Photo: LTTE Cadres at FDL in Muhamali on yesterdayBy. Defencewire
(November, 08, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Politics apart, the failure of the SLA to effectively gauge enemy alertness and preparations ahead of a planned offensive is alarming, and may even be an institutional problem. The alarm is also due to the repetition of the problem without solution.
Western systems of warfare, which many Commanders of established armies have adopted without question, stress technological means of collecting information about an enemy. These systems are Network Centric Warfare (NCW) systems similar to those adopted by the United States in Iraq for example. These strategies place emphasis on operation planning using high-tech information and sharing such information with a network of units for operational success.
In modern warfare involving insurgent and terrorist groups, no technology can replace the skill of the infantryman in gaging enemy intent, readiness and critical-mass by actual observations through effective infiltration. In the recent case in Muhamalai, the finger seem to point at a lack of reparation, possibly due to an operational plan put together for a political agenda.
Military operations against insurgents without covert passive surveillance and human intelligence (HUMINT) is doomed from very inception. Mission success is contingent upon last-minute updates on target sets by human intelligence. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and combat scout units that use hide and conceal tactics are the primary sources of tactical information for field commanders. Deployment of such independent units and obtaining necessary information up to the last minute requires investment in time, expertise and experience.
Muhamalai and Kilali, which do not provide adequate natural cover for effective hide and conceal by SOF is further reason for better planning over a longer period of time. Human Intelligence has the crucial task of identifying tactically sound assembly points, fire bases and assault positions for follow-on forces inside enemy territory until the very beginning of the operation. If this procedure was followed to rule, instead of a political agenda as some have observed, the outcomes of last morning's battle would have been quite different.
Meanwhile security sources confirms, the Sri Lanka Army lost 20 men and over 100 others were injured while attempting to breach the LTTE Forward Defence Line at Kilali. 15 LTTE have also been killed. The thrust made by the 55th Division came from Kilali and Muhamalai SLA FDLs. It was unfortunately boxed-in and attacked by the LTTE, which, according to Field Commanders looked like a well rehearsed and prepared strategy following information leaks of an impending advance from that sector. However, contrary to Pro-LTTE media this was not a major military operation and was a limited operation to neutralize the offensive formations of the LTTE along the lagoon. Not a single man was left behind by troops whose objective was never to hold the ground in either case. No Main Battle Tanks were also lost in the attack contrary to the reports of some media. Some infantry weapons left behind by troops have been seized by the LTTE and pictures strewn all over the Internet as part of its propaganda campaign. The heavy air traffic experienced above Jaffna skies is also customary when a battle is going.
Some Field Commanders speaking to Defencewire expressed amazement at the amount of visible preparations made for the assault during the last few weeks. This and other planning shortcomings have been well studied by the LTTE in this sector as evidenced by Muhamalai I where over 300 soldiers were killed and eight Battle-tanks destroyed. Prior to both these assaults, small LTTE recce teams were observed moving in and out of the area measuring troop strength in Kilali and Muhamalai. The area, lying adjacent to the lagoon, provides ample opportunities for infiltration and reconnaissance.
(November, 08, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Politics apart, the failure of the SLA to effectively gauge enemy alertness and preparations ahead of a planned offensive is alarming, and may even be an institutional problem. The alarm is also due to the repetition of the problem without solution.
Western systems of warfare, which many Commanders of established armies have adopted without question, stress technological means of collecting information about an enemy. These systems are Network Centric Warfare (NCW) systems similar to those adopted by the United States in Iraq for example. These strategies place emphasis on operation planning using high-tech information and sharing such information with a network of units for operational success.
In modern warfare involving insurgent and terrorist groups, no technology can replace the skill of the infantryman in gaging enemy intent, readiness and critical-mass by actual observations through effective infiltration. In the recent case in Muhamalai, the finger seem to point at a lack of reparation, possibly due to an operational plan put together for a political agenda.
Military operations against insurgents without covert passive surveillance and human intelligence (HUMINT) is doomed from very inception. Mission success is contingent upon last-minute updates on target sets by human intelligence. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and combat scout units that use hide and conceal tactics are the primary sources of tactical information for field commanders. Deployment of such independent units and obtaining necessary information up to the last minute requires investment in time, expertise and experience.
Muhamalai and Kilali, which do not provide adequate natural cover for effective hide and conceal by SOF is further reason for better planning over a longer period of time. Human Intelligence has the crucial task of identifying tactically sound assembly points, fire bases and assault positions for follow-on forces inside enemy territory until the very beginning of the operation. If this procedure was followed to rule, instead of a political agenda as some have observed, the outcomes of last morning's battle would have been quite different.
Meanwhile security sources confirms, the Sri Lanka Army lost 20 men and over 100 others were injured while attempting to breach the LTTE Forward Defence Line at Kilali. 15 LTTE have also been killed. The thrust made by the 55th Division came from Kilali and Muhamalai SLA FDLs. It was unfortunately boxed-in and attacked by the LTTE, which, according to Field Commanders looked like a well rehearsed and prepared strategy following information leaks of an impending advance from that sector. However, contrary to Pro-LTTE media this was not a major military operation and was a limited operation to neutralize the offensive formations of the LTTE along the lagoon. Not a single man was left behind by troops whose objective was never to hold the ground in either case. No Main Battle Tanks were also lost in the attack contrary to the reports of some media. Some infantry weapons left behind by troops have been seized by the LTTE and pictures strewn all over the Internet as part of its propaganda campaign. The heavy air traffic experienced above Jaffna skies is also customary when a battle is going.
Some Field Commanders speaking to Defencewire expressed amazement at the amount of visible preparations made for the assault during the last few weeks. This and other planning shortcomings have been well studied by the LTTE in this sector as evidenced by Muhamalai I where over 300 soldiers were killed and eight Battle-tanks destroyed. Prior to both these assaults, small LTTE recce teams were observed moving in and out of the area measuring troop strength in Kilali and Muhamalai. The area, lying adjacent to the lagoon, provides ample opportunities for infiltration and reconnaissance.
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