V THE SIN OF MAXIMALISM
(December, 25, Colombo, Sri Lana Guardian) The end as well as the beginning of the Second JVP Insurgency is shrouded in well constructed and maintained myths. Contrary to received wisdom the state did not want a military solution to the JVP problem. It was not intent on drowning the insurgency in blood. Both the Jayewardene and Premadasa governments endeavoured to effect a compromise solution to the JVP crisis. Jayewardene despite his tough talking, made at least two efforts to begin a dialogue with the JVP, once through his Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali and on another occasion through his Security Advisor and son Ravi Jayewardene.
In mid 1988, as the country teetered on the brink of anarchy, Athulathmudali signed an agreement with a person he thought was an official representative of the JVP. A press conference was held and a joyful Athulathmudali attended it together with a thin, dark, young man who was introduced to the exited media personnel – and through them to the country – as the representative of the JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera. The ‘historic agreement’ was read out and the end of the insurgency proclaimed. The country, reeling under the violence of the JVP and the counter-violence of the state, probably heaved a collective sigh of relief. The relief, however, was short-lived. The dĂ©nouement, when it came, staggered the establishment and the general public alike. An angry JVP denounced the supposed representative of its leader as an impostor and the ‘ceasefire’ as a charade. A few days later the country discovered what many immediate past students of the University of Colombo realised when they saw the picture of the ‘JVP representative’ in the media – that this person, K C Senanayake, was not even a member of the JVP! He was a student of Colombo campus, with no political involvements whatsoever, a loner, who was acting on an impulse. As the JVP stepped up its campaign, this bizarre incident was soon forgotten. But the fact that Athulathmudali, who prided himself on his Oxford degree, allowed himself to be duped by an academically far from successful alumnus of the University of Colombo is indicative of how desperately the Jayewardene administration wanted to restore normalcy to the country, through whatever means necessary—military victory or negotiated settlement. As Prins Gunasekara states:
- “The President is running all over the place looking for a JVP man to talk to. His son and security Advisor is in correspondence with a top JVPer whom he had released, only a month ago… and offering to arrange a meeting with the Hon. Prime Minister… The clergy, the student movement, the trade unions, the intellectuals, the mercantile sector, in fact all who mattered in society were one-voicedly pleading with the JVP to accept what was being offered by the government. It was like a concerned parent beseeching a sulking, hungry child to drink the milk that was being offered, promising more if only he drank the first cup that was being offered. But the stupid, stubborn child would kick the cup of milk—and, crying his heart out for more, choked himself to death!” (A Lost Generation).
After his victory at the Presidential election of 1988 Premadasa too made a number of efforts to avoid the military option. The new president did not want a JVP victory. But he did not want to impose a bloody and humiliating defeat on the JVP either. The tragic failure to effect a non-violent closure to the Second Insurgency was due to the JVP’s determination not to settle for anything other than absolute power. Blinded by maximalism, it failed to see the difference between surrender and compromise. Premadasa was not willing to surrender to the JVP; but he was more than willing to effect an honourable, mutually advantageous compromise. The JVP refused any compromise and demanded unconditional surrender from the regime and the democratic system. The military option was imposed on Premadasa by the JVP, because of this intransigence and maximalism. According to Prins Gunasekara,
- “The readiness with which President Premadasa accepted the suggestion for peace talks was evident from the advanced publicity given by the state managed media… The President was more than willing to call for a cease fire to be reciprocated by the rebels…. President Premadasa’s first offer to negotiate peace in a troubled country was soon after his victory at the Presidential Polls on 20 December… This indeed was a bold step… Not only did he advance the date to end the emergency, he proceeded to free 1,400 detainees in the South from custody, having released another batch of 574 in the first week….. As a gesture of good will towards the JVP+IUSF led campaign, the new Premadasa regime made an early decision to have the North Colombo Medical College (NCMC) vested in the state. The obvious intent of this take over was to mollify the JVP-led IUSF and the student movement that the Premadasa regime was serious about solving issues that concerned specially the youth… President Premadasa took great pains to convince the rebels…that he was genuinely interested in a dialogue with them and that his concern for their welfare was genuine… President Premadasa’s crusade for ‘CONSULTATION, CONSENSUS, COMPROMISE’ was sustained at a very high profile throughout this period. His offer on the National Independence Day 4 February ‘to talk peace with anybody, any where, any time’ was repeated at his Poverty Alleviation programme inaugural address on 25 February 1989… (this call was repeated in Mahiyangana in early April). “One week after the Mahiyangana appeal for peace the state unilaterally declared a cease fire to coincide with the annual National festivities of the Sinhala and Tamil communities…” (ibid).
Premadasa’s appeals were echoed by the ‘hawkish’ Deputy Minister of Defence Ranjan Wijeratne; on numerous occasions he too begged the JVP to come to the negotiating table: “No head of state would go that far to appease the rebels. No Executive President would offer so many attractive concessions to insurgents hell bent on over throwing his regime. Now with hind sight it may be observed that the JVP rejection was an irrevocable disaster to the Southern rebels” (ibid - emphasis mine).
This attitude on the part of the UNP was in marked contrast to the attitudes adopted by regimes of most third world countries facing armed rebellions—particularly in Latin America. Take for instance Peru’s attempts to deal with the Sendero rebellion. President Alberto Fujimori suspended both the Congress and the Constitution in his battle against the Senderistas. Premadasa called for an All Parties Conference and invited the JVP to participate. The parliament and the opposition parties continued to function freely—as freely as the JVP allowed them. Any restrictions on political/social activism were imposed not by the regime but by the JVP. For example, the regime did not impose a press censorship; the JVP did so and the editor of a leading non government Sinhala language daily stopped coming to his office because of JVP threats.
________________________________"This completely unexpected development obviously took the JVP by
surprise and presented it with a dilemma. If it refused the government’s offer to negotiate in the new conjuncture, it would be exposing the hollowness of its anti-Indianism; if it accepted the offer to negotiate it will have to give up its goal of absolute political power which at that moment seemed (and indeed was) so tantalisingly within reach."________________________________
Obviously the JVP was not dealing with some uncompromising and bloodthirsty despotic regime (of the Latin American variety) which did not want to make any concessions and demanded unconditional surrender from the insurgents. Far from it. As Prins Gunasekara points out:
- “Did not President Premadasa release thousands of young rebels held without charge, without trial within two or three weeks of assumption of office…? Did he not concede the highly-charged IUSF demand that the Private Medical College be taken over by the state? Did he not terminate five years of emergency and vow not to re-impose it releasing many rebels even before the emergency ended? How many peace overtures did he make to the rebels—unconditionally? Did he not offer to dissolve the parliament to enable the rebels to contest and enter Parliament? Did he not invite them through All Parties Conference to come out sit and talk to them? Did he not seek to negotiate through independent organisations like the Quaker Peace Services (QPS) to meet the JVP leaders, if necessary outside the country? I’m personally aware of several meetings the QPS representatives had with the JVP representatives in London… I’m aware of the direct talks these foreign reps had with President Premadasa with a view to arranging a meeting, in or out of the country with the JVP leaders.” (ibid).
In other words the JVP (perhaps more than any other rebel movement in the Third World) had the option of an honourable settlement which was advantageous to it and would have given it a significant degree of power at the centre. Unfortunately the JVP regarded Premadasa’s willingness to come to a compromise solution as a sign of weakness. It contemptuously turned down every offer by the Premadasa regime, as it previously rejected the peace overtures of the Jayewardene administration. In fact with every concession made by the government the tempo of the JVP’s violence increased. The more the government showed itself willing to compromise with the JVP, the more intransigent the JVP became. As the year 1989 wended its way the JVP stepped up its violent efforts to terrorise the country and cripple the economy with their indiscriminate killings, wild cat strikes, unofficial curfews and acts of sabotage. The opposition SLFP, its honeymoon with the JVP firmly in the past, became very vocal in criticising the Premadasa administration for not being firm enough, for being unable to restore law and order and normalcy.
By now the regime was in a fight for survival. Colombo buzzed with dark rumours of an impending coup by UNP hardliners. Given the JVP’s refusal to compromise, the regime had only two options. Either give in to the demands of the JVP i.e. hand over power completely; or try to face the challenge. A desperate Premadasa opted for the latter.
This was the context in which Premadasa made his 1, June 1989 demand for the immediate withdrawal of the IPKF. This call was at one and the same time an attempt to persuade the JVP to come to the negotiating table by officially accepting its principal demand and an attempt to create the necessary political conditions for the defeat of the JVP—if it persisted in its refusal to accept an honourable compromise. The JVP had made the stand on the IPKF the dividing line in Lankan politics—and with this announcement Premadasa very firmly placed himself and his government in the anti-IPKF camp. Now was the chance for the JVP to negotiate with the regime, without betraying its principles—because it would be negotiating not with a pro-Indian (therefore ‘unpatriotic’) regime but with an anti-Indian (therefore a ‘patriotic’) regime, and one which had taken the enormous risk of giving the IPKF its marching orders.
This completely unexpected development obviously took the JVP by surprise and presented it with a dilemma. If it refused the government’s offer to negotiate in the new conjuncture, it would be exposing the hollowness of its anti-Indianism; if it accepted the offer to negotiate it will have to give up its goal of absolute political power which at that moment seemed (and indeed was) so tantalisingly within reach. The JVP opted to stick to its real objective—power. At a mammoth rally held in Nugegoda soon after Premadasa’s 1 June announcement, the JVP stepped up its anti-UNP rhetoric and demanded the resignation of both the President and the government. This was followed by a series of crippling strikes which almost brought the country and the economy to a standstill. Colombo became a ghost town and the JVP looked more invincible than ever.
But the tide has turned. Premadasa had understood what the crucially important link was and had grasped it, despite the risks entailed. “Premadasa’s own explanation has been that the presence of the IPKF is creating more antagonisms domestically and the JVP’s call for a ‘war against Indian imperialism’ has to be defused. The best way to do that was to pre-empt the JVP by asking for a quick withdrawal of the Indian troops. As the JVP has the ability to create another wave of civil unrest and destabilise the government Premadasa’s fears are genuine. His response has been to outmanoeuvre the JVP by winning over its extremist nationalist constituency…” (Frontline, 24 June - 7 July 1989) “In Sri Lanka however the general response to Premadasa’s call has been good among the Sinhala majority. There is a wide spread feeling even among sober, moderate people that two years was a long period and that the Indian army’s presence beyond that would be counter productive” (Frontline, 10-23 June 1989).
Before long, the JVP’s monolithic anti-Indian United Front slowly started to unravel. When in July it announced its customary week of protest to mark the second Anniversary of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the response from the public was disappointingly lukewarm. By the second and the third days, the public started to disobey the curfew order for the first time in two years—particularly in Colombo. Consensus had broken down and the JVP’s moment of hegemony was over. From now on it would have to use force primarily and predominantly on an increasingly unsympathetic public in order to get its demands complied with. With the raison d’ĂȘtre for the second JVP insurgency gone, the stage was set for the military campaign against the JVP.
Towards the latter part of that year, as the JVP tried to shift gear from patriotism to anti-systemic, the government set up the Joint Operations Command under the political overview of Minister Sirisena Cooray, Premadasa’s trusted lieutenant. Greater emphasis was placed on gathering accurate intelligence about the JVP leadership. This focus on the top rather than on the poster pasters at the bottom, this preference for surgical strikes at key targets rather than indiscriminate killings worked in a favourable political atmosphere created by the demand to withdraw the IPKF and the pro-poor socio-economic programmes of the new administration. Within six months of Premadasa’s announcement requesting the departure of the IPKF it was all over. The fire of the second JVP insurgency which for two years burnt bright just fizzled out with the capture and the killing of its three top political and military leaders in November 1989. By mid/late December the country was back to normal.
Victory came at a high price—60,000 dead in two years. Premadasa perhaps more than any one else knew that the human cost of victory would be high. This was probably why he made such repeated efforts to avoid the military option. The following comment by Premadasa a few months later can serve as the epitaph of the JVP and its second insurrection.
- “I think the JVP’s aim to overhaul the system was a good one and I was broadly in sympathy with that ideal, but I totally disagreed with their choice of strategies and their commitment to violence and terror. I saw in their idealism and in their commitment a great potential which we could harness to the democratic process in order to speed up change. That was why even in the run up to the Presidential elections, even though my supporters were being murdered brutally, I never condemned or criticised the JVP. I was prepared to wait, hoping that they would change. I’m personally very sad that such idealism, such commitment had to be wasted” (A Charter of Democracy for Sri Lanka - April 1990)
To be continued
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