptuously dismissing all reports regarding the violation of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. There are some indications of Western re-thinking on their attitude to the Rajapaksa Government because of its brazen dismissal of all concerns regarding the human rights situation in the Tamil areas.

Senior officers of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces have been visiting India from time to time for discussions on Indian assistance and military-military relations. Even Gothbaya Rajapaksa has been visiting New Delhi periodically. But these visits were low profile and the Government of India took care not to create an impression of Indian lack of concern over the human rights situation. The high-profile visit of Fonseka and the kind of honours openly accorded to him indicated that the Laxman Rekha, which has so far characterised the co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries, is ceasing to exist and that there is probably a greater readiness----even eagerness--- on the part of the Indian Army to co-operate with the Sri Lankan Army in matters which might facilitate its ground operations against the LTTE in the Northern Province. This perception of a disappearing Laxman Rekha is not confined to the LTTE. It is palpable among large sections of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka and in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.

The desperation and the bitterness caused by this perception have triggered off the official statement of the LTTE. In a language reminiscent of the language which it was using withn regard to Indian policies before the shocking assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May,1991, it has charactetrised any possible change in the Indian policy as amounting to a new historical blunder and insinuated that the Government of India is putting itself in a position, which could be viewed as complicity in what it sees as the Sri Lankan Government's policy of genocide of the Tamils.

The LTTE, like other international terrorist organisations, follows a policy of coming out with comments, not amounting to official statements, which are disseminated by the media controlled by it and coming out with an official statement only in exceptional circumstances. The fact that the LTTE has now come out with an official statement on the co-operation between the two armies indicates that it might be considering the options available to it to counter this.

It is important to re-examine and revamp our intelligence and operational capabilities to neutralise any plan of the LTTE to mount another terrorist strike in Indian territory or against Indian nationals or interests. It would be unwise to dismiss its statement as a desperate outburst of no or only limited consequence.

In recent months, the Police in Tamil Nadu and Kerala have detected attempts by the LTTE to procure supplies and possibly ships also from India through locals. From the published reports, it would seem that many of the locals, who had helped the LTTE, did so for money and not out of sympathy for its cause. But the likely re-emergence of pockets of sympathy for the LTTE's cause is an ever-present danger.

Both the Governments of India and Sri Lanka want to neutralise the LTTE for different objectives. The Indian objective is to punish it for its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and to render it incapable of terrorism. The Sri Lankan objective is to crush it as a terrorist organisation and re-impose the will and interests of the Sinhalese majority over the Tamil minority. Despite all the sweet talk from President Rajapaksa and his officers and advisers, their policy towards the Tamils continues to be characterised by their desire for a dictated peace and their modus operandi of divide and rule.

India should not give an impression that there is a convergence of objectives between the two countries. The Laxman Rekha has served us well in the past and should serve us well in future.

(B.Raman, Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

ANNEXURE

TEXT OF LTTE'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 10,2008

- Sri Lanka Guardian