“Terrorism is not just a military problem. It is primarily a major socio-political problem. In the counter terrorism strategy, besides checking violence, we have to isolate and combat an ideology that is irrational and not acceptable to modern society. We have to use all elements of national power; not just military but political, economic and other kind of persuasion and pressures. For this, we need both hard power as well as soft power: hard power to deal with armed terrorists, and soft power to deal humanely with societies, their culture, traditions and ethos. The intellectual and psychological dimensions of the threat are as important as its physical dimension.”By: General V. P. Malik
Ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor to participate in a conference on countering terrorism in the institute that carries the good name of Sri Lanka’s most famous Foreign Minister, Late Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar. In the diplomatic community, Mr. Lakshman
Kadirgamar led his country's campaign against terrorism with singular determination and laid down his life in that cause.
Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar began his tireless campaign against the LTTE terror network much before the concept of "war on terror" entered the diplomatic dictionary. A man of dignity, honor and integrity, a highly respected statesman, he devoted his life to bringing peace to Sri Lanka. His contribution to India-Sri Lanka relations was also immense. His initiatives and efforts helped bring bilateral relations to the level of what he himself summed up as ‘irreversible excellence', and in the words of India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, ‘a new solidity and warmth to bilateral relations’. His assassination on August 12, 2005 has left a void in Sri Lankan and South Asian political life that will be hard to fill. It is also a tragic reminder that unless we fight terror united in all its dimensions, the monster and scourge of terror will continue to damage our countries and civil societies.
INTRODUCTION
There is rarely a lucky day in South Asia these days when our people are not confronted with an act of terrorism; somewhere or the other, in some form or another, for some reason or the other. Terrorism in South Asia ebbs and flows. Terrorism is neither definable within geographical boundaries nor within the traditional moulds of rationality. Terrorist groups do not owe loyalty to any national flag, religion or even ethnic society. They extinguish innocent lives as legitimate victims and seek martyrdom in suicide missions. The terrorists’ threat is further magnified by their acquiring aerial capability, and the very real prospects of such groups acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction and high technology in the pursuit of their endeavors.
Before proceeding further, I need to point out that the so called war on terrorism is only a misnomer, because terrorism is neither state specific nor an ideology. It is a method of employing political violence in pursuit of an ideology. Second World War was not against blitzkrieg, but against Nazism which used blitzkrieg to overrun Europe. The war on terrorism is just a mobilizing term. It can not achieve success unless there is a comprehensive grand strategy that is implemented in letter and spirit.
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONS
In the last 44 years, starting September 1963, the United Nations has adopted 12 conventions concerning counter-terrorism. The number of signatories kept increasing with each successive convention indicating that when the international community feels a real threat to most of its members, it tends to unite and find the best ways to protect the security and well being of the world population.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1373, unanimously and un-equivocally, condemned the attacks on 9/11 and expressed its determination to prevent all such acts. It urged the member states to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. It also decided that member states should ‘deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts.’ It called to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding actions of terrorists or their networks, traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials, use of communication technologies and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups.
Resolution 1373 was further reinforced in Resolution 1456 when the UN decided to monitor its implementation and establish a committee with the assistance of appropriate expertise. Unfortunately, these provisions have not been translated into effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance so far. It is for this reason that Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, LTTE and other such terrorist groups have over the years developed ability to finance their activities through charities, drug trade, and gun running. The nexus between drug smuggling and terrorism, the organized flow of arms into South Asian nations from East and West, by seas and across porous land borders resulting into increasing terrorists’ activities is self evident.
It is a recognized fact that the more likely targets of terrorism are the democratic societies. That is so because pluralism, peaceful co-existence, dialogue as the basis of resolution of differences, adult franchise as the optimal means of organizing internal affairs of the nations: these are an anathema to the terrorist groups. Such democratic societies challenge the very cause and rationale of the terrorists’ existence. For this very reason, democratic nations have a more significant role than the other members of the coalition. They would more naturally develop multi-lateral institutions and multi-national coordination required to counter terrorism. They would not get bogged down in definitional or causal arguments. Blocking financial supplies, disrupting networks, sharing intelligence, simplifying extradition procedures: these are preventive measures which can only be effective through international cooperation based on trust and shared values. I believe that institutions like the Counter Terrorism Committee of the
United Nations should comprise only the hard-core democratic nations.
COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA
Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar once said, ‘geo-politically, South Asia represents an integral security zone. And in that, India has special ties with each of her neighbors – of ethnicity, language, culture, common historical experience, or of shared access to vital natural resources like water – of a degree of intensity that is not shared by any two others.’
Currently, the whole of South Asia-- India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and
Pakistan--is going through internal unrest and upheavals due to insurgency movements, ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism, or just cussed political polarization that encourage and use terrorism. Their terrorist activities have a history of crossing national boundaries and leading to inter-state tensions.
My impression is that the terrorist situation in South Asia has deteriorated due to lack of political consensus, a comprehensive collective strategy, a will to implement, and adequate capacity building.
Despite committing themselves to SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism- 1987, Eleventh SAARC Summit Declaration adopted at Katmandu on 6th January 2002, and Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism of January 6, 2004, which recognized the importance of updating the Convention to meet the obligations devolving in terms of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001); many SAARC nations continue to provide direct or indirect support to terrorists’ organizations. A few nations in South Asia still carry the belief that someone’s terrorist can be someone else’s freedom fighter. Such a notion is puerile. Any pre-meditated and unlawful act of violence against innocent people or noncombatants, irrespective of its cause and motive is nothing but terrorism. Such notions and advocacy reflect lack of commitment to war against terror. Here, I must repeat what I have been stating ever since 1999, which is, ‘Terrorism is a double-edged weapon. It is like a wicked dog, which often bites the hand that feeds it.’ I have also said that ‘a proxy or sub conventional war through terrorist activities can easily escalate into a conventional war.’
I believe the most important requirement to counter terrorism in South Asia is for the
SAARC nations to raise the level of trust and confidence, and take voluntary action against terrorists’ activities on their soil rather than respond to complaints from neighbors. SAARC nations need to stand together and cooperate as counter terrorism partners. Cooperative regional efforts only can produce genuine security improvements-particularly in securing borders and transportation, enhancing document security, disrupting terrorist financing, and restricting their movements.
A NEW APPROACH AND STRATEGY
Terrorists’ activities anywhere will stop only when their fuel runs out. There is a need to combat and defeat the menace in all its manifestations. We do need a regional strategy and cooperation but essentially local operatives and doctrines. Here, I wish to make a few important points.
One: at the ideological level, this war is between terrorist groups which do not believe in values of democracy, multiculturalism, ethnic and religious tolerance. The counter terrorism grand strategy followed in many countries with its preponderance of Defeat,
Deny and Defend elements is far too militarist and operationally focused. It does not cover the ideological milieu adequately. Long term ideologically and politically sensitized counter terrorism elements must play a more dominant role. A pure military approach, given the fragility of institutional framework in operational areas and volatility of developments, can easily descend into anarchy. I support those who believe that ‘ideologues’ should be included in the strategy and operational fight against terrorism.
Two: we need to devise collaborative strategies at the highest level. However, a uniform top down strategy must not be applied everywhere. Counter terrorism operational strategies and action plans should be worked out for each region and each location. It must take into cognizance important indigenous and local factors to neutralize terror networks.
The terrorists do have ideological, doctrinal and sectarian differences; even ego clashes arising from different cultural and national backgrounds. We need to take advantage of these differences. This can be done only if we attempt to analyze them properly. How they are linked? How they are financed? How do they operate? It is important that each country facing the problem analyzes it independently, and then we pool this information.
We need to build on elements of stability, nurture democratic impulses, nudge regimes to provide greater socio-political and socio-economic justice and engage in dialogues.
Partners in the campaign to isolate terrorism should, as far as possible, be regional, with leadership that emanates through domestic democratic processes.
Three: counter-terrorism strategy and cooperation should deal with all aspects of
international terrorism: its linkages with transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials and their means of delivery. It should also seek a firm commitment and action to meet cross-border threats posed by the terrorists.
Four: terrorism is not just a military problem. It is primarily a major socio-political problem. In the counter terrorism strategy, besides checking violence, we have to isolate and combat an ideology that is irrational and not acceptable to modern society. We have to use all elements of national power; not just military but political, economic and other kind of persuasion and pressures. For this, we need both hard power as well as soft power: hard power to deal with armed terrorists, and soft power to deal humanely with societies, their culture, traditions and ethos. The intellectual and psychological dimensions of the threat are as important as its physical dimension. Youth organizations, educational networks, women’s empowerment and local development initiatives should all play a role, with government as a supportive partner.
Some important elements of that collective strategy and action plan would have to be:
• Establishment of a Regional Counter Terrorism Centre with experts from different countries would work under a common umbrella to provide professional guidance and secretarial support to the SAARC political leadership, and to monitor implementation of their Resolutions in letter and spirit.
• Capacity building in combating terrorism by intelligence, police, paramilitary and military in each other’s schools of instructions and thus learning from varied experience.
• Greater liaison, coordination and inter operability for counter terrorism operations. This would require certain amount of inter operability. The backbone of such interoperability is sets of common inter operable communication system and operating procedures.
• A common data-base at the regional level, a multilateral/bilateral intelligence sharing, and a mechanism for joint interrogation of terrorist leaders and important suspects.
• Trust and transparency of action against sanctuaries in foreign territory and against States sponsoring terrorism.
• Effective action against terrorist-funding, gun running and narcotics production and smuggling.
• Legal assistance to each other in matters relating to investigation and prosecution.
OUR EXPERIENCE IN INDIA
India has a population of over 1 billion spread over 3.1 billion sq kilometers. We have people speaking 16 major languages and 200 dialects. There are a dozen ethnic groups, seven major religious communities with several sects and sub sects, and 68 socio-cultural sub regions: all part of a developing, semi-literate society. There are rapidly rising social, political and economic aspirations of groups in our multi ethnic, lingual, cultural and communal social structure. The ancient, multi ethnic and multi cultural diversity has its plus and negative points. But that makes our national security quite complex.
India has been one of the longest victims of terrorism but we have also handled terrorism successfully in Punjab and several other parts of our country. More importantly, we have not allowed terrorism to politically or economically destabilize our nation. India adopts a comprehensive approach to counter terrorism. We believe that counterterrorism can be effective only if there is a multi-pronged approach based on a national consensus. Our counter-terrorism approach treats terrorism as a phenomenon with political, economic, social, perceptual, psychological, operational and diplomatic aspects, all of which need equal and simultaneous attention. It seeks a holistic approach to all these dimensions. Therefore, we have the system of unified command in terrorist affected areas under a Governor or the Chief Minister, with committees made up of all the earlier mentioned functionaries.
We also believe in a healthy, well-functioning democracy, good governance, and a secular and liberal mind-set, which makes no distinction between the majority and the minority, and treats everyone equal in the eyes of the law. Firmness and determination in action, tampered by a civilized, democratic and patient behavior by the State, have been the hallmark of India's counter-terrorism policy.
The aim of the security operations is only to isolate and arrest or eliminate the hardcore secessionist elements and to deter their supporters. The security forces use a stick and carrot approach and employ the principle of ‘use of minimum force’ during such operations–not the overkill required in a war. The security forces not only fight militants and anti-social elements, but also reassure innocent people feeling insecure or neglected due to inadequate civil administration.
Tough measures lead to increasing alienation. Conversely, attempts to appeasement carry the risk of being read as a sign of weakening resolve. You have to find the right balance.
With experience, we have realized that we need specially organized, equipped and trained, areas-oriented security forces to deal with insurgencies and terrorism. Special Forces, Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles, and Rapid Reaction Force: these are some examples. These forces, and those who work alongside, need training for local terrain, people, their language, customs, and traditions. Special training schools have to be established for this purpose. The Army insists that every soldier, deployed for such operations, carries a Do’s and Don’ts card on his person.
During sustained operations, the security forces involve senior and respected citizens, and professionals, as a link between them and the locals. They also form citizens’ committees to learn about their difficulties, and hold meetings with them as frequently as possible. Along with sustained operations, small and large-scale civic action programs are undertaken. In some areas, the Indian Army formed the Army Development Group and launched Operation Sadbhavana (Goodwill) for this purpose.
The over all aim is to win the hearts and minds of the populace. It is counter productive to alienate hundreds and thousands in order to kill a suspect.
At no stage can any nation afford to give a full license to the security forces to operate freely. There is a requirement to define their responsibility, authority, legality, and accountability clearly.
CONCLUSION
There are no quick-solutions to counter terrorism. It is always a long process. Also, there is no military solution to a terrorist or insurgency or secessionist problem. The military can only create conditions wherein the adversary is inclined to or feel it necessary to come to the negotiating table. Ultimately, the solution lies in the political domain; within existing national constitutions, and sometimes with slightly modified constitutions.
Counter terrorism in South Asia needs a comprehensive strategy that encompasses political, economic, social, perceptual, psychological, operational and diplomatic issues, at regional and national levels. The operations have to be primarily regional, or country specific with local players.
The key success factor, however, is the commitments by South Asian nations to work with each other. It is essential for the governments of the region to cooperate, build trusted networks, seek active informed support from their people, provide responsive, effective, and legitimate governance, and engage closely with international community, to be able to eliminate terrorism, prevent instability and avoid conflict in the region.
Full text of the speech made by, General V. P. Malik, Former Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, India at the International Conference on Countering Terrorism (ICCT) on 19th October 2007 at the BMICH, Colombo.
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