Pakistan's civil and military rulers created and nurtured the Taliban and mujahideen for securing 'strategic' depth in Afghanistan and bleeding India by a thousand cuts. Now some of these jihadis have turned the tables against the last bastion of Pakistan's defence and security. The Army has failed to stop their march in the tribal areas and daring suicide assaults in the heartland.by Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)
(November, 15, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) It is said that states have an Army. In Pakistan, the Army is the state. Not surprisingly, at the core of the current crisis is the Pakistan Army and its chief, President Pervez Musharraf. Together they have succeeded in alienating a major portion of society, including a section of the Army, undermined democratic institutions and even failed to contain the jihadi scourge, which has threatened to convert Pakistan into an extremist Islamic state. The irony is that a highly reputed professional force has been so deeply sucked into politics, business and governance that its very rationale is being questioned. The Army's authority is being challenged not only by the Taliban, but also the people of Pakistan.
Pakistan's civil and military rulers created and nurtured the Taliban and mujahideen for securing 'strategic' depth in Afghanistan and bleeding India by a thousand cuts. Now some of these jihadis have turned the tables against the last bastion of Pakistan's defence and security. The Army has failed to stop their march in the tribal areas and daring suicide assaults in the heartland. With a rather diminished strategic vision, the General's quest of de-Talibanisation of Pakistan because of politics and personal survival have superseded national interest. All his talk about unity of command has fallen at the altar of expediency. His bluff is being called by even his strongest ally, the Americans.
Since 9/11 the strategic focus for Pakistan has shifted from India to Afghanistan, where Gen Musharraf is seen to be fighting the US's war on terror. Six years ago, as a prelude to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage set seven conditions for Gen Musharraf's compliance, or Pakistan would be "returned to the stone age". The General had little choice then, but the double game he played helped neither him nor the Americans. After $10 billion of American aid and six years, Mr Armitage told US lawmakers last week that if Gen Musharraf did not deliver, the US would need to "hammer" him.
Recent developments astride the Pakistan-Afghanistan border do not bode well for the political and security goals of both the US and the region as a whole. The US's war in Afghanistan, which was terminated prematurely but 'mission accomplished' proclaimed promptly, has spilled over into FATA and NWFP. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have extended their control in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur in FATA and other parts of NWFP. More recently, Qazi Fazlullah has seized 80 per cent of Swat Valley. The troops are not resisting but laying down arms and deserting.
The lessons learnt by the British and Soviets in the frontier region were apparently never assimilated by the Pakistan Army. The Army is losing the internal war because local people support the Taliban and other indigenous groups. In this lawless land, historically, there has been resistance to outsiders. The Americans understand infringement of local pride and have, therefore, urged Gen Musharraf to permit hot pursuit and cross-border operations, which hurts his pride. This Catch-22 won't go away and sooner than later, US troops will begin crossing the border. In addition, US training teams are believed to be planning special motivation capsules to rebuild the Pakistan Army's will to fight. Besides losing people's support, vital in any counter-insurgency operation, the security forces are thoroughly confused and demoralised, which explains the spate of surrenders, depleted appetite for resistance and largescale desertions.
The loss of will to fight "your own people" can be overcome by employing troops from different regions, or using Shias against Sunnis. This is where the class composition of the Pakistan Army becomes relevant. The Army is a symbol of Punjabi domination. Roughly, 80 per cent of the Army is Punjabi, while Pathans are about 20 per cent. The paramilitary forces are officered by the Army where the majority is again Punjabi: 75 per cent of all ex-servicemen come from three districts of Punjab -- Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Campbellpur.
The Islamisation of the Army plays into the hands of the Taliban. Islam is meant to be the unifying force, primarily to fight the kafirs of Hindu India. The process of Islamisation was boosted by Gen Zia-ul Haq when he upgraded the status of the Unit Moulvis and required them to go into battle. The mullahs and moulvis, who indoctrinated the Army, are themselves the target of military operations. A combination of loss of popular support, perception about fighting the American war and killing one's brethren, especially the clerics, has sapped the morale of the fighting forces. Many Western experts have said that the Pakistan Army could never fight another Muslim nation.
The jihadis are also winning the war for the hearts and minds of the people. The sterling work done by Jamaat-ud Dawa, the parent organisation of Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, during the recent earthquake, outdoing the Army, is etched in the memory of the victims. The girls at Lal Masjid were the orphans of the earthquake. The storming of Lal Masjid was the Pakistan Army's equivalent of Operation Blue Star in Amritsar and the beginning of a loss of face and morale.
The Pakistan Army, on the whole, is a disciplined force with its chain of command still intact. It has interfered far too frequently in politics and governance and now finds itself overstretched, performing multiple tasks. It may have lost its will to fight an internal war, but will rise to the occasion to deter and external foe. The security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is reported to be foolproof, which is underscored by a high degree of trust and loyalty of the personnel who man its "layered defence". The Americans must exercise some level of surveillance and monitoring without exercising any control of the strategic assets.
While Gen Musharraf enjoys the support and loyalty of the Corps Commanders, one cannot be sure of his popularity in the rank and file. It is almost certain that he will give up his uniform soon and Gen Ashfaq Qayani will be the new Chief of Army Staff. Pakistan could be returning to the era of a power troika, a strong President (Gen Musharraf), a weak Prime Minister (Ms Benazir Bhutto) and an ambitious but new to the game COAS, leading an uncertain Army.
This is only the second time that two of the three in the troika will be from the Army and the challenge to the three will be putting Pakistan back on the track and restoring the image of the Army. Without being patronising, India should not lose this opportunity to assert its credentials as a peaceful neighbour and not an enemy country.
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