Low Tech Vs High Tech

Photo: The following picture is of the US Army AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter gunship that was allegedly shot down by a farmer with an old bolt action rifle.

by Defencewire

(December, 21, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The picture is a US Army AH-64D Apache Longbow Helicopter Gunship that was allegedly shot down by a farmer with an old bolt action rifle. In the picture, the composite material rotors of the AH-64D were shredded when hit by gunfire. The damage was actually caused by a 23mm Russian made Anti-aircraft projectile. A 23mm bullet costs less than five dollars, at most. An AH-64D Long Bow Apache helicopter costs more than 60 million USD, which is equivalent to the annual defense budget of a small nation.

This same phenomenon could have occurred in the reverse in Sri Lanka had sophisticated interceptors or anti-aircraft missiles were purchased, which may cost more than its target, the Zlin Z-143. It has now transpired that the government has created a much more cost-effective system of defence against the TAF Z-143s. However, several weeks after the first bombing raid by the TAF's Z-143, the government was contemplating the purchase of a missile defence system from the Czech Republic. They were also contemplating the purchase of Mig-29s. An analyst famously termed this move as being similar to squashing a fly with a sledgehammer.

Considering the nature of insurgents, guerillas and terrorists, a typical insurgent/guerrilla/insurgent tactic is not a frontal attack using military hardware, but continuous harassment to the host nation. Over-consumption of high-tech arms can obstruct the economic development of small nations fighting insurgents. According to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual of the US Marine Corps, conventional operations need a minimum ratio of 1:3, (three men for every insurgent) to maintain superiority. A counter insurgency operation generally requires at least a ratio of 1:20, (20 men for every insurgent). A guerrilla war is vastly asymmetric. Therefore the US Marine Corps suggests a simple and inexpensive way: LOW TECH VS. LOW TECH.

The above example maybe an extreme case, but it demonstrates the need to maintain eye-level in-terms of the cost of military equipment when dealing with Insurgents/terrorists/guerillas. Finally, in Counter-insurgency or Counter-Terrorism warfare, it is the quality of the infantrymen that counts and not necessarily the high technology.