The State of Jihadi Terrorism in Pakistan

It has been my view that while constant US pressure on Musharraf to repeatedly use his Air Force against suspect madrasas and alleged Al Qaeda hide-outs in the tribal area has partly contributed to the jihadi upsurge, Musharraf cannot escape his own share of responsibility for the increase in the activities of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda jihadi terrorists in Pakistani territory.

(November,15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) At the instance of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the new Vice Chief of the Army Staff who is expected to take over as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) as and when Gen.Pervez Musharraf keeps his commitment to give up his second hat as the COAS, a background briefing on the state of jihadi terrorism in Pakistan was organised by the Directorate-General of Military Operations (DGMO) for a select group of Pakistani journalists at the General Headquarters at Rawalpindi on November 14,2007. This was the first briefing of its kind held by the Pakistan Army since 9/11. It is believed that the Army officers, who conducted the briefing, were unusually free and frank in sharing their views and concerns with the invited journalists.

It is not clear whether Gen.Kiyani himself attended the briefing. According to reliable sources in the Pakistani media community, what came out clearly during the briefing was that Gen.Kiyani believes that the failure to deal effectively with jihadi terrorism in Pakistani territory was to some extent due to the over-militarisation of Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy under American influence. Even before this briefing and weeks before Musharraf imposed a State of Emergency, non-Governmental analysts in Pakistan were pointing out that some of the problems being faced by Pakistan in the tribal areas could be attributed to what they perceived as Musharraf's amenability to US pressure in counter-terrorism.

A point often heard from non-Governmental analysts was: Would the US use the kind of military methods on its own citizens in its homeland that it has been forcing Musharraf to use on the tribal citizens of Pakistan? They were having in mind the repeated bombing of madrasas in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) allegedly under US pressure just because US intelligence agencies and military officers suspected that these madrasas were being used by Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban as training centres for suicide terrorists. According to them, hundreds of innocent tribal children were killed in the bombings, thereby spreading anti-US and anti-Musharraf anger right across the tribal belt. After the bombings, it was allegedly found that the US-supplied intelligence, which led to the aerial bombing, was not correct.

Ayesha Haroon, of the "News", who was one of the journalists, who attended the briefing at the GHQ, has said in her detailed report published by her paper on November 15,2007,as follows: "The journalists were told that the VCOAS stresses that "military solutions must be politically acceptable" and "only minimum use of force must be resorted to."

It has been my view that while constant US pressure on Musharraf to repeatedly use his Air Force against suspect madrasas and alleged Al Qaeda hide-outs in the tribal area has partly contributed to the jihadi upsurge, Musharraf cannot escape his own share of responsibility for the increase in the activities of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda jihadi terrorists in Pakistani territory. His predecessors as military dictators had the good sense to realise that the Army alone cannot effectively govern the country and maintain law and order without the co-operation of the Police and other civilian bureaucracy.

The Police has an important role in counter--insurgency and counter-terrorism. They act as the eyes and ears of the Government even in the remotest of villages. They know the community better than the Army. Gen.Zia ul-Haq and other military dictators of the past tried to strengthen the self-pride and elan of the Police in order to secure their co-operation for the Army. Musharraf was the first military dictator, who sought to humiliate the Police right from the day he took over in October,1999, and marginalise its role. He appointed junior and middle-level Army officers---some serving, some retired--- as monitors of the performance of senior police officers. There were shocking instances where senior Police officers, holding a position equivalent to the rank of a Maj.Gen. in the Army, were asked to report to army officers of the rank of Major or even Captain. These junior officers, who knew very little of the community, were asked to write the annual performance report of very senior police officers. Musharraf also started an exercise to militarise the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of the Ministry of the Interior, which, in the past, used to be largely, if not predominantly, staffed by Police and other civilian officers. The IB of Pakistan shared the same civilian traditions and work practices as its Indian counterpart. Musharraf sought to change this in order to give the Army a greater role in the IB. There was a similar mishandling of the non-police sections of the civilian bureaucracy.

The result: A drying-up of the flow of intelligence not only from the tribal areas, but also from other parts of the country as well. Police officers hardly investigated terrorism-related cases either because of their resentment with Musharraf or because of a fear of incurring the wrath of the terrorists." It serves the Army and Musharraf right" was their attitude. There was neither effective prevention nor successful investigation in most cases. Successful investigation and prosecution is an important deterrent to the spread of terrorism. This is hardly to be found in Pakistan.

8.Another blunder committed by Musharraf was the over-use of the Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Corps in the operations against terrorists in the tribal areas. He wanted to avoid using the Punjabi-dominated Army for ground operations. While the Army is actively involved in the ground operations against the Baloch freedom-fighters in Balochistan, it was confining itself to the barracks in the FATA and in the Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). American officials and their counterparts in Pakistan often claim that Musharraf has deployed nearly 80,000 troops in the tribal areas. The Americans cite this as one of the reasons for their strong backing to the General despite his growing unpopularity.

What they do not mention is that many of these security personnel are the tribal members of the para-military forces, who come from that area, and not Pakistani military personnel recruited from other areas of the country. A large number of the Pakistani army personnel are used not for ground operations aqgainst the terrorists, but for providing physical security to American and other NATO military supplies to Afghanistan from the Karachi port after they are landed there. This has been creating resentment among the tribal personnel of the para-military forces, who feel that Musharraf, under US pressure, is making not only Muslims kill Muslims, but also Pashtuns kill Pashtuns, in the name of the so-called war on terrorism. The FM radio stations operated by pro-Al Qaeda jihadi leaders in the tribal areas have been repeatedly alleging in their broadcasts directed to the fellow-tribals in the para-military forces that innocent tribals are being killed in order to save American lives in the US homeland.

10. As a result of this, there has been a growing number of desertions of Pashtuns serving in the para-military forces. Only now, for the last few days, Musharraf has been using regular Army units to counter the supporters of Maulana Fazlullah in the Swat Valley, but afraid that the Pashtun soldiers of the Army too might start deserting their units like the Pashtun members of the para-military forces, he has been avoiding the use of the army in ground operations and has instead been relying increasingly on helicopter gunships. This has, on the one hand, resulted in an increase in the number of civilian casualties due to indiscriminate air-mounted actions and, on the other, further fuelled the resentment in the para-military forces, whose personnel are asking: Are the lives of the Army personnel more precious than those of the Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Corps?

Musharraf has so far not told his people and the international community that Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations in the tribal areas have been increasingly targeting Shias and Christians. Captured Shia members of the para-military forces are being treated with brutality and killed by beheading or by cutting their throats. Shia members of the civil society are also being targeted. The FM radio stations have been indulging in the most horrible anti-Shia broadcasts. Shias are being projected as American agents in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. They are alleging that the majority of the prostitutes in Pakistan are Shias and projecting the Shias as the sect of the prostitutes in the Ummah. A highly reputed school for poor tribal girls run in the FATA by a Christian missionary organisation was targeted and forced to close through intimidation. There are no Buddhists in the tribal areas, but many historical Buddhist heritage sites are there. These too are systematically being attacked. Al Qaeda is trying to replicate Iraq in Pakistan by exacerbating the already existing divide between the Shias and the Sunnis in the civil society as well as in the Army.

Musharraf has been totally helpless in dealing with the situation. There is an urgent need to encourage the emergence of a new leadership---political as well as military---which would be able to deal with the worsening jihadi terrorism with greater political sensitivity and operational effectiveness.

The text of the "News" report on the GHQ briefing is annexed.

(B.Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

ANNEXURE (From the "News" of November 15,2007)

‘No impact of emergency on militancy’

Army says elements freed by SC attacking security forces

By Ayesha Haroon

ISLAMABAD: Even as General Musharraf's 2007 emergency has had no impact on the ongoing counter-terrorism action by the military operations, Swat and Malakand are expecting a major Army operation to rid them of local Taliban leadership by the end of December.

In a background briefing to senior editors by the Directorate General of Military Operations, at the GHQ on Wednesday, about the VCOAS' concept of handling growing militancy in the country, especially in NWFP and Balochistan, it was told that the VCOAS wanted to create a balance between the military and political solutions.

Significantly, when asked how the imposition of emergency has improved the DGMO's work in quelling militancy, given that countering militancy was one of the main reasons given for General Musharraf's Emergency 2007, it was told that emergency has had "no impact" on the DGMO's work vis a vis terrorism.

"The journalists were told that the VCOAS stresses that "military solutions must be politically acceptable" and "only minimum use of force must be resorted to." Worryingly, the message from those involved in the military operations is that they see no political will to "get it over with". It was said that "neglect" of the intrinsic issues and the deep-seated political and development problems is continuing.

It was shared in the briefing that no willingness from the government functionaries was forthcoming to adequately administer the areas - even the "political agent of Waziristan sits in Peshawar".

"Improving the situation would need a wholesome approach which is not there, except in presentations," was a rather depressing assessment. The MO says it is trying to aim for a strong political administration and building up local institutions. "That is the end state we are looking for, but when we try to push the local administration to take the lead, they are hesitant."

Participants of the briefing were told that while the Government of Pakistan's Fata strategy included multiple prongs: military, political, and development; however, all three prongs did not work at the same pace; particularly development, which came to a halt due to the security situation.

It was said that the valley of Piochar, currently under the control of Mullah Fazalullah and his comrades, would be sanitised by the end of December and the local gang leaders, including Fazalullah, Qari Mushtaq, Ikramuddin, Cheenala, TOR Mullah, are the main targets.

Bedevilled by the poor intelligence, which earlier resulted in embarrassing captures of soldiers and members of law-enforcing agencies, the MO personnel leading the action have come to the conclusion that instead of the huge threat of thousands of local Taliban followers of Fazalullah, Swat is being terrorised by a group of 40-50 odd thugs. They are thugs masquerading as Taliban leaders, and they will soon be cleaned up, participants of the briefing were told.

Troops morale given the abductions and the seeming lack of central authority and the writ were the issues raised a number of times during the briefing. While the participants were reassured of the willingness by all those in the field to carry out the orders diligently, it was conceded that there appears no central agency in the affected areas.

"What can you do if the police or levies give up arms?" The local administration is too threatened to man the posts, exacerbating the already poor law and order situation. About the troops' surrender at Wana there was no excuse given. "It was shameful for us that people decided not to fight." It will take us a long time to come out of it, participants were told. Interestingly, the recently amended Army Act, that includes court martial of civilians, did not elicit much enthusiasm or confidence by the MO personnel.

Online adds: More than 600 security personnel and 1,300 civilians were killed in at least 28 suicide attacks after the Lal Masjid operation. The high-ups at GHQ admitted that the incidents of extremism and terrorism were on the rise after the operation. The extremists in North Waziristan have ended the peace agreement, the meeting was told.

The security personnel were ambushed for at least 192 times, 39 bomb blasts and 28 suicide attacks occurred in the country after the Lal Masjid operation. The military is strengthening its positions in the Swat valley. The top officials said that situation in North and South Waziristan was not satisfactory, and a priority of the security forces was to narrow the noose around Baitullah Mehsud.

From 2001 to date, at least 966 military men were martyred and 2,259 others were injured; 488 foreign extremists were killed, 24 others were arrested and 324 foreign extremists were injured, it was said. The military official said the elements released by the Supreme Court were attacking the security forces and targeting national installations. "We have irrefutable evidence those who were set free under the directives of Supreme Court are attacking the security forces, targeting national installations and worsening the situation.

"We will not allow extremism to spill into other parts of NWFP. However, more measures will be taken to crush it," they vowed. The Army has fortified its position in Swat and 100,000 troops are participating in war against extremism in Balochistan, tribal areas and other parts of NWFP," the officials said. "We are cooperating and coordinating with the international forces, engaged in operation in Afghanistan. Different targets in NWFP have been hit due to this cooperation."