The government is fixated on militarily defeating the LTTE and squeezing it out of the two and half districts — Mannar, Mullaithivu and Kilinochchi — that they control. The government’s first priority has been the sanitization and security of Colombo which has been achieved. The Northern offensive involving three divisions appears to be moving simultaneously on two fronts.by Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)
(November, 13, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The targeted killing by the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) of S.P. Tamilchelvan, head of the political wing of the LTTE and the international face of the botched peace process, signals the virtual end of any prospect for a negotiated solution to the ethnic conflict. That is why there is much clarity today in Sri Lanka about the intentions and capabilities of the two warring sides. The Sri Lankan Government (SLG) is making no bones about the pursuit of a military solution while posturing with a political package to be offered once the Tigers have been weakened.
High on morale and motivation, the deeply depleted Tigers are firmly resolved to securing Eelam. When the history of the Tigers is written it is they who will be blamed for two missed opportunities: for failing in 2000 after capturing the Elephant Pass to press home the attack on Jaffna which was up for grabs; and in 2002 to cash in on the peace process. There is one constant: Sinhalese competitive politics and lack of any southern consensus on power sharing.
Since President Mahinda Rajapakse took charge two years ago, there is a rare unity of command between the government and the armed forces. The President’s brother and Defence Secretary, Mr Gothabaya Rajapakse, has turned the military around by impressive salary hikes and providing new respect and dignity to the services which has lowered desertion rates. The induction of two new Infantry Divisions and military hardware while doubling defence spending this year has given the military a renewed sense of confidence and morale reflected in the recent victories in the East. Through active diplomacy, the SLG has successfully isolated the Tigers internationally and seriously disrupted their diaspora network which shores up the flourishing business empire, the backbone of their enviable logistics chain to the North-East.
By discreetly shifting the focus from the ethnic conflict to Tiger terrorism and giving it a global dimension, the SLG has secured considerable international sympathy and support. The war in the East was being described as humanitarian operations to liberate the people from the clutches of the Tigers. The establishment has convinced itself that, as in the East, terrorism can be defeated in the North as well with coordinated operations. While many foreign experts still accept the LTTE as the world’s most deadly and sophisticated terrorist group, the SLG believes it can and must be crushed.
French counter-terrorism expert Gerard Chaliand has had to point out that this was not achievable. The government is citing its impressive 7.4 per cent economic growth rate to assert that it is possible both to fight terrorism and build the economy. Eliminating terrorism is the new buzzword, which echoed during the Track one and a half international conference on terrorism held last month in Colombo. The world’s who’s who on terrorism was invited. Not everyone agreed that the Tigers were a terrorist group. Predictably, there was no agreement over the definition of and the term “war” against terrorism. Awkward issues like human rights, torture, disappearances, and the need for military operations to be compatible with humanitarian law were skirted.
Recently, a host of visiting senior UN officials have made adverse comments on the security of aid workers, the human rights record and the rule of law and justice in Sri Lanka. In some conferences on Sri Lanka, the Tigers are represented by proxy. Not in this one where they were at the receiving end. A few days before the conference, the Tigers had routed a military post at Yala, deep south in the country. The coup de grace was delivered in a daring ground and air assault on the second largest airbase at Anuradhapura within hours of the end of the conference — a Tiger riposte to the deliberations which showcased them as weak and shrivelled.
The sheer audacity of the attack and its stunning execution devastated the base and, according to an authoritative account, destroyed or damaged 21 of the 24 aircraft, the biggest loss of the SLAF. Of the 20 Black Tigers, three were shot dead and 17 blew themselves up. The two Zlin 143 aircraft flew back safely to base, scoring their fourth air strike in seven months without losing an aircraft. The bold raid, which the establishment called an act of desperation, revealed serious holes in the low-level air defence and quick reaction capability. The precision bombing to take out Tamilchelvan was the SLAF’s revenge attack.
The Navy has scored incredible successes against the Sea Tigers and destroyed all their big vessels. The Army has made the seizure on Thoppigala, the centerpiece of its victory in the East. The SLAF is out on daily bombing missions on land and at sea.
The combined operations of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have severely degraded the fighting capability of the Tigers. Their control of territory and operational capacities have diminished considerably. The LTTE’s elaborate local and international network of resource mobilisation yields nearly $400 million annually of which $8 million goes towards operational costs. Mr Shanaka Jayasekara from the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, MacQuarie University, Australia, has said that the government’s coordinated politico-military diplomatic offensive has reduced the LTTE’s resource mobilisation and supply chain capability by 60 to 75 per cent and that the Tigers would require 12 months to restore it to 50 per cent capacity. According to him, this gives the government a 12-to-18-month window of opportunity for reviving the political process, the last priority for the government.
The government is fixated on militarily defeating the LTTE and squeezing it out of the two and half districts — Mannar, Mullaithivu and Kilinochchi — that they control. The government’s first priority has been the sanitization and security of Colombo which has been achieved. The Northern offensive involving three divisions appears to be moving simultaneously on two fronts. One is the clearance of the A 32 Coastal Highway from Mannar to Pooneryn as the alternate Main Supply Route (MSR) to Jaffna since the A 9 MSR runs through Tiger territory. This thrust will ensure that the LTTE’s 130 mm guns which shell Palaly airfield from Pooneryn are neutralised. The second front is directed at the heart of Wanni and has made at least three battalion-size incursions despite stiff resistance.
Army Commander Gen Sarath Fonseka’s plan is to weaken and destroy the LTTE so that it becomes an unviable force. An all-out offensive on the North is fraught with danger for an already overextended Army.
The All-Party Representative Committee (APRC), which is tasked with producing the political package, has gone into hibernation. It will be a miracle if it can deliver this year, a devolution framework with a Southern consensus as the UNP, the JVP and the TNA are outside the APRC. The notion of power sharing is kept alive to appease the international community. India is sticking to silent diplomacy: our position is well known; we do not favour a military solution and have told the government to move expeditiously towards a political package.
Many Sri Lankan Tamils fear that the Rajapakse brothers who rule Sri Lanka are determined to wipe out the Tigers, systematically demerge the North-East and seriously dilute the political package. Ironically, the beleagured Tigers are their only hope now. Watch out for Prabhakaran’s November 27 Heroes’ Day Speech.
Gen Ashok K Mehta was commissioned in the 5th Gorkha Rifles in 1957. He took part in all the military operations undertaken by India except the 1947 war in Jammu and Kashmir and the 1962 China war when he was on a peacekeeping mission in Congo (Zaire) in 1962. He did courses at Fort Leavenworth (US) in 1975 and the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK in 1974. He is a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff, of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His last assignment was General Officer Commanding, Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) South, in Sri Lanka.
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