Two years of Rajapaksa rule shows a shift in the nation's contextual and conceptual approach, not only in handling the war with the LTTE, but also on issues relating to political morality, governance (including accountability and 
rule of law), ethnic amity (not co-existence as his vision says), and fundamental rights of citizens. Instead of using the CFA the peace process as means to end the war, the President has used their aberrations as an excuse to use the military as the means to 'end' the conflict.(November, 19, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Mahinda's vision for the country: CHANGE Sri Lanka to be a Modern State whilst Fostering the National Heritage and Culture with Peaceful Co-existence among the Communities of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and others, instilling Economic Growth and Prosperity; and Maintaining Friendly Relationship with all Nations. –
Mahinda's vision for the country
Clever, grim and sad. These three words sum up Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa's two years in office this month. These three words also present a cameo of the present, the immediate future and the long term future of Sri Lanka and its people. If Mahinda's vision quoted above was being implemented, his actions during the two years of presidency did not show it, despite some paradigm changes he has effected in the island. It is clear that he sees 'the path to peace' through a military prism rather than a negotiated peace process.
On the other hand, the results of his actions during the last two years show a well-planned and executed effort to achieve a few other macro goals. These include: make himself the unquestionable leader and saviour of Sinhalas, take Sri Lanka out of the morass of peace negotiations, restore military morale by giving freedom of action, take advantage of Karuna's breakaway from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to gain control of the east, contextualise the war against the LTTE to the global war on terror, and make the opposition parties including the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) irrelevant to his strength in the long term.
In this scheme of things, two aspects of global concern (particularly India) that would have long term effect on Sri Lanka as a nation did not figure. These are: creating conditions for lasting peace, and erasing the dismal human rights record of Sri Lanka. Despite their shortcomings, his predecessor Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga and the leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickremesinghe, while in office tried to address these two important issues.
Two years of Rajapaksa rule shows a shift in the nation's contextual and conceptual approach, not only in handling the war with the LTTE, but also on issues relating to political morality, governance (including accountability and rule of law), ethnic amity (not co-existence as his vision says), and fundamental rights of citizens. Instead of using the CFA the peace process as means to end the war, the President has used their aberrations as an excuse to use the military as the means to 'end' the conflict.
Qualitatively, three clear paradigms emerge from this shift. These are: political interests over riding national interests, military initiatives overtaking other considerations, and trading off human rights for political or military priorities.
As a result, the feeling of insecurity among the minorities, particularly Tamils, increased for the first time after the ceasefire came into force in 2002. The clock has been put back on the so- called 'federal formula' which held so much hope for peace mongers and the people weary of war. The peace vision has faded under the bright glare of an emerging military vision. It is a tragic development for the people of Sri Lanka because peace and military visions never travel together.
Political Gamesmanship
The President, a politician more than a peacemaker, had cleverly used the existing negative leverages in politics and the peace process to establish himself and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) firmly in the saddle. He has put the opposition and its leader and presidential aspirant Ranil Wickremesinghe in disarray. The UNP is now locked in a struggle to survive as a credible alternative to the ruling party.
Rajapaksa has probably halted the run on the SLFP vote banks engineered by the JVP, which has set its eyes on grabbing power. While people sniggered at Rajapaksa's omnibus expansion of his cabinet strength to 100 plus, the President had the last laugh as the political trade offs paid. The UNP lost key members in parliament who crossed over to the President's ranks. Smaller minority parties, stranded and listless, have joined the presidential bandwagon. To ensure everyone acted upon his script, the control was passed on to the Rajapaksa family. He appointed his brothers ? Basil and Gotabaya in key appointments. This triumvirate of Rajapaksa brothers guide government policy, administration, and security operations regardless of ministerial domains.
Rajapaksa has sent clear signals that he would not forgive or forget those who break away from his ranks or present his rule in poor light. Smear campaigns against them have become part of the political game. No one can accuse him of partiality in this respect. It did not matter whether they enjoyed a cosy relationship with him like Tiran Alles or Mangala Samaraweera. He made it costly for them to defy or embarrass him. Tiran Alles's business is now shattered and his future looks bleak. Attempt of Mangala Samaraweera, former foreign minister, to create a viable opposition party out of Rajapaksa's detractors has not succeeded despite all the fanfare on its arrival. Media criticism was handled with equal vehemence, regardless of international cries over curbs on media freedom.
His action have shown little concern or urgency in responding to human rights grievances. The bureaucratic handling of cases of abductions and 'disappearances,' mostly among Tamils and Muslims, are examples of this. NGOs, particularly of the international kind, who were critical of the government were branded as anti-national or accused as fellow travellers of the LTTE. They were probably considered inconvenient obstacles to the military ends of the President.
Some achievements
It would be incorrect to say there were no achievements in this period. The armed forces regained their morale, earlier shattered by lack of direction in the past. The LTTE's self acquired freedom to behave as it pleased in the first three years of ceasefire has been curbed as the military was given a free hand not only to retaliate but also act proactively. This has put the LTTE on the defensive. As a result LTTE's ability to launch suicide operations at sea and on land was largely reduced. The security forces have "won" the east. It is a moot point whether they would have planned this operation in the same fashion if Karuna had defected from the LTTE with his followers and helped them.
The President also paid special attention to build bridges with countries where the LTTE networks had been operating with impunity. Their fund collection and weapons procurement operations had been a source of strength to the LTTE to further the war effort. Sri Lanka's sustained efforts were instrumental in getting the LTTE banned in the EU and Canada, particularly after they were annoyed with the LTTE for its suspected hand in the killing of Lakshman Kadirgamar, the foreign minister, under Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga. That had set off a series of actions in India, Canada, the US and the EU which are now making the LTTE's overseas operations more and more difficult and risky. Intelligence cooperation between Sri Lanka and these powers has played a powerful role in crippling the LTTE's ocean fleet of supply ships.
For the first time a Sinhala consensus of sorts, though with negative connotations, is emerging. More Sinhala masses are perhaps now veering round to the belief that military action could become the magic wand in the hands of Mahinda to end the 'Tamil Kottiya' regime. The peace lobby has been muted and at times muzzled. War has become a better buzz word than peace now. It is a tragic reality that is dragging the country into an endless abyss of war.
It would be incorrect to attribute the President's achievements were due to his charisma or excellence in governance. The results have been reached through a strong-Mahinda centred orientation to goals rather than the means adopted. His cold blooded non-military strategies included political manipulations, arm twisting of media, ignoring aberrations of corruption and human rights, and offering political trade offs for support. If morality was never the strong suite of Sri Lanka politics, amorality has become the order of the day in the last two years.
(To be concluded in Part II)
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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