''HASTENING SLOWLY' PART II: Slow Burn in Sri Lanka War

"First and the most tempting option would be to launch the much expected full scale, multi-pronged offensive in the north. This has the advantage of maintaining the momentum of recent successes. However, the weather is not good for providing air support and even other heavy fire support in scale that such an operation would require. With one more division raised now, the Sri Lanka Army appears to have adequate force levels to undertake this operation."

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[This article may be read in continuation of South Asia Analysis Sri Lanka Update No 133 "Hastening Slowly Part I: Perspectives on Politics and Prabhakaran in Sri Lanka"]

Operational status

The Sri Lanka security forces' strategy of "Hastening Slowly" at last appears to be yielding handsome dividends in the Eelam War-4. They made two serious breaches in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) defences in their sustained operations in the north during the month. The well fortified LTTE defences dominating the Vavuniya- Omanthai route from the west, and the Vavniya-Mannar axis from the north were at last penetrated. They have been offering stiff resistance to repeated efforts of the security forces for over four months now.

After taking a year to complete the reestablishment of the government authority in the east, During the last four months the security forces trying to break through the LTTE defences particularly in three areas - the forward defences in the Muhamalai area, area west of Omanthai and pushing the LTTE domination of the Vavuniya-Mannar axis northwards. However, the progress was painful. Blunted by such experience, the security forces focused on inflicting casualty on the LTTE regularly, rather than occupying territory. Though these forays had made slow progress, probably they sapped the staying power of the LTTE as the fall of strong points in area west of Giants Tank and the Uyilankulam entry point near Madhu church on the Vavuniya-Mannar axis indicated. We can expect further progress more easily in this sector that could affect Sea Tiger operations between Delft Island and Mannar. It also widens the options to tackle Pooneryn.

Similarly the security forces efforts to break into the LTTE defences west of Omanthai had also faced stiff resistance. The security forces have been also trying to make progress along the areas east of Vavuniya-Welioya. Though the security forces were inflicting casualties on the LTTE regularly major territorial gains were not made. It is significant that these operations through the monsoon period when the weather was not conducive for close air support. The fact that the security forces managed to seep behind the LTTE defences should be making the LTTE defences increasingly untenable.

Though the LTE casualties so far are said to be raw recruits with trained cadres held in reserve, presumably frontline defences are beefed up with regular cadres. This would imply thinning out to reinforce the threatened strongholds. The Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has assessed the LTTE strength in Vanni at 3000. This is probably the battle hardened elements of the LTTE.

A big morale booster for the security forces was the killing of the LTTE political head SP Tamilchelvan in an air strike in November and the reported injury to Prabhkaran in another strike a few days later. The improved morale has undoubtedly had a hand in the major successes the security h have had recently. The defence spokesman is now discussing of marching to Kilinochichi which was "in sight" while the media debated the question "who is after Prabhakaran." No one would have thought of raising these speculations a few months back.

Though the air force suffered a big setback after the resounding success of the LTTE attack on Anuradhapura, it regained some of its gloss after a retaliatory raid killed the LTTE leader SP Tamilchelvan. On the other hand, the Navy has continued with its successful run. It is expanding its domination of the seas. It has closed the year with sinking 11 LTTE boats off Delft Island in the Jaffna coast on December 26, 2007. Though the Navy estimated the LTTE losses at 40 men, the LTTE has acknowledged the death of 18 personnel in the action. The naval domination of the high seas has probably made it difficult for the LTTE to import of arms and military supplies from abroad. This is likely to sap its staying power.

The successful expansion of security forces' control over some of the key posts west of Omanthai, neutralisation of the LTTE defences at Uyilankulam and the progress west of the Giants Tank have opened up a number of military options to the security forces.

Full scale offensive: First and the most tempting option would be to launch the much expected full scale, multi-pronged offensive in the north. This has the advantage of maintaining the momentum of recent successes. However, the weather is not good for providing air support and even other heavy fire support in scale that such an operation would require. With one more division raised now, the Sri Lanka Army appears to have adequate force levels to undertake this operation. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission has reported the raising of a large civil defence force by the government in the east. With this perhaps some more regular troops from the east could be made available for operations in the north. On the other hand such an operation has a few negative riders. Troops fighting the LTTE in well fortified defences are likely to suffer heavy casualties as the LTTE will fight for their existence. The government might find it politically inconvenient to accept heavy casualties of security forces. Such casualties are likely to dampen the increasing public support President Rajapaksa has built up with his military successes against the LTTE. International pressure also would mount on the government as the war prolongs.

"Slow burn" attacks: This would be to continue present tactics of inflicting high casualties on the LTTE to deplete their ranks. As more casualties are inflicted they could be enlarged further to eat into their territory. The problem with this method is it is time consuming and offering time for the opponent to recoup and reinforce his defences. It will also be a costly war, for which ordinary Sri Lankans are already paying dearly. Lack of spectacular successes would be the order of the day. And politically there might not be enough time and space for operations stretched over a long period.

A combination of the two methods: This would involve continuing the present technique of seeping attacks on at least three to four fronts and launching sizeable offensives as and when an opportunity arises to exploit breakthrough in LTTE defences. This is likely to be the preferred option given the political constraints both nationally and internationally.
Security forces vulnerabilities

Though the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka closed a successful year with a warning to Prabhakaran that there was "no assurance" he would survive the next six months, achieving it is going to be a tricky proposition. The security forces have to cope with inbuilt weaknesses (all armies have such problems) and external factors outside their control. The Anuradhapura air base attack had revealed that the security of bases in depth areas continue to be inept and casual. Though measures are often taken to tighten their security after every surprise raid, sloth and lack of application at top level appear to be recurring maladies. Strategically a base like Minneriya in Polonnaruwa district is vulnerable to such guerrilla or suicide raids. Success in yet another raid would boost LTTE's sagging morale and confidence to build upon such actions elsewhere. Moreover as troops join in on the main battle, inevitably their administrative tail would be vulnerable to the LTTE hit and run raids.

Colombo's security will continue to be a major concern. Mass round ups so far have shown to be counter productive. Apart from the adverse publicity generated by such actions, systems get clogged, and delay the spotting of actual culprits. The resulting overload also encourages casualness in screening process and short circuiting of standard operating procedures.

In the past episodes of Eelam War, the security forces have shown a lack of mental mobility to maintain momentum. This is essential to exploit fleeting opportunities when the main offensive is launched after making breakthroughs in Vanni defences. Mental mobility of commanders at all levels might well decide success or failure of such operations. This is a must when offensives result in tactical setbacks. Good coordination of air and naval support and earmarking of sufficient reserves and firepower are some of the other aids to handle such situations.

Human rights violations will continue to be the most important external factor. The security forces inevitably push human rights considerations to the back burner in times of war. And this has gone on for quite some time in Sri Lanka. The attitude of international friends of Sri Lanka on this issue has been hardening. There are indications that they would be moving from the talking to the action stage to pressurise the government on this count. However, the government appears to have taken their support for granted. Both in India and the U.S., 2008 is an election year and politically they would be compelled to act on this issue. The EU's special trade concessions offered exclusively to Sri Lanka are also due for renewal in 2008. Sri Lanka's war economy is highly vulnerable to the active support of these countries. Prolonged operations could further restrict their financial assistance, and sale and supply of military equipment. Thus the government could be tempted to put the security forces under pressure to produce quick and spectacular results to overcome this constraint with detrimental operational impact.

India, and in particular Tamil Nadu, had been taking the military developments in the stride. They are unlikely to be a major deterrent to the President's ends provided prevarication on coming out with a devolution package and exodus of Tamil refugees to India are avoided.

LTTE response

Ideally, after isolating Vanni and securing the A9 will become the security forces priority. That would involve major operations to secure the lines Pooneryn- Kilinochchi, and Elephant Pass- Nagarkovil. Once these are secured the bottling up of Vanni would be complete. After that the main defences of Vanni could be tackled piecemeal. Perhaps this is what the security forces would attempt and also what the LTTE would expect. So much of the success in operation would depend upon who outsmarts the other side using deception as a major force multiplier. The LTTE as a guerrilla force uses deception as a stock in trade. How it is able to translate it to a conventional operational setting is the question. It has no option but to fight it out at Kilinochchi which has a great psychological importance to the LTTE as its undeclared capital.

Simlarly loss of Pooneryn would mean giving up an option to tackle peninsular Jaffna and engage Palali airfield with its artillery. So these two LTTE bastions are likely to be major focal points of operation in the coming months.

It is good to remember the LTTE's strengths rather than gloat over their tactical defeats before going for such operations. This writer has written a number of times that the LTTE owes its battlefield successes to tenacity of effort and its ability to bounce back. So far the security forces operations have been only a little beyond the forward defended localities manned by the LTTE cadres, beefed up with recruits. So if the Army Commander can achieve what he had told Prabhakaran even within the year 2008 it would be a great achievement. But can he do it? The coming months will tell.

Lastly, the Sri Lanka approach appears to focus on Prabhakaran and the LTTE and not the larger issue of devolving powers to the Tamils. If the government has glossed over the issue, it is for Tamil politicians of all hues to ensure that the military successes are used as a means to this end and not an end in itself. This is where the danger lies. But will the Tamil leaders heading their own outfits (including the conglomerates of the Tamil National Alliance), and divided like the proverbial Chera, Chola and Pandian kings who never saw eye to eye on any issue in Tamil history, converge on a common action plan? I fear the answer is no, if the past history is any lesson. I hope they prove me wrong.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)