“The LTTE is suffering from serious international isolation. India and western governments have arrested several of its fundraisers and key operatives over the past year. Colombo is convinced that the international community will not go beyond expressing regret over its decision to call off the ceasefire.”______________________________________
by Sudha Ramachandran
(January 28, Mumbai, Sri Lanka Guardian) No longer bound by the constraints of a ceasefire agreement or truce monitors, the Sri Lankan government is preparing to launch an all-out war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the coming weeks.
Over the past two years, both the government and the LTTE have repeatedly violated the truce. While the government brazenly resorted to aerial bombing of Tamil areas and grabbed territory designated under the ceasefire agreement as Tiger territory, the LTTE carried out suicide attacks, often killing civilians.
During the ‘ceasefire period’ the government described its military offensives as defensive. It will not feel the need to extend such explanations any longer.
A series of recent military gains seem to have emboldened the armed forces into believing that a military solution to the conflict is within reach. Army chief General Sarath Fonseka has in fact predicted the “end” of the LTTE this year.
On the face of it, the advantage lies with Colombo. In terms of military hardware and international support, it appears to have the upper hand. Pakistan and China have been generous in their military assistance to Colombo with lethal weaponry. India and the US have provided Lanka with radars, intelligence and surveillance support.
The LTTE is suffering from serious international isolation. India and western governments have arrested several of its fundraisers and key operatives over the past year. Colombo is convinced that the international community will not go beyond expressing regret over its decision to call off the ceasefire.
With the west reoccupied with its ‘war on terror’ and India dithering in its response to the Lankan conflict, Colombo believes it will be able to wage the war unfettered by humanitarian concerns.
But the Lankan government might have overestimated its advantages in Eelam War IV. The LTTE has been severely weakened over the past year and has lost control over the east. Still its capacity to fight back must not be under-estimated.
It has the capability to defend territory in the north and fight unconventional battles in the east. The Lankan army’s advance into Tiger territory in the north will come only at a very heavy cost.
The resulting massive humanitarian crisis in the Tamil areas could result in Lanka’s donors pressuring Colombo by turning off economic aid. Japan, Sri Lanka’s largest aid donor, has already hinted a cutback if violence goes up.
An escalation in the war in the north will trigger an exodus of refugees to India. While India’s response will not involve support to the LTTE, it could apply pressure by cutting back on intelligence and surveillance support.
These are critical inputs that the Lankan forces are dependent on and something their friends in Pakistan cannot provide.
The LTTE may avoid hitting India’s sizeable economic interests in the island but could focus on Pakistan’s interests. It could target hotels, the airport and business centres. Tourism is Sri Lanka’s fourth largest foreign exchange earner.
According to official figures, tourist arrivals fell by 20 per cent in 2007 and that was during the ‘ceasefire’ agreement. However flawed the ceasefire might have been, it brought a semblance of peace to the island and boosted economic growth. The north and east witnessed spectacular growth rates.
The GDP in the east, which bore the brunt of decades of fighting, soared from 4.6 per cent pre-ceasefire to over 10 per cent during the five years of truce.
The ceasefire drew foreign investors back to the island and the cost of doing business with Sri Lanka fell, partly because risk insurance dipped. The Colombo stock market boomed. Infrastructure development and real estate witnessed phenomenal growth. Tourism did well till 2006, with foreign companies moving in to develop the hitherto unexplored beaches in the east. Economic optimism which marked the ceasefire
period has now evaporated.
As the much-hoped for quick victory over the LTTE fails to materialise, Colombo will find itself bogged down militarily in the north and under pressure from the Sinhalese public in the south. Sections among the Sinhalese — the Buddhist monks and Sinhalese hardliners — might be supporting and egging on President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military option today but much of the support will dry up as the economy is increasingly hit hard.
The past two decades of fighting has clearly established that a military solution is not possible. If the past is any indication, the island is in for a long war.
( The writer is a commentator on political affairs)
by Sudha Ramachandran
(January 28, Mumbai, Sri Lanka Guardian) No longer bound by the constraints of a ceasefire agreement or truce monitors, the Sri Lankan government is preparing to launch an all-out war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the coming weeks.
Over the past two years, both the government and the LTTE have repeatedly violated the truce. While the government brazenly resorted to aerial bombing of Tamil areas and grabbed territory designated under the ceasefire agreement as Tiger territory, the LTTE carried out suicide attacks, often killing civilians.
During the ‘ceasefire period’ the government described its military offensives as defensive. It will not feel the need to extend such explanations any longer.
A series of recent military gains seem to have emboldened the armed forces into believing that a military solution to the conflict is within reach. Army chief General Sarath Fonseka has in fact predicted the “end” of the LTTE this year.
On the face of it, the advantage lies with Colombo. In terms of military hardware and international support, it appears to have the upper hand. Pakistan and China have been generous in their military assistance to Colombo with lethal weaponry. India and the US have provided Lanka with radars, intelligence and surveillance support.
The LTTE is suffering from serious international isolation. India and western governments have arrested several of its fundraisers and key operatives over the past year. Colombo is convinced that the international community will not go beyond expressing regret over its decision to call off the ceasefire.
With the west reoccupied with its ‘war on terror’ and India dithering in its response to the Lankan conflict, Colombo believes it will be able to wage the war unfettered by humanitarian concerns.
But the Lankan government might have overestimated its advantages in Eelam War IV. The LTTE has been severely weakened over the past year and has lost control over the east. Still its capacity to fight back must not be under-estimated.
It has the capability to defend territory in the north and fight unconventional battles in the east. The Lankan army’s advance into Tiger territory in the north will come only at a very heavy cost.
The resulting massive humanitarian crisis in the Tamil areas could result in Lanka’s donors pressuring Colombo by turning off economic aid. Japan, Sri Lanka’s largest aid donor, has already hinted a cutback if violence goes up.
An escalation in the war in the north will trigger an exodus of refugees to India. While India’s response will not involve support to the LTTE, it could apply pressure by cutting back on intelligence and surveillance support.
These are critical inputs that the Lankan forces are dependent on and something their friends in Pakistan cannot provide.
The LTTE may avoid hitting India’s sizeable economic interests in the island but could focus on Pakistan’s interests. It could target hotels, the airport and business centres. Tourism is Sri Lanka’s fourth largest foreign exchange earner.
According to official figures, tourist arrivals fell by 20 per cent in 2007 and that was during the ‘ceasefire’ agreement. However flawed the ceasefire might have been, it brought a semblance of peace to the island and boosted economic growth. The north and east witnessed spectacular growth rates.
The GDP in the east, which bore the brunt of decades of fighting, soared from 4.6 per cent pre-ceasefire to over 10 per cent during the five years of truce.
The ceasefire drew foreign investors back to the island and the cost of doing business with Sri Lanka fell, partly because risk insurance dipped. The Colombo stock market boomed. Infrastructure development and real estate witnessed phenomenal growth. Tourism did well till 2006, with foreign companies moving in to develop the hitherto unexplored beaches in the east. Economic optimism which marked the ceasefire
period has now evaporated.
As the much-hoped for quick victory over the LTTE fails to materialise, Colombo will find itself bogged down militarily in the north and under pressure from the Sinhalese public in the south. Sections among the Sinhalese — the Buddhist monks and Sinhalese hardliners — might be supporting and egging on President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military option today but much of the support will dry up as the economy is increasingly hit hard.
The past two decades of fighting has clearly established that a military solution is not possible. If the past is any indication, the island is in for a long war.
( The writer is a commentator on political affairs)
Post a Comment