Sri Lanka: Three players and three strategic errors

"The 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution which was the outcome of the ISLA and is still in vogue, led to a devolution package, the temporary merger of the North and the East into the North East Provincial Council (NEPC) and an elected provincial government located at Trincomalee."
_________________________________

by Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)

(January 30, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) in 1987 was the culmination of a tripartite political process between India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers in finding a resolution to the ethnic conflict rooted in the conflicting demand of Tamil statehood and Sinhalese nationhood.

1983, the watershed year, was marked by anti-Tamil riots and 300,000 refugees fleeing to Tamil Nadu. This kick-started a series of political dialogues in Thimpu, Delhi, Bangalore and Colombo. High drama and anti-accord riots in the South of Sri Lanka accompanied the signing of the ISLA. President Jayewardene requested for the IPKF — of which he was to become the Supreme Commander — which was also to help in implementing the accord.

The 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution which was the outcome of the ISLA and is still in vogue, led to a devolution package, the temporary merger of the North and the East into the North East Provincial Council (NEPC) and an elected provincial government located at Trincomalee. Both the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan Government (SLG) reneged on the accord and a change of government in Delhi — Prime Minister V.P. Singh replaced Rajiv Gandhi — scuttled the accord resulting in the withdrawal of the IPKF before it could complete its mission.

By the time the IPKF returned in March 1990, it was being called the Indian Tamil Killing Force and its welcome ceremony in Chennai was boycotted by Tamil Nadu leaders. As Prime Minister V.P. Singh was advised not to join the ceremony, a token IPKF was flown to Delhi to enable the Prime Minister to meet the contingent.

The ISLA has been called a failure of India’s coercive diplomacy and various reasons are attributed to the great haste with which the accord was signed and an advance contingent of IPKF sent to Jaffna. The Bofors scandal was certainly one reason linked to the ISLA.

In his book, Assignment Colombo, J.N. Dixit, a key architect of the accord, says Rajiv Gandhi was guided by the advice of MEA, Army and Intelligence. The advice given to him was obviously flawed. R&AW chief Anand Verma underestimated the capabilities and motives of the LTTE and kept referring to them as “Our Boys”. Army Chief General Sundarji told Gandhi the Army would disarm LTTE within three weeks if required.

A new book, Intervention in Sri Lanka: IPKF Experience Retold by Maj-Gen Harkirat Singh who was the first senior commander to reach Jaffna has criticised J.N. Dixit, R&AW and the Army Chief. He says his formation went to Sri Lanka with a tourist map and that Prabhakaran made a commitment to him in writing that he would surrender all his weapons. This must have been the first document that Prabhakaran signed. And the rest is history.

It is instructive to recall the reasons for signing the ISLA. The SLG pursuit of a military solution against the LTTE through Operation Liberation in Vadamarachchi in early 1987 had cornered Prabhakaran. It was Delhi’s breadbombing that halted military operations and brought the warring sides back to the negotiating table. Pressure from Tamil Nadu was instrumental in India’s intervention.

The purpose of ISLA was to give the Tamils a devolution package. Although not at par with what was expected, the political power sharing arrangement was about the best offered to the Tamils so far. It recognised the NEPC as the historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people. The merged NEPC had an elected council, a Governor and a first ever Chief Minister, Varadarajah Perumal.

This happened when it became clear that the LTTE was not going to join the political mainstream and fight elections. The devolution of power was incomplete as Indian political and diplomatic efforts got diverted by President Premadasa’s ultimatum to the IPKF to leave Sri Lanka.

The IPKF has a substantial record of achievements. It prevented the breakup of Sri Lanka by thwarting the LTTE design of secession and militarily weakened it. This left the SLA free to deal with the JVP. The IPKF helped organise provincial and presidential elections, assist in the implementation of ISLA to the extent feasible, restore democratic institutions and processes in the North East and helped rebuild the province with its limited resources.

The After Action Report of the IPKF like the Henderson Brooks Report is under wraps. It would be a fitting tribute to the unjustly maligned and forgotten soldiers to declassify the report so that military, diplomatic and political lessons can be learnt by all. It was patently unfair to transfer the onus of blame to the IPKF.

Unfortunately, the ISLA was doomed to failure once there was a change of government in India and a new President in Sri Lanka, both opposed to ISLA. The accord itself was flawed as LTTE was not part of it. President Premadasa’s secret agreement with LTTE to get IPKF out of Sri Lanka was the last nail in the coffin. The ISLA provided the framework for a political settlement of the ethnic problem but Sri Lanka chose to negate it and has now rolled back the concept of a Tamil homeland through the demerger. What President Mahinda Rajapakse is doing in Sri Lanka is the complete reversal of ISLA and pursuit of a military solution in the North as he has in the East. Will India, the self-proclaimed Big Power in the region watch the war in the North as a silent spectator or intervene as it did in 1987 to prevent the decimation of the Tamil cause?

The IPKF will be remembered for maintaining the unity of Sri Lanka. As many as 1200 Indian soldiers laid down their lives doing so. Unfortunately, they are a forgotten force but Sri Lankans lament the premature return of the IPKF and keep promising to build a memorial to IPKF in Colombo.

History will remember the three strategic errors committed by the three players involved in the still unsolved ethnic conflict. India, for arming the LTTE; LTTE for killing Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka for returning the IPKF.