III. ON THE THRESHOLD OF POWER
The first of the two most dangerous moments in the Second JVP Insurgency happened in the run up to the Presidential Election of 1988. The JVP came within an ace of capturing state power not because it was a colossus but because all non-JVP institutions became pigmy-like. The loss of will to resist the JVP avalanche was a generalised phenomenon, affecting political parties, organisations and individuals across the spectrum. Though it was known – and often privately acknowledged – that the killing spree was being sustained mainly by the JVP, very few wanted to admit it in public or to draw the obvious and inescapable conclusion from it. This gave the JVP carte blanche to act as it willed and to make claims that were totally at variance with reality, without the fear of either resistance or contradiction.
Constitutionally Presidential elections were due in December 1988. In September President JR Jayewardene declared that he will make no attempt to seek a third term by amending the constitution once again. He also summoned the UNP Working Committee and announced the candidacy of Prime Minister Premadasa. The JVP responded by demanding a total boycott of the election and the SLFP-JVP alliance fell apart because of the SLFP’s unwillingness to abide by this dictat. The JVP did not want a Presidential poll because it would have resulted in a new president – irrespective of which party won the election. Such a change would have had a cathartic effect on the democratic system asphyxiated by the authoritarian practices of the Jayewardene administration, particularly the fraudulent referendum of 1982. The last thing the JVP wanted was a resuscitation of the democratic system, the reawakening of popular expectations in its efficacy and willingness to deliver a better future. A new government would have legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate and the world. Consequently such a government would become a tougher opponent than the intensely unpopular and illegitimate administration of JR Jayewardene. Hell bent on preventing this unfavourable state of affairs, the JVP intensified its campaign of violence as soon as nominations were called.
The JVP’s demand was that parliamentary and presidential elections should be held simultaneously, under the auspices of a caretaker administration. This demand seemed valid to many, given the lack of legitimacy of the existing parliament - the Report of the Elections Commissioner, which clearly exposed the fraudulent nature of the Referendum, was out by then. The JVP very successfully used the understandable yearning for peace and normalcy on the part of the populace, to push its agenda forward (this is what the LTTE has done and is still doing, with remarkable success). For many, exhausted by the unremitting and often indiscriminate violence, appeasing the JVP seemed the easier way out. Almost the entirety of the political-religious-professional elites backed the JVP’s demand (though the SLFP may not have been happy about the JVP formula, it lacked the courage to express its reservations openly). By late 1988 a desperate President Jayewardene had been forced to the point of surrender. There was only one impediment to the success of the JVP’s creeping coup—the strident opposition of Prime Minister Premadasa.
On the face of it the JVP’s demand seemed extremely democratic. Actually it was tailor made to weaken the democratic system from within, dismantle whatever resistance there was from the polity and society and pave the way for a JVP takeover of state power. The UNP had already been considerably weakened; with the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of an interim administration, it would have lost what little will to resist that still remained. In fact once it lost its (already far from strong) grip on power, it would have had to be on the run from its opponents. Both the JVP and the SLFP would have been intent on revenge (of course far in excess of its original sins – as the JVP, inelegantly but unequivocally, put it, ‘JR you devoured the country; we will devour you’ – JR, tho rata kewa; api tho kanawa). The UNP therefore would not have been able to put up much of a performance at either the Presidential or Parliamentary election. And if the JVP proposals were accepted overriding the objectives of Premadasa, the UNP would have lost the only candidate capable of taking the party to victory at the Presidential polls—since Premadasa had threatened to resign from his candidacy in such an eventuality. This would have opened the door to an internecine confrontation between Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake (with the former supported by the armed forces and the latter by India) for the candidacy, thereby further dividing and debilitating the UNP.
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The SLFP was not being realistic. The JVP had absolutely no intention of allowing the SLFP to become the chief beneficiary of its campaign of violence. Neither did it want to be a junior partner in a SLFP regime. The JVP wanted to use the SLFP as a battering ram to force the regime into holding the Presidential and Parliamentary elections simultaneously under a caretaker government —the scenario most advantageous to it. Then the UNP would have been on the run and the SLFP, given its organisational weakness and dependence on the JVP, would never have been strong enough to withstand the JVP’s pressure let alone challenge it for the dominant role.
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K M de Silva and Howard Wriggins in their biography of J R Jayewardene state that Premadasa told several of his confidantes that by the end of 1988 he intended to retire from politics.
- “Jayewardene saw this as a bit of kite-flying to see how the party would respond to this for both he (Jayewardene) and party stalwarts realised that he (Premadasa) was the UNP’s best candidate and probably the only one with the ability to defeat Mrs. Bandaranaike. If on the other hand he was genuinely intent on retiring from politics such an announcement was certain to lead to a bitter struggle for leadership of the UNP” (JR Jayewardene of Sri Lanka – A Political Biography – Vol. II). This is confirmed by none other than J N Dixit, the former Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka: “Despite our reservations about Premadasa… he was the most appropriate choice for succeeding Jayewardene… Whatever his political persona and his limitations, he had a mass base and he was immensely popular with the rural population of Sri Lanka” (Assignment Colombo).
Even more dangerously the SLFP during this time was completely dependent on the JVP’s organisational muscle and propaganda skills. Prins Gunasekara’s account of the famous Mawbima Surakeeme Viyaparaya (MSV) rally in Kandy organised ostensibly by the SLFP and the MEP is illustrative of the extremely close links between the main opposition party and the JVP and the former’s near total dependence on the latter in the sphere of politico-agitational work:
- “On the previous Thursday, when I visited Kandy, there were no visible signs of any preparations for the weekend meeting… I walked into the SLFP Office in the heart of the City hoping to find an explanation. There I met Colonel Anuruddha Ratwatte and Yasaratne Tennekoon… the two active SLFP stalwarts who ran the show in the area… The two of them led me to an adjacent room in their office, opened the door and showed me the posters, flags, buntings, banners and other decorative paraphernalia for the meeting… I expressed my disbelief. ‘How can you make a success of the meeting on Saturday with all this publicity material still locked up and stacked in your SLFP headquarters?’ ‘Nothing to worry Prins... tonight the city and all the approaches for miles will be covered up by these flags and posters…’ assured Anuruddha. ‘But where is the organisation—and the personnel’ I was still sceptical. ‘No problem Prins… the JVP boys in the area will take care of all of that’ both of them observed… When I attended the meeting on Saturday afternoon… the town was a sky of saffron coloured flags. The boys had done what Anuruddha said they were going to do” (A Lost Generation).
- “It (the JVP) called upon the SLFP to withdraw from the elections and asserted that if the JVP were to join the SLFP in any future government, it would want at least a fourth of the Cabinet positions and a fourth of the seats in parliament. Among the cabinet posts they insisted on was the Ministry of Defence” (JR Jayewardene of Sri Lanka).By mid-1988, the SLFP was confident that its long stint in the Opposition was coming to an end. The JVP was rapidly making the country ungovernable; it had also removed an important electoral threat to the SLFP with the assassination of the charismatic leader of the SLMP/USA, Vijaya Kumaratunga. The SLFP hoped to reap the benefits soon in the form of electoral victories over its main rival, the UNP. “Anura Bandaranaike Leader of the Opposition said this would be the last May Day rally the SLFP would be holding as a opposition party as he was certain of the party coming into power at the next general election due next year and holding the May Day rally at the Galle Face Green as the Governing party…” (A Lost Generation).
Even with Premadasa as a candidate the UNP had very little will to resist the JVP’s violently enforced dictats. During this period banners by local UNP stalwarts announcing their retirement from politics – as per JVP’s orders – were a common sight. Civil society seemed confused, unable or unwilling to be critical of the JVP, at least openly. The killing of Vijaya Kumaratunga had dealt a mortal blow to the non-JVP left. By this time the USA, founded by Kumaratunga as a left-democratic alternative to the UNP, the SLFP and the JVP, was imploding due to internal differences. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who had left the country a couple of months after her husband’s assassination, was the President of the USA. She wanted the USA to boycott the Presidential election or support a common anti-UNP candidate – which would naturally have been her mother. Her demand was backed by the LSSP and the NSSP, opining that a USA candidate would help the UNP to win by dividing the anti-UNP vote. A majority in the SLMP as well as the CP wanted the USA to implement Kumaratunga’s programme and field a candidate. The obvious choice was Kumaratunga’s widow. Given her virulent opposition to the idea, the choice fell upon Ossie Abeygunasekara, Kumaratunga’s closest friend, and a founding member of the SLMP. Since the LSSP and the NSSP refused to allow the use of either the USA name or symbol, Abeygunasekara had to contest as the candidate of the SLMP.
If the JVP’s demand has been granted the JVP would have gone for a ‘common patriotic’ slate with its supporters and members dominating the lists; it would also have nominated a pliant ‘eminent citizen’ as its candidate for the presidency. If the SLFP opposed these moves, the JVP would have turned its guns on it. The UNP, plagued by internal fights, would have been a shadow of its former self. With the two major parties thus debilitated there would have been no entity capable of resisting the political advance of the JVP. The armed forces would have either stayed out of the contestation or taken sides. If the Forces tried to take sides that would have caused one or several internal splits. This would have spiralled the violence into new and unprecedented levels. Any active Indian military involvement in the Southern conflict would have made matters infinitely worse. Sri Lanka would have had to endure a long and a brutal civil war, a war of all against all, in which no side abided by civilisational norms.
To be continued
 III. ON THE THRESHOLD OF POWE...){kind=link}
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