Powerful international forces — the US, EU, Japan and Norway, who are donors and co-chairs of the peace process — have failed to resuscitate the negotiations, leaving the ceasefire in tatters. Martin McGuinnis of the Sinn Fein who has publicly hailed the GFA as one of the most successful peace processes in the world was in Sri Lanka condemning the EU ban of the LTTE. It is only now that India has perked up and is more visibly involved. Without India the peace process will go nowhere. ______________________________
We can learn from Irish experience
___________________________
by Major-Gen Ashok Mehta (retd)
(February 03, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) In 2006 I was in Dublin and Belfast, Northern Ireland in the UK to study how a successful peace process there compares with peace processes in India’s neighbourhood. Though there is no one template, common to any peace process is the realisation by all sides that there cannot be a military solution and the importance of mature leadership for making compromises. Patience, a sense of humour and patience are indispensable virtues. In the sequencing of a perfect peace process, are a ceasefire, negotiations, political agreement and implementation.
Borders between North and South in Ireland have become irrelevant. No papers are required for travel between Dublin and Belfast. In the heart of Belfast, Europa where the key makers of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) stayed, is the most bombed hotel anywhere in the world.
The GFA of 1998 was the outcome of years of hardnosed negotiations between the governments of the UK and Ireland and political parties representing the warring factions in Northern Ireland. It followed the best practices of conflict resolution: powersharing in Northern Ireland, North-South linkages and an Anglo-Irish resolve. The roles of civil society, business community, Irish Americans, US and EU in shaping the GFA were crucial. The impetus to the political process came in 1993 from a British declaration that they had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”. Both UK and Ireland set aside political claims.
While holding their strategic differences, the Nationalists (who want a united Ireland) and Unionists (who want it to remain in the UK) chose to let the political process and the consent of the people take over. Last year, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) made a historic declaration: “Ours is not a ceasefire but the end of armed conflict”.
The predominant view is that the peace process is at such an advanced stage that the IRA will not risk its political future to return to violence. There can be no political change in Northern Ireland — Union with Ireland versus status quo — without the consent of the people. What the contending parties have accepted without prejudice to their political goals is an interim and not a final solution that they are willing to pursue along a democratic electoral path.
The key lesson of the GFA is that the international community has to remain involved in its implementation process and that even if the political process breaks down the peace process remains intact.
What other lessons can be culled from the Northern Ireland experience relevant to our neighbourhood ? Paramount is the need for ending violence and making the peace process irreversible. The spoilers have to be neutralised, ideally taken on board. A full and final solution emerges only incrementally. External facilitation and cooperation between countries directly involved or affected by conflict is essential for the progress of the peace process.
With differences though, the most tempting comparison with the GFA in process and content is J&K. Both are partition-related conflicts and have to do with consent of the people. There are three linkages — India and Pakistan; PoK with Pakistan and J&K with India; and in the future, J&K with PoK and Northern Areas, making borders irrelevant. As there is no comprehensive ceasefire and end to armed conflict by Pakistan and its paramilitary proxies, violence goes on. There is nothing comparable to a GFA which postpones the final settlement to the future without prejudice to beliefs hopes and differences.
Pakistan holds the peace process hostage to a final settlement on Kashmir. On the other hand, an interim political package linked to a full and final solution to J&K could lead to a decommissioning of armed groups and their reintegration with Indian and Pakistan armies. The India-Pakistan normalisation process has very little peace and is even less of a process with terrorists calling the shots. Without external facilitation the peace process will merely meander.
The Nepal story is unique. The peace process which led into the political process is in two phases. The first phase of converting a tripolar conflict into bipolar is all but over. The King has been marginalised. The New Delhi Agreement (NDA) between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists in November 2005 facilitated by India established the framework for an interim political settlement — holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly. It was hammered out to end autocratic monarchy and restore multiparty democracy even before the end of the King’s direct rule was in sight.
A roadmap towards a ceasefire, modalities for holding elections, management of arms and armies and role of third party was in place before the SPA and Maoists launched their peaceful protests which erupted into a spontaneous popular uprising. The speed with which the road map is being implemented has surprised everyone. Unlike the GFA there was no George Mitchell or Bill Clinton to push the NDA.
The Maoists have already secured major political victories — removal of terrorist tag and red corner notice and release of most of the prisoners. The IRA has not been taken off the terrorist list by both UK and Ireland though the US has. Three of the Maoist key demands have already been met — placing the army under civilian control, dismantling monarchy and elections to a Constituent Assembly.
Further, the PLA who are “qualified and capable” will be merged with the new Nepal Army. Far from being a failed state, Nepal’s success in peacemaking will be remembered as an accident of history.
By releasing the political prisoners the Nepalese government has lost the only leverage it has with the Maoists. But it is only the beginning of the peace process. The government has committed a second mistake — demoralising the security forces. India must hang on to Maoist prisoners as leverage on Nepal’s behalf.
In Sri Lanka, a perfectly sound peace process was wrecked by the cussedness of competitive domestic politics. For the first time, the elusive LTTE supremo Prabhakaran signed any agreement — a ceasefire. It held for four years but the political process had broken down owing to lack of a Sinhala consensus. Powerful international forces — the US, EU, Japan and Norway, who are donors and co-chairs of the peace process — have failed to resuscitate the negotiations, leaving the ceasefire in tatters. Martin McGuinnis of the Sinn Fein who has publicly hailed the GFA as one of the most successful peace processes in the world was in Sri Lanka condemning the EU ban of the LTTE. It is only now that India has perked up and is more visibly involved. Without India the peace process will go nowhere.
Bangladesh is sorely in need of an internal peace process to prevent it from being Talibanised. India helped establish a secular Bangladesh but erred in pulling out of the country too soon instead of helping rebuild the state. Political and diplomatic advantage arising from the military victory in 1971 were squandered both in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The GFA in comparison to the peace processes in our region is certainly a clincher.
(Maj. Gen Ashok K Mehta was commissioned in the 5th Gorkha Rifles in 1957. He took part in all the military operations undertaken by India except the 1947 war in Jammu and Kashmir and the 1962 China war when he was on a peacekeeping mission in Congo (Zaire) in 1962. He did courses at Fort Leavenworth (US) in 1975 and the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK in 1974. He is a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff, of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His last assignment was General Officer Commanding, Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) South, in Sri Lanka.)
by Major-Gen Ashok Mehta (retd)
(February 03, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) In 2006 I was in Dublin and Belfast, Northern Ireland in the UK to study how a successful peace process there compares with peace processes in India’s neighbourhood. Though there is no one template, common to any peace process is the realisation by all sides that there cannot be a military solution and the importance of mature leadership for making compromises. Patience, a sense of humour and patience are indispensable virtues. In the sequencing of a perfect peace process, are a ceasefire, negotiations, political agreement and implementation.
Borders between North and South in Ireland have become irrelevant. No papers are required for travel between Dublin and Belfast. In the heart of Belfast, Europa where the key makers of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) stayed, is the most bombed hotel anywhere in the world.
The GFA of 1998 was the outcome of years of hardnosed negotiations between the governments of the UK and Ireland and political parties representing the warring factions in Northern Ireland. It followed the best practices of conflict resolution: powersharing in Northern Ireland, North-South linkages and an Anglo-Irish resolve. The roles of civil society, business community, Irish Americans, US and EU in shaping the GFA were crucial. The impetus to the political process came in 1993 from a British declaration that they had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”. Both UK and Ireland set aside political claims.
While holding their strategic differences, the Nationalists (who want a united Ireland) and Unionists (who want it to remain in the UK) chose to let the political process and the consent of the people take over. Last year, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) made a historic declaration: “Ours is not a ceasefire but the end of armed conflict”.
The predominant view is that the peace process is at such an advanced stage that the IRA will not risk its political future to return to violence. There can be no political change in Northern Ireland — Union with Ireland versus status quo — without the consent of the people. What the contending parties have accepted without prejudice to their political goals is an interim and not a final solution that they are willing to pursue along a democratic electoral path.
The key lesson of the GFA is that the international community has to remain involved in its implementation process and that even if the political process breaks down the peace process remains intact.
What other lessons can be culled from the Northern Ireland experience relevant to our neighbourhood ? Paramount is the need for ending violence and making the peace process irreversible. The spoilers have to be neutralised, ideally taken on board. A full and final solution emerges only incrementally. External facilitation and cooperation between countries directly involved or affected by conflict is essential for the progress of the peace process.
With differences though, the most tempting comparison with the GFA in process and content is J&K. Both are partition-related conflicts and have to do with consent of the people. There are three linkages — India and Pakistan; PoK with Pakistan and J&K with India; and in the future, J&K with PoK and Northern Areas, making borders irrelevant. As there is no comprehensive ceasefire and end to armed conflict by Pakistan and its paramilitary proxies, violence goes on. There is nothing comparable to a GFA which postpones the final settlement to the future without prejudice to beliefs hopes and differences.
Pakistan holds the peace process hostage to a final settlement on Kashmir. On the other hand, an interim political package linked to a full and final solution to J&K could lead to a decommissioning of armed groups and their reintegration with Indian and Pakistan armies. The India-Pakistan normalisation process has very little peace and is even less of a process with terrorists calling the shots. Without external facilitation the peace process will merely meander.
The Nepal story is unique. The peace process which led into the political process is in two phases. The first phase of converting a tripolar conflict into bipolar is all but over. The King has been marginalised. The New Delhi Agreement (NDA) between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists in November 2005 facilitated by India established the framework for an interim political settlement — holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly. It was hammered out to end autocratic monarchy and restore multiparty democracy even before the end of the King’s direct rule was in sight.
A roadmap towards a ceasefire, modalities for holding elections, management of arms and armies and role of third party was in place before the SPA and Maoists launched their peaceful protests which erupted into a spontaneous popular uprising. The speed with which the road map is being implemented has surprised everyone. Unlike the GFA there was no George Mitchell or Bill Clinton to push the NDA.
The Maoists have already secured major political victories — removal of terrorist tag and red corner notice and release of most of the prisoners. The IRA has not been taken off the terrorist list by both UK and Ireland though the US has. Three of the Maoist key demands have already been met — placing the army under civilian control, dismantling monarchy and elections to a Constituent Assembly.
Further, the PLA who are “qualified and capable” will be merged with the new Nepal Army. Far from being a failed state, Nepal’s success in peacemaking will be remembered as an accident of history.
By releasing the political prisoners the Nepalese government has lost the only leverage it has with the Maoists. But it is only the beginning of the peace process. The government has committed a second mistake — demoralising the security forces. India must hang on to Maoist prisoners as leverage on Nepal’s behalf.
In Sri Lanka, a perfectly sound peace process was wrecked by the cussedness of competitive domestic politics. For the first time, the elusive LTTE supremo Prabhakaran signed any agreement — a ceasefire. It held for four years but the political process had broken down owing to lack of a Sinhala consensus. Powerful international forces — the US, EU, Japan and Norway, who are donors and co-chairs of the peace process — have failed to resuscitate the negotiations, leaving the ceasefire in tatters. Martin McGuinnis of the Sinn Fein who has publicly hailed the GFA as one of the most successful peace processes in the world was in Sri Lanka condemning the EU ban of the LTTE. It is only now that India has perked up and is more visibly involved. Without India the peace process will go nowhere.
Bangladesh is sorely in need of an internal peace process to prevent it from being Talibanised. India helped establish a secular Bangladesh but erred in pulling out of the country too soon instead of helping rebuild the state. Political and diplomatic advantage arising from the military victory in 1971 were squandered both in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The GFA in comparison to the peace processes in our region is certainly a clincher.
(Maj. Gen Ashok K Mehta was commissioned in the 5th Gorkha Rifles in 1957. He took part in all the military operations undertaken by India except the 1947 war in Jammu and Kashmir and the 1962 China war when he was on a peacekeeping mission in Congo (Zaire) in 1962. He did courses at Fort Leavenworth (US) in 1975 and the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK in 1974. He is a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff, of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His last assignment was General Officer Commanding, Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) South, in Sri Lanka.)
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