The SLFP, now on the list of enemies for its participation in the election, was not spared either. Several of its meetings were attacked and a number of activists were killed—though the level of violence directed at the SLFP was considerably lower than the level of violence directed at the UNP and the USA, the authors of the J R Jayewardene political biography point out: “By the beginning of November the JVP turned on the SLFP and started killing SLFP supporters in the South of the country, although not on the same scale as they did the UNP cadres and supporters of the Socialist Alliance” (JR Jayewardene of Sri Lanka)
Premadasa on the other hand was able to obtain the support of the powerful Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)—and through these, the votes of the upcountry Tamils of Indian origin and Eastern Province Muslims. He also succeeded in winning over the poorer segments of the populace through his innovative poverty alleviation programme, Janasaviya. KM de Silva and Howard Wriggins identified organisational weaknesses and the inability to win over the ethnic and religious minorities as the main causes of the SLFP’s unexpected defeat. “A number of perceptive journalists who followed Mrs. Bandaranaike on the campaign trail remarked on how untidy and disorganised the SLFP campaign had been up to that time… There was also a paucity of top quality speakers on the SLFP platform… The SLFP had not been able to evoke a strong response from the minorities, ethnic and religious. All the signs were that most of the Christians, Muslims and Sri Lankan Tamils resident outside the North-East and above all the Indian Tamils backed the UNP” (J R Jayewardene of Sri Lanka)
An analysis of the electoral statistics demonstrates the validity of many of these arguments. In the Eastern province with its large number of Muslim and Tamil votes, the average poll was a high 61.7% and the UNP came first, 16.4% ahead of the SLFP. In the Nuwara Eliya district with its majority of Tamils of Indian origin, the valid vote was a high 79.96% and the UNP won by 26.2%. There was a similar outcome in the Roman Catholic majority areas. The valid vote was high (as the level of JVP violence was low) and the UNP won the so-called ‘Catholic belt’ resoundingly.
Subsequently the SLFP filed an election petition claiming that the Presidential election was unfree and unfair because of the violence that prevailed. The UNP’s counter argument was that the anti-election violence by the JVP affected the UNP far more than it did the SLFP. After listening to the evidence of 977 witnesses over a period of 2,047 days of inquiry, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka held with the UNP and rejected the election petition. The SLFP had charged that the violence directed at it came not mainly from the JVP but from the UNP, a claim that most impartial observers did not take seriously. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review “The SLFP… has claimed the UNP has used the JVP name and disrupted SLFP meetings but it had become clear that the UNP had no hand in these incidents…” (quoted in A Lost Generation).
An analysis of the election statistics disproves the SLFP theory. Polling was low precisely in areas where the JVP was strong and well entrenched—such as the main base of the JVP, the Southern Province (34.4%); North Central Province (35%); and the Uva Province (29.45%). Low polling does not seem to have hurt the SLFP much. In fact, of the eight districts outside of the North East in which the valid vote was higher than the national average, the SLFP won only two; on the other hand, of the nine districts in which the valid vote was lower than the national average the SLFP won three. And the SLFP managed to poll more than 50% of the votes only in districts where there was a low poll and the valid vote fell far short of the national average (55.5%).
It is also significant that in the traditional bastion of the Bandaranaike family, the Gampaha district, the SLFP did not succeed in obtaining more than 50% of the vote (it only got 48.83%) despite the fact that the valid vote was a high 76.12%. The UNP also won the capital city, Colombo where election related violence by the JVP was low and polling was high. In the Colombo city the valid vote was 65.8%; the UNP got 59% of the vote while the SLFP polled only 35% of the vote. All this clearly demonstrates that a low poll – and therefore JVP violence - was relatively more advantageous than disadvantageous to the SLFP.
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“Witness recalled that one of them asked for her husband by name… One of 
them pulled him by his hair and took him outside… The following morning they got information that her husband was killed on the bund and that his body was thrown into the marsh… She went and saw the dismembered body of her husband lying in the marsh, his eye missing, minus teeth, his body bearing deep cuts and a gaping bullet wound on his chest.
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The UNP as part of its defence in the election petition provided evidence that the JVP/DJV carried out a systematic campaign in the run up to the Presidential election against the UNP, unlike the occasional attacks on the SLFP. Given below are three samples chosen at radom because they provide a valuable insight into the modus operandi of the JVP.
The evidence of Mrs Greta Kodituwakku Abeysirigunawardene (34) whose husband K W Dayananda of Akmeemana (Galle) was a UNP activist. On the 6 December 1988 a group of about 15 people came to her house. “Witness recalled that one of them asked for her husband by name… One of them pulled him by his hair and took him outside… The following morning they got information that her husband was killed on the bund and that his body was thrown into the marsh… She went and saw the dismembered body of her husband lying in the marsh, his eye missing, minus teeth, his body bearing deep cuts and a gaping bullet wound on his chest. Beside his body was a poster and witness remembered someone read it giving the reasons for her husband’s killing as voting for the traitorous UNP government, holding office in the government party and for supporting the Presidential election. No Bhikkhu attended her husband’s funeral rites as they too had been threatened. Her husband was still President of Padinoruwa UNP when he was killed” (The Daily News – 2.7.1991). In Wilgamuwa, Handungamuwa, “Biso Menike provided refreshments for UNP meetings. Her hair was shorn off and her husband and son assaulted. She was ordered to go round the village on a bicycle with two placards pinned on her body” (The Daily News – 5.6.1991). The evidence of L H Upali of Ambalangoda: “Three houses of UNP supporters were attacked and burnt simultaneously in a UNP bastion and the inmates killed a few days before the Presidential election. (They were hacked and burnt to death). The incident caused fear among the voters and over 100 persons did not go to vote” (The Daily News – 6.6.1991).
To be continued
 IV AN ELECTION ON A PRECIPICE THE Presidential ele...){kind=link}
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