"Indo-Lanka relations presently seem to be moving on an even keel" – R. Swaminathan

"Pirabhakaran’s appeal displays elements of frustration and desperation"

(December, 06, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) “I do not agree with LTTE’s claim to be the sole champion of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka,” R. Swaminathan , President & DG of the International Institute of Security and Safety Management (New Delhi); and a Trustee of the Catalyst Trust (Chennai), said an exclusive interview with Sri Lanka Guardian.

Mr. R. Swaminathan spoke his mind clearly on Sri Lanka’s crisis and Indin opition also current political and military developments in South Asia nightmare in an exclusive interview with Nilantha Ilangmauwa to Sri Lanka Guardian. R. Swaminathan joined Indian Police Service in 1954 also served for nearly 33 years in central intelligence and security organizations. He was retired in 1990 as Special Secretary, DG (Security), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India. He has been actively associated with a few think-tanks since his retirement from service; and has published a number of papers on different issues related to national security and international relations.

“LTTE may now seem to be facing a critical situation towards the end of 2007, but it has shown in the past great resilience and capacity to rebound,’ he said.

Whatever, “India may then be able to deal with an LTTE without Pirabhakaran and others involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi,” he observed.

According to him, “Sea Tigers, a third navy in Indo-Sri Lankan waters is not in the interest of India's national security”

Even, “the Tamil Eelam is in a different category and a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Pirabhakaran is very unlikely to find any supporters in the international community,” he said.

He must state at the outset that he have been retired from government service for more than seventeen years and presently have no role in the government. Whatever he state in this interview, therefore, represents only my personal views and assessments.

Excerpts of the Interview,

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa with R. Swaminathan

Q. Could you please let us know your assessment of the Indian foreign policy within the context of its regional interests and influence?

A. It is my view that India is already a significant power - economically as a matter of fact, militarily as a matter of relative strengths, and politically if these can be leveraged to her national advantage. Many analysts have for long been used to India being strong on rhetoric but an under-achiever, and it may not be easy for them to see that the ugly duckling is growing into a beautiful swan (like in Hans Christian Anderson’s fairy tale). India is trying to achieve and is achieving in a few years what many other significant powers could comfortably achieve in many decades or centuries - as the world gradually evolved from the Middle Ages to the modern era. In the process, many intermediate steps are being skipped (as has happened in many areas of India’s technological development) and this accelerated growth is not easy to cope with. Though India may seemingly have allowed foreign invasions and colonial rule to make her forget her glory days (except perhaps in speeches and school text books), it has to be recognized that India has in reality grown out of her exploited under-dog status of nearly two centuries and is speeding on her way to becoming a big power. India’s changed (and changing) status has also caused significant changes in the expectations of other countries about India’s involvement in world affairs.

India should be expected increasingly to make overall national interest the primary and supreme consideration in formulating her foreign and security policies. Domestic politics and partisan interests should and would always provide major inputs during the stage of consultations, but are unlikely to become reasons for casting doubts on the credibility of the national foreign policy as it emerges out of those consultations.

India’s “Look East” policy, the recent interactions with ASEAN and initiatives in SAARC are part of her efforts to further her regional interests and influence. The difficulties in maintaining friendly and cordial relations with her smaller neighbors may be due to her earlier inability to deal with them as total equals. The smaller neighbors may be justifiably worried by the asymmetry in size, human and material resources and economic and military strengths. India’s readiness to assert her national interests (e.g. India’s role in the creation of Bangladesh, Indian support to the Tamil movements in Sri Lanka; Indian encouragement and support to its political favorites in different countries of the region) and continuing differences relating to the utilization of water resources may also be matters of concern to the neighbors. The affected countries tend to guard themselves by avoiding the development of very close (and possibly dependent) economic and other linkages with India, by developing (balancing) economic and military linkages with other countries. This often results in positions of near hostility, suspicion and distrust. The Indian Prime Minister’s statement that India is willing to consider asymmetric concessions to her less developed neighbors (as distinguished from the customary rule of reciprocity in matters of trade and commerce), as and when translated into practical policy, should help in removing or lessening the perception of India as the ubiquitous “Big Brother” in the neighborhood.

There is a lot of talk about India and China being rivals for influence in the region. The reality, as I see it, is that both countries are actively pursuing their own national interests. In the process, there will be areas of cooperation, as there will be areas of competition. This should not pose any major problem as long as both countries are also aware of and are sensitized to the interests of the other country.

Q. What do you think about the Indo–Lanka relations based on its historical experience and its current and future interest?

A. Though India and Sri Lanka are physically separated by a narrow strip of sea, the peoples of the two countries are bound together by bonds of geographic proximity, historical ties, religious and cultural affinities and similarities etc. State level relations tend to fluctuate from time to time, influenced by domestic political compulsions, international situation, economic needs etc. Stable state level relations are possible only when they closely reflect the reality of people-to-people ties.

Indo-Sri Lanka relations presently seem to be moving on an even keel. The political relations between the UPA government in India and the Rajapakse government in Sri Lanka are “correct”, though not yet very close. Economic relations are improving gradually, but the dialogue on defense and security matters is progressing very slowly (mainly due to differing perceptions and lack of full trust).

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"India may give the impression of being a helpless spectator of the developments in Sri Lanka, but it has to be appreciated that presently she has very little influence on either the Rajapakse Government or the Tamil militants. However, India has to be concerned about the growing presence and influence of non-regional Powers in Sri Lanka. If this trend continues, India may have to consider taking a more active role in Sri Lanka, much against her natural inclination."

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There are two major irritants in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. The first is the “ethnic issue”, which we will discuss later, and the other relates to Kachchativu. The latter issue is really less about ownership and sovereignty over the small island than about fishing rights around it. However, the issue of sovereignty over the island has been emotionalized to an unduly large extent, both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. The regional parties in Tamil Nadu have never been happy with the 1974 and 1976 Maritime Boundary Agreements between India and Sri Lanka. The issue has become an irritant also in the relations between the Central Government and the Government of Tamil Nadu; and has the potential of radicalizing Tamil nationalism.

Despite the Maritime Boundary Agreements, Indian fishermen have continued to fish in areas (including those in Sri Lankan territorial waters) where they have traditionally been carrying on their vocation. The Palk Strait has also become the conduit through which the Tamil militants move their men and materials. Though all the concerned entities seem to be happy to let the situation simmer and be available (whenever required) as a stick to beat the other entities with, it needs to be defused with a sense of urgency.

The fishing communities on both sides of Palk Strait had jointly exploited (with hardly any outside intervention) the marine resources for centuries. If the two governments could restore to those communities the right and responsibility to work out friendly, cooperative and sustainable fishing in these waters, the problem could probably be solved amicably. The two governments could encourage and facilitate whatever the fishermen are able to agree upon and reserve the waters of the Palk Strait for joint and co-operative fishing, exclusively by artisanal fishermen of the littoral fishing communities.

Apart from the fishing issue, it is possible that people to people relations and the media can act as pressure groups to evolve some kind of synthesis between differing security and political interests and priorities of India and Sri Lanka. Intellectuals, human rights advocates, lawyers, press corps, artistes and film stars could easily set in motion a closer understanding between the two countries and eventually compel their governments to agree that cooperation on ecology and efforts to eradicate poverty and deprivation should receive higher priorities than narrow political considerations. When the peoples of two countries develop a vested interest in peace and good relations between their countries, the governments would have to follow suit.

The repeated movement of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka to India includes the possibility of LTTE cadres sneaking in with them. This could lead to instability and spillover of the culture of violence in Tamil Nadu, as experienced some years ago.

India may give the impression of being a helpless spectator of the developments in Sri Lanka, but it has to be appreciated that presently she has very little influence on either the Rajapakse Government or the Tamil militants. However, India has to be concerned about the growing presence and influence of non-regional Powers in Sri Lanka. If this trend continues, India may have to consider taking a more active role in Sri Lanka, much against her natural inclination.

Q. What do you have to say about Indian assistance to curtail the Tamil terrorism in Sri Lanka?

A. India is basically opposed to terrorism of any form anywhere. She has been suffering from terrorist activities for some decades, and still continues to be a victim of terrorism, some indigenous and some foreign-inspired and supported. In my assessment, India is and would be prepared to share her experience and expertise in handling terrorism and in defusing issues that give raise to terrorism. However, memories of the manner in which IPKF suffered in Sri Lanka are unlikely to permit India to provide any material assistance to the Sri Lankan Government (SLG) in tackling what you describe as “Tamil terrorism”.

Q. India has been always stated that it will never support carving out a separate state of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Will India support any Tamil movements to campaign against the Sri Lankan government as it did in the past by giving military training and practical support?

A. This question is in two parts and I will try to answer both, one after another.

India’s consistent opposition to the carving out of a separate sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is based both on the international requirement normally to preserve the integrity of existing states and her national interests. She has herself often had to struggle to preserve her national integrity against efforts by occasional local movements to secede from the Indian Union. [India’s support to the inevitable separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan should be seen in the different context of an intolerable situation of “genocide” and large scale refugee movement.] A separate sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is unlikely to function of a classical “buffer state”, but is more likely to have the potential to become a focus for pan-Tamil parochialism and nationalism.

On the issue of Indian support to Tamil movements campaigning against SLG, I would like to draw attention to India’s normal policy of “non-involvement” in differences between sovereign states and their populations of Indian origin. But non-involvement should not be interpreted as lack of concern. In Sri Lanka, Indian involvement was essentially triggered by SLG’s attempt to deny citizenship to a large number of Tamils who had been staying and working in Sri Lanka for generations. Subsequent efforts at discrimination and marginalization of the Tamil population, coupled with the non-addressing of legitimate grievances, led to a deepening crisis in the ethnic issue. The radicalization and polarization on this issue could probably have been avoided by tolerance of diversity and sympathetic understanding of grievances and aspirations. India has to discharge her moral responsibility to support the aspiration of the Tamils to be “equal” citizens of Sri Lanka.

It is unfair to second guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the Indian decision (more than twenty years ago) to provide military training and practical support to Tamil movements in Sri Lanka. It was obviously based on an objective analysis of the available facts and the prevailing ground realities. I am extremely doubtful if, in the current circumstances, India would repeat those actions.

Q. What is your assessment about the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Can you tell your views on their past, present and the anticipated future?

A. LTTE was one of the many parallel Tamil movements that came up in protest against SLG’s decisions that were seen as discriminatory against the Tamils. It was, however, one of the most radical of those organizations and believed from the beginning that an independent sovereign state of Tamil Eelam was the real solution to the problem. LTTE was initially very reluctant to join the other Tamil movements in the 1985 talks at Thimpu, aimed at finding a solution through the devolution of powers to the Tamils, within an integrated state of Sri Lanka. Over a period of time, mainly through the free use of the weapons of violence and assassination, LTTE eliminated or marginalized most other Tamil movements. In the areas controlled by it, the LTTE has been able to establish a rudimentary state structure, without letting those areas become ungoverned and chaotic. Despite all this, I do not agree with LTTE’s claim to be the sole champion of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.

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"There would, of course, be considerable reluctance to express any different point of view, as Pirabhakaran and LTTE have shown total intolerance of any dissent or even any difference of opinion – with “elimination” being the favorite solution. Over the years, LTTE has shown itself to be one of the most ruthless, determined and murderous terrorist organizations."

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LTTE has had two faces - one as arguably the most effective champion of the Tamil cause and another as a dreaded terrorist organization. While there would be wide-spread support for LTTE’s basic objective of getting justice for the Tamils, its use of terrorist methods and insistence on having a separate state perhaps do not elicit the same extent of support from the Tamils. There would, of course, be considerable reluctance to express any different point of view, as Pirabhakaran and LTTE have shown total intolerance of any dissent or even any difference of opinion – with “elimination” being the favorite solution. Over the years, LTTE has shown itself to be one of the most ruthless, determined and murderous terrorist organizations.

LTTE may now seem to be facing a critical situation towards the end of 2007, but it has shown in the past great resilience and capacity to rebound. However, it would appear that the best days of LTTE are behind it. The differences between the eastern and northern cadres of LTTE may or may not lead to a change in leadership, but there may still be scope for that. India may then be able to deal with an LTTE without Pirabhakaran and others involved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It would anyway be unwise for India or any other concerned party to ignore the reality of LTTE.

The development and activities of the Sea Tigers and the fledgling air capability are major matters of concern, even after the damages claimed to have been inflicted by SLG. A third navy in Indo-Sri Lankan waters is not in the interest of India's national security. The Bengal Bay is very sensitive from India’s security point of view, not necessarily in the military sense only. India has to ensure the integrity of the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Strait, lest LTTE misuses them to smuggle material useful for waging war. The capability and potential of Sea Tigers to disrupt fishing in the Bengal Bay and for maritime terrorist acts cannot be under-estimated. The Government of India has made precautionary deployment of Coast Guard and Naval vessels in the area, but has been surprisingly quiet about the threat posed by Sea Tigers. This may be due to the peculiar compulsion of coalition politics, but the stage may soon come when India may have to take some hard decisions about the Sea Tigers. India may have to work towards the constitution of an international coalition against maritime terrorism, which could force LTTE (through diplomatic pressure if possible and through naval action, if necessary) to dismantle its maritime capability. The last unenviable option, if Indian security gets seriously threatened, may be for India unilaterally (or in collaboration with Sri Lanka) to take the necessary naval actions.

Q. In his recent Hero's day speech V. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE demanded the international community to rethink their approach to support the Sri Lanka government on the conflict and also asked the Tamil Diaspora community to support the LTTE struggle. Will his appeal have sympathetic hearing?

A. It is my assessment that Pirabhakaran’s appeal displays elements of frustration and desperation at the present situation. I personally doubt if the appeal would have any effect, unless accompanied by changes in the behavior of the LTTE.

Q. If V. Prahakaran declares Unilateral Declaration of Independence will the international community support his effort like they did to recognize the independence of Kosovo, Montenegro and East Timor? What do you think about his present predicament and Pirabakaran’s war tactics?

A. I hope that Pirabhakaran would not feel compelled to take such an ill-advised step. Kosovo and Montenegro had “voluntarily” joined the Socialist Federal Republic of Jugoslavia at the end of World War II. They were, in effect, retracting their earlier merger. Tamil Eelam is in a different category and a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Pirabhakaran is very unlikely to find any supporters in the international community. I doubt if the step (and the possibility of consequent isolation and sanctions) would even get the support of all the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

I feel that Pirabhakaran and the LTTE would have to undertake a serious exercise of introspection, take into account all the realities and decide whether or not to pursue the goal of an independent state.

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"I am afraid that I cannot say anything positive about the present SLG in that context. When Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidential election in November 2005, with the support of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), it was expected that the government would move away from Chandrika’s federal formula for handling the Tamil insurgency. The President’s approach to the ethnic problem appears to carry sufficient credibility to attract at least the guarded support not only of his electoral allies of JVP and JHU, but also of the erstwhile electoral opponents of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC)."

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Q. How will the present politics in Tamil Nadu influence the Central government to intervene in the crisis in Sri Lanka?

A. The coalition regime in Indian politics produces some strange situations. Regional and ideological positions, which would normally be considered to be of marginal consequence, tend to acquire greater importance. In the case of Tamil Nadu, the regional political parties find it difficult to adopt moderate positions on many issues, lest they surrender ground to the more radical political parties like the Pattali Makkal Katchi. Even considering their present disproportionate influence in decision-making by the Central Government, I do not think that the mainstream politicians in Tamil Nadu would attempt to make the Central Government agree to intervene physically in the crisis in Sri Lanka; or that they would succeed if they made the attempt.

Q. How could the Government of Sri Lanka deal with the crisis it is facing for many decades now?

A. It was a complex situation to start with and successive governments, as well as many Sinhala politicians, helped to increase its complexity over many decades. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that there could be a miracle cure for this problem. The existing crisis of confidence needs to be overcome first. The first essential step would seem to be take measures to convince the majority of the Tamils that their legitimate grievances and aspirations would be attended to without their having to resort to coercive actions merely to be heard. The Tamils require to be convinced that Sinhala political parties do not consider them to be enemies or second-class citizens. If a comprehensive agreement cannot be reached with the Tamils, SLG should be prepared to consider taking the initial steps unilaterally and hope that the Tamils would respond favorably to those gestures of reconciliation. Such an action would take the wind out of the sails of radical Tamil elements and strengthen the presently-silent moderates amongst them. This, however, calls for a major shift in the thinking of the Sinhala majority and its leadership. It is as yet a matter of doubt if they can summon up the necessary moral strength, maturity and pragmatism to take the step.

When Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidential election in November 2005, with the support of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), it was expected that the government would move away from Chandrika’s federal formula for handling the Tamil insurgency.

Q. What is your observation (negative and positives) about the present Rajapakse government in Sri Lanka?

A. I will answer this question only in the limited and narrow context of the ethnic problem. I am afraid that I cannot say anything positive about the present SLG in that context. When Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidential election in November 2005, with the support of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), it was expected that the government would move away from Chandrika’s federal formula for handling the Tamil insurgency. The President’s approach to the ethnic problem appears to carry sufficient credibility to attract at least the guarded support not only of his electoral allies of JVP and JHU, but also of the erstwhile electoral opponents of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC). Though the LTTE was initially nudged back to the negotiating table at Geneva, the repeated provocative attacks by the Tigers on the security forces and the retaliatory attacks by SLG on Tamil areas led to a situation where the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) has died, though short of a formal revocation by the signatories. On its part, the LTTE has clearly demonstrated that it is not prepared to work within the existing (or a slightly modified) system. After each hopeful pause, it resumes its violent methods. Along with the proclaimed terrorist outfit, the legitimate and democratically elected SLG has done little to help in resolving the “Tamil problem”. If anything, the Mahinda government has been equally responsible for escalating an intractable problem into one that is becoming near-impossible to solve.

“Some of the counter-attacks by LTTE have highlighted the weaknesses of the government. The military offensives cannot obviously be carried to their logical conclusion.”

Q. What do you think about present Military offensives against the LTTE by the state forces?

A. There have been many claimed successes. It would appear that the capabilities of the Sea Tigers have been severely crippled, at least for the present. Limited advances on the ground have also been reported. However, aerial bombardment of one’s own territory (not under foreign occupation), with resultant casualties amongst innocent civilians, does not show SLG as being in control of the situation. Some of the counter-attacks by LTTE have highlighted the weaknesses of the government. The military offensives cannot obviously be carried to their logical conclusion. I doubt the ability of the Sri Lankan Security Forces totally to eradicate the presence or influence of militant LTTE cadres from the areas presently controlled by them, much less from all of Sri Lanka.

Armies that have fought long wars are aware of the phenomenon of battle fatigue, resulting in lack of motivation and vigor. Similarly, historical evidence is that ethnic or ideological insurrections or revolutionary movements lead to their own versions of revolutionary fatigue. Some time after the CFA stabilized to a certain extent, LTTE showed signs of having reached that critical stage. The intensified military offensives by SLG has probably done more to remotivate and reinvigorate the fighting cadres of LTTE than any exhortation by Pirabhakaran could have achieved.

Further, the continued offensives ignore the lessons of history. Any movement by an ethnic minority, based essentially on legitimate grievances of discrimination and perceived suppression, cannot be eradicated totally by military means alone. Military measures should be accompanied by sincere and sympathetic efforts to address the legitimate grievances and to minimize any discrimination by the state.

Q. Can Sri Lanka find an effective and a durable solution for the problem on its own?

A. The question should not be whether Sri Lanka can find an effective and durable solution, but whether Sri Lanka can afford not to find such a solution. Ideally, the solution should be totally indigenous and arrived at by consensus. Less ideally, it can be achieved with the help of mediators or intermediaries from outside. It is very clear to me that any solution imposed only by military force or majoritarian fiat would neither be effective nor durable.

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