"Their primary and immediate objective is the defeat of the US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan and forcing their withdrawal by 
operating from the rear bases set up by the jihadis in Pakistani territory. Their second objective is to extend their activities to the non-tribal areas of Pakistan in the medium and long-term. They realise they cannot control the non-tribal areas immediately. "(November,18, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Pakistan has been in a state of unstable equilibrium due to the erratic decisions and actions of President Pervez Musharraf since March,2007, and his inaction against pro-Al Qaeda jihadi terrorist elements in the tribal areas, which has led to the emergence of a de facto jihadi state in the South and North Waziristan areas of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the Swat Valley of the Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
The Mehsud tribe, headed by Baitullah Mehsud, are in effective control of South Waziristan. A hotch-potch of groups----local tribals, Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Group and Arabs of Al Qaeda--- jointly control North Waziristan and the followers of Mulla Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) effectively control the Swat Valley. All these groups are allied to the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2, are their mentors, but they do not necessarily co-ordinate their operations, meaning, there is no definitive evidence of a joint command and control. All groups, while having common adversaries and objectives, have maintained their autonomy of operations.
Their primary and immediate objective is the defeat of the US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan and forcing their withdrawal by operating from the rear bases set up by the jihadis in Pakistani territory. Their second objective is to extend their activities to the non-tribal areas of Pakistan in the medium and long-term. They realise they cannot control the non-tribal areas immediately. Their short-term objective in Pakistani territory is to keep the Pakistani security forces bleeding in the hope that battle fatigue would set in, thereby enabling them to achieve their medoum and long-term objective.
Against this background, I discuss in the following paras the possible scenarios under three headings----political stability in Pakistan, the jihadi ground situation and Pakistan's nuclear aresenal.
I.POLITICAL
(A).SCENARIO NO.1: Musharraf holds the elections without lifting the Emergency. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif and other parties opposing Musharraf boycott the elections. The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) headed by Mr.Shujjat Hussain, the defectors from the PPP, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr.Altaf Hussain and other supporters of Musharraf come back to power with a majority. The new National Assembly passes an Act of Indemnity in the form of a Legal Framework Order endorsing ex-post facto Musharraf's proclamation of the Emergency on November 3,2007, and all actions taken by him under it. After thus protecting himself from the legal consequences of his actions, he lifts the Emergency and makes the new National and provincial Assemblies endorse his re-election as the President by the previous Assemblies. He has already made a promise that he will submit his re-election to the new Assemblies for endorsement in order to show that his continuance as the President had the approval of the old as well as the new Assemblies. His opponents in the PPP, the PML and other parties and the elite of Pakistan refuse to accept these results and keep up their street agitation.
(B).SCENARIO NO.2: The PPP, the PML and other opponents of Musharraf decide not to boycott the elections. They contest and win a majority. The new Assemblies refuse to endorse Musharraf's re-election as the President by the old Assemblies. They refuse to pass an Act of Indemnity and initiate action for his impeachment and for the criminal prosecution of his associates for unconstitutional and illegal acts during the Emergency. Musharraf dissolves the Assemblies and decides to continue his rule through provisional constitutional orders as he has been doing since the Emergency was proclaimed. His opponents take to the streets once again.
(C).SCENARIO NO.3: His opponents contest the elections. Musharraf rigs the elections in order to prevent their coming to power. His supporters win a majority and take actions as indicated in Scenario No.I. His opponents refuse to accept the election results and take to the streets.
(D).SCENARIO No.4: Benazir ditches the PML and other opponents of Musharraf once again and contests the elections. Her party either wins a majority or emerges as the largest single party. She agrees to form a coalition government with the supporters of Musharraf, with her as the Prime Minister. As a quid pro quo for her being made the Prime Minister, she makes the new Assemblies endorse Musharraf's re-election as the President and pass an Act of Indemnity to enable the lifting of the emergency. The PML of Nawaz Sharif and the religious fundamentalist parties come together and start an agitation against her. The jihadis, who oppose a woman becoming the Prime Minister, step up their acts of terrorism in the non-tribal areas.
Whichever scenario materialises, there will be continuing---if not deteriorating---political instability in Pakistan and this will come in the way of effective action against jihadi terrorism.
II. JIHADI TERRORISM
(A). THE INDONESIAN SCENARIO: Alarmed by the spread of jihadi terrorism from the tribal to the non-tribal areas and its impact on the lower ranks of the security forces, senior army officers, in collusion with the US intelligence, get rid of Musharraf and wipe out all jihadi elements ruthlessly through large-scale massacres. Pakistan continues under military rule for some more years, with US blessing, to ensure that the jihadis cannot stage a come-back again. I call it the Indonesian scenario because in 1967-68,when the pro-Beijing Indonesian communists of the PKI, taking advantage of the inaction of the then President Sukarno, seemed to be on the verge of taking over power, the Indonesian Army under Suharto, at the prodding of the US intelligence, got rid of Sukarno and embarked on a large-scale massacre of the communists in the civil society and the army in order to make sure that the commusists are destroyed once and for ever. This scenario is unlikely in Pakistan.In Indonesia, Suharto was able to succeed because the Army, by and large, viewed the Communists as Godless atheists and not as fellow-Muslims and had no qualms over massacring them. In the Pakistan Army, many in the lower ranks look upon the jihadis as fellow-Muslims and even as true Muslims. They will never let themselves be used by the senior officers for a massacre of the type one witnessed in Indonesia in respect of the Communists.
(B). THE IRANIAN SCENARIO: The jihadis and the fundamentalist political parties join hands, take advantage of the unpopularity of Musharraf and the US, organise a street revolution, capture power and proclaim an Islamic State. Unlikely. The majority of the Pakistanis are against the fundamentalists and the jihadis. In the elections of 2002, which was the best year for the Pakistani fundamentalists since Pakistan became independent in 1947, they could win only 11 per cent of the votes polled. Eighty-nine per cent voted for non-religious parties. There is no evidence to show further support for the fundamentalist parties. In the Pakistan Army, there is no support for the fundamentalists at the level of Lt.Gens. The Lt.Gens. may not be averse to using the fundamentalists and the jihadis against India or for regaining their position in Afghanistan, but they would not like them to capture power in Islamabad. There is some support for the fundamentalists and the jihadis at the level of Maj.Gens. and below. This support is worrisome, but not yet alarming.If there is real danger of the fundamentalists and the jihadis coming to power, the Army and the various non-religious political parties will join hands to prevent it.
(C). THE PRE-OCTOBER 7,2001, AFGHANISTAN SCENARIO: This refers to the Taliban and Al Qaeda jointly controlling Afghanistan. Unlikely for the same reasons as mentioned under "the Iranian Scenario".
(D)THE LEBANON SCENARIO: The pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elements, by taking advantage of the political instability, strengthen their de facto control over the tribal belt. The Pakistani security forces are unable to dislodge them. Pakistan comes under the dual control of the jihadi elements in the tribal areas and the non-jihadi elements in the non-tribal areas. The jihadis operating from the areas under their control in the tribal areas are able to organise frequent acts of terrorism in the non-tribal areas without being able to expand their territorial control to the rest of Pakistan. The tribal areas continue to serve as the breeding ground for jihadi terrorists operating in different countries of the world. The only difference between Southern Lebanon and the tribal belt of Pakistan would be that whereas in Southern Lebanon, the Hizbollah is in receipt of assistance from Iran and Syria, the jihadi elements in Pakistan's tribal belt would not have the support of any state. However, they would have the support of the Muslim diaspora in the West. This scenario is already taking shape.
III.THE NUCLEAR DANGER
(A).THE NUCLEAR BOMBS ALREADY MANUFACTURED: These are kept in de-mated forms in different locations. The Pakistan Army is exclusively responsible for their physical security. It is technically assisted by US experts. There is no danger of these weapons falling into the hands of the jihadi terrorists unless and until they capture power in Islamabad, which is unlikely.
(B). THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL: This consists of weapons-grade enriched uranium, reprocessed plutonium and nuclear waste capable of being converted into a dirty bomb. The nuclear waste is stored in different places in the NWFP and Balochistan. The responsibility for their physical security is jointly shared by the Pakistan Army and the scientists. In the past, Pakistani Army officers posted on security duty at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant had colluded with A.Q.Khan in selling technology and material such as centrifuges to Iran, Libya and North Korea. There is a danger of the terrorists getting hold of such material even without capturing power in Islamabad. The danger is particularly high in the case of nuclear waste.
(C). NUCLEAR KNOW-HOW: The danger of nuclear know-how leaking to the jihadis through Pakistani scientists sympathetic to their cause is equally high. Such a danger has always existed. If A.Q.Khan and his associates can sell material and know-how to State actors clandestinely, there is no reason why a group of anti-US and pro-bin Laden scientists should not be able to do so to non-State jihadi actors with the complicity of similar-minded military officers at the lower and middle levels.
Restoration of political stability in Pakistan is the sine quo non for the defeat of the jihadi terrorists and for preventing any catastrophic scenario from materialising. There cannot be political stability in Pakistan so long as Musharraf continues to be in power. Public opinion alone cannot make him quit so long as he has the support of the senior leadership of the Army. This leadership has to be persuaded that it is in the interest of the Army, the State and the civil society that he is eased out. This is the task to which the international community should address itself.
The growing instability in Pakistan and the spread of jihadi terrorism pose a threat principally to India, Afghanistan and the West, where there is a large Pakistani diaspora, and then only to the rest of the international community. India and the US should co-operate actively, but covertly in containing jihadi terrorism. Indo-US co-operation in containing and neutralising jihadi terrorism is more important than in containing China.
(B.Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Mehsud tribe, headed by Baitullah Mehsud, are in effective control of South Waziristan. A hotch-potch of groups----local tribals, Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Group and Arabs of Al Qaeda--- jointly control North Waziristan and the followers of Mulla Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) effectively control the Swat Valley. All these groups are allied to the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2, are their mentors, but they do not necessarily co-ordinate their operations, meaning, there is no definitive evidence of a joint command and control. All groups, while having common adversaries and objectives, have maintained their autonomy of operations.
Their primary and immediate objective is the defeat of the US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan and forcing their withdrawal by operating from the rear bases set up by the jihadis in Pakistani territory. Their second objective is to extend their activities to the non-tribal areas of Pakistan in the medium and long-term. They realise they cannot control the non-tribal areas immediately. Their short-term objective in Pakistani territory is to keep the Pakistani security forces bleeding in the hope that battle fatigue would set in, thereby enabling them to achieve their medoum and long-term objective.
Against this background, I discuss in the following paras the possible scenarios under three headings----political stability in Pakistan, the jihadi ground situation and Pakistan's nuclear aresenal.
I.POLITICAL
(A).SCENARIO NO.1: Musharraf holds the elections without lifting the Emergency. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif and other parties opposing Musharraf boycott the elections. The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) headed by Mr.Shujjat Hussain, the defectors from the PPP, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr.Altaf Hussain and other supporters of Musharraf come back to power with a majority. The new National Assembly passes an Act of Indemnity in the form of a Legal Framework Order endorsing ex-post facto Musharraf's proclamation of the Emergency on November 3,2007, and all actions taken by him under it. After thus protecting himself from the legal consequences of his actions, he lifts the Emergency and makes the new National and provincial Assemblies endorse his re-election as the President by the previous Assemblies. He has already made a promise that he will submit his re-election to the new Assemblies for endorsement in order to show that his continuance as the President had the approval of the old as well as the new Assemblies. His opponents in the PPP, the PML and other parties and the elite of Pakistan refuse to accept these results and keep up their street agitation.
(B).SCENARIO NO.2: The PPP, the PML and other opponents of Musharraf decide not to boycott the elections. They contest and win a majority. The new Assemblies refuse to endorse Musharraf's re-election as the President by the old Assemblies. They refuse to pass an Act of Indemnity and initiate action for his impeachment and for the criminal prosecution of his associates for unconstitutional and illegal acts during the Emergency. Musharraf dissolves the Assemblies and decides to continue his rule through provisional constitutional orders as he has been doing since the Emergency was proclaimed. His opponents take to the streets once again.
(C).SCENARIO NO.3: His opponents contest the elections. Musharraf rigs the elections in order to prevent their coming to power. His supporters win a majority and take actions as indicated in Scenario No.I. His opponents refuse to accept the election results and take to the streets.
(D).SCENARIO No.4: Benazir ditches the PML and other opponents of Musharraf once again and contests the elections. Her party either wins a majority or emerges as the largest single party. She agrees to form a coalition government with the supporters of Musharraf, with her as the Prime Minister. As a quid pro quo for her being made the Prime Minister, she makes the new Assemblies endorse Musharraf's re-election as the President and pass an Act of Indemnity to enable the lifting of the emergency. The PML of Nawaz Sharif and the religious fundamentalist parties come together and start an agitation against her. The jihadis, who oppose a woman becoming the Prime Minister, step up their acts of terrorism in the non-tribal areas.
Whichever scenario materialises, there will be continuing---if not deteriorating---political instability in Pakistan and this will come in the way of effective action against jihadi terrorism.
II. JIHADI TERRORISM
(A). THE INDONESIAN SCENARIO: Alarmed by the spread of jihadi terrorism from the tribal to the non-tribal areas and its impact on the lower ranks of the security forces, senior army officers, in collusion with the US intelligence, get rid of Musharraf and wipe out all jihadi elements ruthlessly through large-scale massacres. Pakistan continues under military rule for some more years, with US blessing, to ensure that the jihadis cannot stage a come-back again. I call it the Indonesian scenario because in 1967-68,when the pro-Beijing Indonesian communists of the PKI, taking advantage of the inaction of the then President Sukarno, seemed to be on the verge of taking over power, the Indonesian Army under Suharto, at the prodding of the US intelligence, got rid of Sukarno and embarked on a large-scale massacre of the communists in the civil society and the army in order to make sure that the commusists are destroyed once and for ever. This scenario is unlikely in Pakistan.In Indonesia, Suharto was able to succeed because the Army, by and large, viewed the Communists as Godless atheists and not as fellow-Muslims and had no qualms over massacring them. In the Pakistan Army, many in the lower ranks look upon the jihadis as fellow-Muslims and even as true Muslims. They will never let themselves be used by the senior officers for a massacre of the type one witnessed in Indonesia in respect of the Communists.
(B). THE IRANIAN SCENARIO: The jihadis and the fundamentalist political parties join hands, take advantage of the unpopularity of Musharraf and the US, organise a street revolution, capture power and proclaim an Islamic State. Unlikely. The majority of the Pakistanis are against the fundamentalists and the jihadis. In the elections of 2002, which was the best year for the Pakistani fundamentalists since Pakistan became independent in 1947, they could win only 11 per cent of the votes polled. Eighty-nine per cent voted for non-religious parties. There is no evidence to show further support for the fundamentalist parties. In the Pakistan Army, there is no support for the fundamentalists at the level of Lt.Gens. The Lt.Gens. may not be averse to using the fundamentalists and the jihadis against India or for regaining their position in Afghanistan, but they would not like them to capture power in Islamabad. There is some support for the fundamentalists and the jihadis at the level of Maj.Gens. and below. This support is worrisome, but not yet alarming.If there is real danger of the fundamentalists and the jihadis coming to power, the Army and the various non-religious political parties will join hands to prevent it.
(C). THE PRE-OCTOBER 7,2001, AFGHANISTAN SCENARIO: This refers to the Taliban and Al Qaeda jointly controlling Afghanistan. Unlikely for the same reasons as mentioned under "the Iranian Scenario".
(D)THE LEBANON SCENARIO: The pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elements, by taking advantage of the political instability, strengthen their de facto control over the tribal belt. The Pakistani security forces are unable to dislodge them. Pakistan comes under the dual control of the jihadi elements in the tribal areas and the non-jihadi elements in the non-tribal areas. The jihadis operating from the areas under their control in the tribal areas are able to organise frequent acts of terrorism in the non-tribal areas without being able to expand their territorial control to the rest of Pakistan. The tribal areas continue to serve as the breeding ground for jihadi terrorists operating in different countries of the world. The only difference between Southern Lebanon and the tribal belt of Pakistan would be that whereas in Southern Lebanon, the Hizbollah is in receipt of assistance from Iran and Syria, the jihadi elements in Pakistan's tribal belt would not have the support of any state. However, they would have the support of the Muslim diaspora in the West. This scenario is already taking shape.
III.THE NUCLEAR DANGER
(A).THE NUCLEAR BOMBS ALREADY MANUFACTURED: These are kept in de-mated forms in different locations. The Pakistan Army is exclusively responsible for their physical security. It is technically assisted by US experts. There is no danger of these weapons falling into the hands of the jihadi terrorists unless and until they capture power in Islamabad, which is unlikely.
(B). THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL: This consists of weapons-grade enriched uranium, reprocessed plutonium and nuclear waste capable of being converted into a dirty bomb. The nuclear waste is stored in different places in the NWFP and Balochistan. The responsibility for their physical security is jointly shared by the Pakistan Army and the scientists. In the past, Pakistani Army officers posted on security duty at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant had colluded with A.Q.Khan in selling technology and material such as centrifuges to Iran, Libya and North Korea. There is a danger of the terrorists getting hold of such material even without capturing power in Islamabad. The danger is particularly high in the case of nuclear waste.
(C). NUCLEAR KNOW-HOW: The danger of nuclear know-how leaking to the jihadis through Pakistani scientists sympathetic to their cause is equally high. Such a danger has always existed. If A.Q.Khan and his associates can sell material and know-how to State actors clandestinely, there is no reason why a group of anti-US and pro-bin Laden scientists should not be able to do so to non-State jihadi actors with the complicity of similar-minded military officers at the lower and middle levels.
Restoration of political stability in Pakistan is the sine quo non for the defeat of the jihadi terrorists and for preventing any catastrophic scenario from materialising. There cannot be political stability in Pakistan so long as Musharraf continues to be in power. Public opinion alone cannot make him quit so long as he has the support of the senior leadership of the Army. This leadership has to be persuaded that it is in the interest of the Army, the State and the civil society that he is eased out. This is the task to which the international community should address itself.
The growing instability in Pakistan and the spread of jihadi terrorism pose a threat principally to India, Afghanistan and the West, where there is a large Pakistani diaspora, and then only to the rest of the international community. India and the US should co-operate actively, but covertly in containing jihadi terrorism. Indo-US co-operation in containing and neutralising jihadi terrorism is more important than in containing China.
(B.Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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