While proclaiming the Emergency, he has suspended the Constitution and granted to himself special powers to amend the Constitution through executive orders. He has removed from office Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other judges of the Supreme Court, who were taking an independent line since March, 2007, and inducted other judges, who were perceived to be favourable to him and the Army.(November, 08, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is engaged in a desperate battle on three fronts---against the judiciary, the people and the pro-Al Qaeda and pro-Taliban jihadi terrorists.
All these three fronts are of his own creation and the outcome of the battle would have an impact not only on the future stability of Pakistan, but also on peace and security in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, which has been the spawning ground of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda terrorist organisations, which are active in different countries of the world.
His proclamation of a State of Emergency on November 3, 2007, was a panic attempt to pre-empt any adverse ruling by the Supreme Court setting aside his re-election as the President by the National Assembly and the provincial Assemblies of Pakistan on October 6, 2007. While allowing the election to go ahead as scheduled, the Supreme Court had ordered that the official announcement of the result and the swearing-in of the successful candidate would have to await its ruling on petitions filed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and other opponents of Musharraf, challenging the validity of the special dispensation, which Musharraf had got approved by the rubber-stamp National Assembly in 2003.This dispensation allowed him to to wear two hats as the President and as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). This dispensation was meant to circumvent the electoral laws under which a serving Government servant cannot contest an election.
While proclaiming the Emergency, he has suspended the Constitution and granted to himself special powers to amend the Constitution through executive orders. He has removed from office Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other judges of the Supreme Court, who were taking an independent line since March, 2007, and inducted other judges, who were perceived to be favourable to him and the Army. The removal of these Judges followed their refusal to take a new oath under the orders issued by him after suspending the Constitution. Their taking the new oath would have implied their approval of his unconstitutional actions.
When the Supreme Court conditionally allowed the election to the office of the President to go ahead as scheduled, Musharraf and his supporters presumed that the court appeared to be disinclined to set aside the special dispensation. But, as the proceedings on the petitions continued, it appeared as if the majority of the judges was coming round to the view that the special dispensation was illegal.
Thus, Musharraf was faced with two options in order to ensure his survival in power--- await the judgement and then proclaim an Emergency if the judgement went against him or pre-empt the judgement by proclaiming an Emergency. He apparently chose the second option since once the judgement was pronounced, it might have been difficult to have it set aside by an executive order since he would have legally ceased to be the President after the judgement.
After having made a pre-emptive strike against the judiciary, he has made a pre-emptive strike against the people in order to prevent any public uprising against his blatantly illegal and arbitrary actions. He has ordered the arrest of a large number of his political opponents, placed the sacked Chief Justice, other non-cooperative judges and human rights activists under house arrest, gagged the media and given a free hand to the police to suppress any public demonstrations against his actions.
There have been sporadic demonstrations at Lahore, Multan and some other cities, mainly spearheaded by lawyers, who have been in the forefront of the campaign against Musharraf since March, 2007, but one does not as yet see the making of a public revolt of uncontrollable dimensions. Such a public revolt is likely only if the various political and religious parties opposed to his continuance in power unite against him. They have not been able to because many distrust Mrs. Benazir Bhutto as much as they distrust Musharraf. He has exploited this lack of unity to weaken the opposition to him ever since there were growing signs of disenchantment with him since the beginning of this year.
Whether there is a successful public revolt or not would largely depend on the attitude of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and Mr. Altaf Hussain's Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The PPP has a large following in the rural areas of Sindh and in the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab and the MQM in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur in Sindh. The MQM is unlikely to join any movement to destabilise Musharraf, a fellow-Mohajir, who has brought it out of the dog house of political isolation and enabled it to come to power in Sindh as part of a coalition.
As she was doing even before the proclamation of the Emergency, Benazir continues to play a double game. While making strong pro forma criticism of Musharraf and his actions and calling for a public rally and a so-called long march to demand the restoration of the status quo ante, she has been trying to keep undamaged the covert bridges which she had built up with Musharraf through the good offices of the US in order to facilitate her return to power as the Prime Minister. If she gives a call for a public revolt to demand his resignation instead of merely demanding the restoration of the status quo ante, it could have an electrifying effect on large sections of the people, but whether she would do so would upon the kind of signal she gets from the US, her benefactor and mentor.
Like her, the US and the rest of the Western countries too have been playing a double game----overt condemnation of Musharraf's actions coupled with calls for a return to the status quo ante and simultaneously an anxiety to prevent a mass revolt. In their perception, such a revolt might not only result in the overthrow of Musharraf, but might also further endanger Western interests in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region at a time when Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and their jihadi associates have stepped up their activities against the NATO forces in Afghanistan and against the Pakistan Army in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
There has been considerable disenchantment with Musharraf in Pakistan as well as in the West. The Pakistani people do not see his political exit as likely to presage a political disaster for Pakistan.
As against this, the Western countries are grudgingly realising that he has become an embarrassment and a liability and hence may have to go ultimately. But they do not want him to go immediately till a stable replacement for him is in position. They would prefer him to be slowly eased out over a period of time by the normal political process and not removed abruptly by a public revolt. They look upon Benazir as capable of providing such an alternative despite the fact that her past performance as the Prime Minister during two terms was unsatisfactory. Her previous tenures as the Prime Minister saw the emergence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, from where Al Qaeda spread its tentacles to the rest of the world.
Musharraf's game plan is to have his re-election as the President on October 6 validated by the re-constituted rubber stamp Supreme Court, amend the Constitution through an executive order to curtail the independence of the judiciary and prevent its future interference in matters perceived as likely to have an impact on political stability and national security and then lift the Emergency and allow elections to the National assembly and the provincial Assemblies to be held. He is hoping that the West would get reconciled to his unconstitutional actions if his game plan succeeds and that Benazir would not rock his boat if he continues to dangle before her the carrot of another term as the Prime Minister and if the US manages to keep her under control.
Benazir would have reason to fear that her chances of becoming the Prime Minister again would diminish if Musharraf were to quit. In his absence, all the Punjabi and most of the religious parties might unite to prevent her return to office as the Prime Minister. She needs Musharraf to return to power and Musharraf would need her to survive in power.
The ultimate success of Musharraf's efforts to survive in power and re-establish his credibility in the eyes of the international community would depend on his success in dealing with the jihadi terrorists. Despite American security assistance of over US $ two billion to fight the terrorists, he has hardly done anything worthwhile to neutralise the terrorists----apart from arresting some Al Qaeda operatives, who were living in different Pakistani towns and handing them over to the US. The spectacular resurgence of the Neo Taliban and the resilience shown by Al Qaeda were facilitated by Musharraf's inaction.
They are now spreading death and destruction not only in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, but also in large parts of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, where they have set up a de facto parallel State. Battle fatigue is setting in the Pakistani para-military forces, who are bearing the brunt of the terrorist attacks. They are slowly losing the will to fight their own co-religionists to serve what they perceive as purely US interests. From the tribal areas, the terrorists are now spreading their activities to non-tribal areas, including even Islamabad, Rawalpindi and other garrison towns. Initially they were attacking police officers. Then they started attacking Army and para-military officers. Now, they are attacking even Air Force officers. Only Naval officers have not been attacked so far.
The jihadi elements and the religious fundamentalist parties view the total identification of Musharraf and Benazir with the US' security interests as detrimental to Pakistan and Islam. If the two come together in power at the prodding of the US, this is bound to provoke them to further step up their activities. Whatever utility Musharraf and Benazir have in the eyes of the West would disappear if their coming together makes the terrorist situation even more difficult to handle than it is today.
Two other factors would determine how the situation evolves in Pakistan---- the attitude of the senior and junior officers of the Armed Forces. Till now, Musharraf has been having the support of the Lt. Gens and above to his actions. Will he continue to have their support if there is a mass revolt against him? Conventional wisdom holds that there is a strong esprit de corps and discipline in the senior leadership of the Pakistan Army and that a General may not stage a coup against another General. This may be true, but even the Lt. Gens. and Gens, who are loyal to Musharraf, may be constrained to act against him and make him quit in a graceful manner if they are worried that the credibility of the Army as an institution is being damaged by his actions and by the public opposition to him.
Such a situation could arise if there is a mass agitation against him and the security forces are forced to open fire on their own co-citizens repeatedly. Such a situation could also arise if terrorism gets out of control and if the senior officers decide that because of his close identification with US policies and interests, he would not be able to bring the situation under control. It could also arise if the desertions increase from the para-military forces and soldiers start deserting even from the Army and senior officers fear a mutiny at the lower levels in protest against Musharraf making them kill fellow-Muslims to save American lives and interests.
The esprit de corps and discipline are weak in the case of the officers of the rank of Maj. Gens. and below. They might be tempted to move against Musharraf to put a stop to his serving the US agenda and suppressing alleged jihadis to please the US, but they may not succeed without the support and guidance of at least some of the Lt. Gens. In 1995, Maj. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi and some other junior officers had planned a coup against Benazir in co-operation with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), but they could not succeed because they had very little support even at the level of Maj. Gens and no support at the level of Lt. Gens.
The greatest danger for Musharraf and Benazir presently is an assassination attempt by the jihadis or by their supporters at the lower levels of the Armed Forces or the intelligence agencies. The would-be assassins have to be lucky only once to be able to get rid of them. If that happens, whoever succeeds them, will start marking the distance from the US and its so-called war against terrorism.
Nuclear-armed Pakistan faces an uncertain future. Musharraf and the US have to equally share the responsibility for the mess in Pakistan. Through their sins of commission and omission they have offered Pakistan on a platter to Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists. Osama bin Laden could not have asked for more. He has reasons to be grateful to Washington DC.
(B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
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