The air raid is sure to boost the morale of the LTTE cadres and warm the hearts of its support network among the Tamil Diaspora. 
Its timing, when the LTTE is at the receiving end militarily with its international operations in jeopardy, is perhaps ideal. However, it is time the LTTE comes to terms with the realities of the ground situation and see the air raid in perspective. The loss of two aging Mi-24 gun ships is not going to stop the Kfir and MiG strikes on LTTE strongholds. Nor is the relentless military pressure in Mannar, Omanthai, Muhamalai, Nagarkovil and Pulmoddai areas going recede.(October,22, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Two light aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s air wing in a predawn raid on the Sri Lanka air base at Anuradhapura in north central district dropped two bombs to destroy two Mi-24 gun ships of the air force today. For the first time the LTTE air raid was combined with a ground attack. One airman was killed and 14 others were reported injured in the LTTE raid. The operation lasting from 3 am to 5 am has clearly indicated that the LTTE might be down but not out. A Bell 212 helicopter, that took off from the nearby airbase in Vavuniya to provide follow up action, crash-landed due to a technical failure killing two pilots and the two gunners.
The LTTE air raid was not unexpected. The LTTE's past experience has shown that air operations even on a limited scale draw disproportionately high publicity and cause panic in Colombo. With no great successes to boast of in recent times in both ground and sea operations, air operation was the LTTE's ideal choice. However, the LTTE's targeting of Anuradhapura, a religious centre and a 'must visit' point in the international tourism itinerary, close on the heels of sporadic LTTE actions in the less popular tourist spot of Yala National Park in the Deep South is interesting. The LTTE's air assets are qualitatively and quantitatively limited and replacements are dear if not non existent. Active bases like Katunayake though more attractive as targets may not be as vulnerable to sneak raids with better air defence measures in place. Anuradhapura is not a mainline operational base. It has been a training base and used for drone operations in the past. A raid on Anuradhapura has all the dramatics the LTTE wants to catch international headlines. With the adverse publicity mileage gained in the Anuradhapura raid, one can expect the issue of international travel advisories against tourist travel to Sri Lanka, particularly as it comes after attacks in Yala area.
Another significant aspect of the air raid on Anuradhapura is combining of the LTTE's ground operations for the first time. In my SAAG Sri Lanka up date No. 117 'LTTE air raid on Katunayake air base' dated March 26, 2007 (available ) I had commented on the advantages of a combined air and ground attack: "It is difficult to believe that LTTE risked their precious aircraft just to lob two bombs that caused little damage to Sri Lanka air force aircraft. There is a strong possibility that LTTE planned to carryout the air raid in coordination with a ground strike on the air base, which did not materialise. If that were so, LTTE's ground support in the vicinity of the airbase could have been in one or more forms: a mole in the airbase, a ground attack force of LTTE commandos, a diversionary effort elsewhere to prevent retaliatory action etc." Though in the two air raids that followed Katunayake attack the LTTE had not used ground forces, in Anuradhapura the LTTE appears to have used the operational logic ofcombining a ground attack in tandem.
The ability of the LTTE to sneak in a force large enough to sustain a night operation (and perhaps to indicate the target for the raiding aircraft) in a high security air base shows gross inadequacies in the Sri Lankan ground security measures. [Ideally an area at least within the machine gun range (say 3000 yards) around the perimeter needs to be sanitized and patrolled vigorously particularly at night.] Another aspect is the proximity of Anuradhapura to Wilpattu National Park on the west offering ideal sanctuary for LTTE raiders. For quite sometime in the past, Wilpattu was considered a safe haven for the LTTE though sporadic search operations did not yield results.
The air raid is sure to boost the morale of the LTTE cadres and warm the hearts of its support network among the Tamil Diaspora. Its timing, when the LTTE is at the receiving end militarily with its international operations in jeopardy, is perhaps ideal. However, it is time the LTTE comes to terms with the realities of the ground situation and see the air raid in perspective. The loss of two aging Mi-24 gun ships is not going to stop the Kfir and MiG strikes on LTTE strongholds. Nor is the relentless military pressure in Mannar, Omanthai, Muhamalai, Nagarkovil and Pulmoddai areas going recede.
In the nearly 22 months of the undeclared Eelam War-4 since December 1, 2005 the LTTE has undoubtedly been weakened. Their losses in terms of territory and war casualties have put the organisation in the most vulnerable position for the first time after the bloodletting undergone in their war with Indian troops (1987-90).
The LTTE is hemmed in both on the sea and land. It never enjoyed the freedom of air space in full. In fact it is fighting a desperate defensive battle in the face of the looming threat of full scale northern offensive by the security forces. Its efforts to carry out major guerrilla action or suicide attacks in Colombo and elsewhere in recent times have not succeeded. Similarly its moves to turn the international concerns on human rights and humanitarian issues in Sri Lanka in its favour have not yielded results. It should be clear to the LTTE that international human rights agenda is not a zero sum game.
According to the statistics released by the Media Centre for National Security (uncorroborated by any other independent source) up to October 18, 2007 a total of 5791 persons have lost their lives in the war. This figure includes LTTE? 3628, Security Forces? 1304 and civilians (unlucky people who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time) - 867. Evidently, the 'killed in action' data does not include hundreds of civilians who have been killed by 'killer squads' of both sides, and others killed or 'disappeared' in fratricidal wars of Tamils. Despite the unreliability of depending solely upon these figures, and in the absence of any other reliable data in the public domain, it is clear the mounting losses are hurting the LTTE more than the security forces.
Though the LTTE had been able to tenaciously hold on to its forward defended localities west of Omanthai and in Muhamalai-Nagarkovil area, the security forces operations have kept there has prevented the LTTE from taking any initiative. The security forces tactics is to wear out the LTTE by slow bleeding rather than through dramatic large scale operations as in the past. It seems the security forces have realised that while gaining territory would make headlines in the news media, bleeding the LTTE to death would provide better results in the long run. This has enabled military initiative to rest in the hands of the security forces for some time now. While the security forces have been regularly using air strikes to keep the LTTE force's head down and disrupt its logistic bases, the much vaunted LTTE artillery is being put to restricted use as ammunition supply lines from overseas have become unreliable. The LTTE had also not been able to procure a reliable air defence weapon or missile, for the same reason.
The LTTE has been steadily losing men and material in clashes with the security forces almost every day. The 'creeping offensive' tactics of the security forces west of A-9, along the Nagarkovil salient and in Mannar sector are likely to be the order of the day for some time to come. Probably Welioya-Kokkilai region east of Vavuniya also will come under this category in the weeks to come.
Last week's LTTE operations in Yala national park area down south in three separate incidents on October 15, 16 and 17, 2007 in which seven soldiers were killed show its efforts of to take the sting out of east. Beyond holding faint hope of reversal of fortune for its cadres operating in the east, the three actions have shown only the LTTE's limited capability. At best strategically it might affect tourism in this region for sometime just as the LTTE attack on the naval station at Galle last year did. It has had some success in Amparai; at the same time its ability to spread is operations further south should not be overestimated. These operations are also not going to ease the security force's pressure in the east or elsewhere because of the sheer lack of numbers with the LTTE.
The Sri Lanka Navy's sinking of 'Matsusima' said to be the LTTE's gun running cargo ship in international waters 700 nautical miles off southern coast of Sri Lanka on October 7, 2007 has dramatically illustrated the new reality of Eelam War-4. The 3000-ton ship went down with its cargo like seven other ships of its kind bringing military cargo for the LTTE during the last one year of naval operations targeting LTTE supply ships.
An analysis of the reports of naval engagements and successes has some interesting pointers to the improvement in the navy's performance. Till February 2007, the navy engaged four vessels within a radius of 200 nautical miles off southern coast of Sri Lanka. However, in September 2007 it managed to sink three ships in a major engagement in a span of two days operating as far away as 700 nautical miles. The Sri Lanka navy is not exactly designed for such long range operations. The off-shore patrol vessels (OPV) in these operations were dispatched well in advance to intercept the LTTE ships. Thus to take up such a long range operation advance intelligence should be available to the navy from the moment the LTTE ship casts off after lifting the cargo.
The navy has said the interrogation of Sea Tigers arrested after the sinking of the Indian trawler (seized by the LTTE) 'Sri Krishna' had provided the intelligence on the LTTE cargo carriers. In a highly secretive organization like the LTTE such information would be available only on a 'need to know' basis. Moreover, the navy had tracked ship movements on a real time basis and engaged them presumably in pre-selected killing zones. All these are point to qualitative improvement not only in the operational competence of the navy but also the inflow of a wide range of information from multiple civil and military sources, particularly from nations with a strategic interest in the region.
After every action, the navy has been able to come out with a list of cargo carried by the ship. If such information are correct (in the absence of any LTTE rebuttal, it is presumed to be so) there was advance information on LTTE's procurements, if not the wish list. The losses of such expensive and difficult to procure military cargo have caused not only huge financial loss to the LTTE but also set back to its operational plans.
The government and the security forces would like to follow the age-old military wisdom of reinforcing success. The LTTE without politics or ideology never clouding its thoughts, has bigger problems at hand: to keep its powder dry to save its domain when the northern offensive breaks out, and save its international support outfit from international counter terror action.
The LTTE's time tested tactics both on land and sea have been failing for sometime now and its operational efficiency is being tested with every victory of the armed forces. While the reasons the falling fortunes of the LTTE are obvious to those outside the confines of the LTTE domain in Wanni, apparently the LTTE is either ignoring them or wishing them away at the policy making level.
The views expressed by the LTTE's Political Head S.P. Thamilchelvan on the current military situation in his interview to TamilNet on September 19, 2007 indicate the LTTE had not come to terms with reality yet. The statement laid heavy emphasis on two things:
The government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) was carrying out "its genocidal war against the Tamil people" without caring for the concerns raised by the international community.
The LTTE would like "the international community not to be carried away by the deceitful programme of the GoSL and to stop every form of aid, to pressure the government to create an environment for peace efforts"
Even after the loss of over 5000 lives in the last two years the international community has shown its inability go beyond renewing the call for peace. The same applies to their human rights concerns not only in Sri Lanka, but in Myanmar and in Darfur as well. International community are the most undependable factor in the whole Eelam equation.
The Eelam War -4 has now gone beyond dramatics. Time has come for the LTTE now to think out of the box, think beyond morale boosting dramatic raids, to wage peace using the fastly depleting reserves of international goodwill the Tamil cause has enjoyed all these years. Will those in the bunkers of Wanni listen? It will be sad for Tamils if they don't.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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