By: N. Ram and B. Muralidhar Reddy for Hindu
(October, 04, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Your party has just put out a special statement on the need for a negotiated political statement based on a credible power-sharing proposal acceptable to all communities. Could you tell us what exactly you mean by it?
Many interpretations have been given to the speech I made during the JRJ commemoration lecture. The title was “Indo-Lanka Accord-20 years after.” So we issued the statement putting down the points that I mentioned in my speech. The first part deals with the history of the national crisis in Sri Lanka from 1977 to 1988 and thereafter the relevance of the JRJ experience to the present-day situation. This communiqué states the points that I mentioned. It’s for people to look at these points and thereafter to come to whatever conclusion they want — at least the media can avoid putting down points which were not made by me during the speech.
What we have said here is the policy of the party. A credible power-sharing solution acceptable to all communities is the only way to find long-lasting peace in Sri Lanka. That has been accepted by the party’s sessions in 2004 and 2006. We have included that in the Memorandum of Understanding we entered into with the SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom Party]; it’s included in our proposals to the APRC [All Parties Representative Conference]; it’s also included in the statements issued by the Co-Chairs.
You are the creator or co-creator of the framework that led to an extended ceasefire, a framework that is, in some ways, still in place. How do you see the relationship between the ceasefire and the attempt to find a political solution? Has the balance shifted?
A cessation of hostilities is always needed during a peace process. As far as I’m concerned the CFA [Cease Fire Agreement] can be used but there have to be amendments to the CFA. One important issue is the fact that three of the nations that formed the SLMM [Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission] have listed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. There has to be provision for other countries to be brought in. The ground situation has changed.
Then, in February 2006, the government agreed to allow only the legally constituted forces of Sri Lanka to operate in the east. That was part of the discussions held in Geneva between the government and the LTTE. In the light of recent developments and our past experiences, it will be necessary to amend some of the clauses of the CFA.
A section of the media has speculated that you would like the CFA to be redrafted.
No, I’ve used the term ‘amend’ the CFA. So take the sections that have to be amended. We mentioned that even in the manifesto issued during the presidential election [in November 2005]. There we looked at the security issues that arose in the eastern province. It’s different now. Once the LTTE was listed in EU [European Union], the relationship between the LTTE and three of the countries has changed. You can’t run this only with Iceland and Norway. What is the role of the SLMM? It has to be more specific. Those aspects have to be gone into and once agreement is reached, the CFA can be amended accordingly.
The strategic situation changed during your government, when you were Prime Minister. Karuna broke away from the LTTE in the east. How has it affected the overall picture?
Karuna broke away in February 2004 when we were facing the general election. It has certainly changed the picture because, on the one hand, Karuna and his supporters are working with the government forces. And on the other hand, there are allegations that the Karuna group is also responsible for the suppression of human rights and democracy in the east. It’s not merely a question of dealing with the LTTE — but with the rights of the people in general. We have got complaints even from Polanaruwa. Okay, the government got some intelligence on the east which they didn’t have earlier — they have the support of Karuna’s cadres — but that became a thorn in the relationship between the government and the LTTE both during the time of President [Chandrika] Kumaratunga and subsequently during this administration. Then President Rajapaksa had to concede this point in the talks in Geneva in February 2007. I think this will remain a major issue between the LTTE and the government.
The impression is that the present military operations have put tremendous pressure on the LTTE, riding on top of the Karuna breakaway faction. But at what cost?
My view always has been that the LTTE’s main battleground is in the north, in the Wanni. Karuna’s group and the LTTE’s operations in the east helped to tie down certain number of army units. Subsequently, after Karuna defected and Kaushalyan was killed, the LTTE didn’t have good commanders in the east. Nevertheless, a large number of army units are now in the east and they’ve got tied down in the east. But the main operations are going to be in the north and there the LTTE seems to be gathering its forces, mobilising its forces. The government has said that they will complete [military operations in] the north by the end of the year. I do not know if that will happen.
What is your view on holding elections in the east, disarming the militant groups?
I don’t think the ground situation is there for holding of elections in the east. It’s not just the political parties. The law and order situation has not been restored. It is only when the police can operate and be responsible for law and order that we can hold elections in the east. This is a matter of great concern not only to the UNP. It has been raised by other political parties also.
Meanwhile there are indications that some interim arrangement could be put in place for the east as well as the north.
I don’t know because in the situation in the east there have been a lot of low-intensity attacks going on. The issue is how an interim administration can function either for the east or the north. The Chief Secretary for the east was assassinated just a few weeks ago. The ground situation has not settled. But what the government is doing, no one knows. They’re talking of interim arrangements, their proposals seem to be changing from week to week. I don’t think we’ll see anything practical in the next few months.
And the disarming of militant groups?
Well, that has to take place. The law and order situation must settle down before there can be elections.
You don’t see them coming any time soon? Within months?
I don’t know, at the moment we can’t say. We are getting ready for elections in the east. As to whether they will come immediately, we don’t know. The rains have come anyway.
The JVP has expressed its opinion: “we want elections in the east but you must create conditions for peaceful and fair elections.”
We agree with the JVP that we haven’t the environment for free and fair elections in the east.
Their view is that you can create a situation, an incentive, for people for self-governance. It serves as an example for people in the north as well.
Well, they are looking beyond the question of elections. As to that issue, the government must first say what they’re going to do. They have not told us what their proposals are, what they plan to do. And you have to have some solution. They have claimed that they’re going to have a military solution by the end of this year. We must know if that’s going to work out.
If we may go back to the question of a political solution eventually, we have the Indo-Lanka Agreement, the 13th Amendment and President JR’s contribution to this — you were also part of that — and we have what is in place in India. What is the relevance of these experiences to a future political solution in Sri Lanka?
The experiences of President J.R. Jayawardene are very useful for today. That’s the main point I made in the JRJ commemoration lecture. But we’ve got to adapt it to today’s environment. What he did was…the 13th amendment was really a merger of the 1978 Constitution with the system of State administration in India. While we’re all debating what exactly the nature of this amendment is, the Provincial Councils are functioning. And there you’ve got the experience of many other countries. So we have to finally have a model that is unique to Sri Lanka. That’s the main point of my speech. But we can draw on certain Indian experiences also in this regard.
Do you think the north and the Tamil areas in the east can have more devolution than other areas in Sri Lanka? At one point you were considering that.
The UNP has not been opposed to the idea of different levels of devolution. It has happened even in the United Kingdom. But finally whatever the proposal is, it must be accepted by the people. We have taken a position that any negotiated solution must be accepted by the people at a referendum. Thereafter you can bring in a constitutional amendment, and it is likely that a constitutional amendment will also require approval at a referendum.
How do you look at the current state of the APRC [the All Parties Representative Conference constituted by the President to evolve consensus on the ethnic question]?
The APRC is virtually dead. It couldn’t come to an agreement. The UNP has left the APRC, so we are no longer involved in the work of the APRC. If the government wanted to come up with a solution, they should have come up with it earlier. This whole question of a solution after the budget doesn’t work — because everyone will want to know what type of solution. Then you might as well have announced it earlier! Otherwise you antagonise everyone. If you need to wait to get the budget passed before you get the core solution, that is not a point accepted by us. We know the differences among the parties with regard to the solution. Either the government could have come up with some proposal and reconcile these differences; otherwise they’ve got to opt for one of the models. And that has to be done before the budget. Every party now wants to know what the proposal is going to be.
The role of India in this context: what do you expect from India?
I think India’s help is required to get a political solution. We must have a political solution that has the backing of India. Politically, it’s a model that no one can wink at; even the LTTE had to sit down and talk about it. But if you don’t get this support from India, you can’t resolve this whole conflict. The government has to finally bring in a solution acceptable to the majority of the people in all the communities and also accepted by the international community. They know the parameters; they can suggest alternative parameters. But they must be accepted. Without acceptance, the solution is of no use.
You have worked with Mahinda Rajapaksa for a long time, much before he became President. What is the level of your engagement with him and what is the present chemistry?
Nil.
Courtesy- The Hindu
(October, 04, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Your party has just put out a special statement on the need for a negotiated political statement based on a credible power-sharing proposal acceptable to all communities. Could you tell us what exactly you mean by it?
Many interpretations have been given to the speech I made during the JRJ commemoration lecture. The title was “Indo-Lanka Accord-20 years after.” So we issued the statement putting down the points that I mentioned in my speech. The first part deals with the history of the national crisis in Sri Lanka from 1977 to 1988 and thereafter the relevance of the JRJ experience to the present-day situation. This communiqué states the points that I mentioned. It’s for people to look at these points and thereafter to come to whatever conclusion they want — at least the media can avoid putting down points which were not made by me during the speech.
What we have said here is the policy of the party. A credible power-sharing solution acceptable to all communities is the only way to find long-lasting peace in Sri Lanka. That has been accepted by the party’s sessions in 2004 and 2006. We have included that in the Memorandum of Understanding we entered into with the SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom Party]; it’s included in our proposals to the APRC [All Parties Representative Conference]; it’s also included in the statements issued by the Co-Chairs.
You are the creator or co-creator of the framework that led to an extended ceasefire, a framework that is, in some ways, still in place. How do you see the relationship between the ceasefire and the attempt to find a political solution? Has the balance shifted?
A cessation of hostilities is always needed during a peace process. As far as I’m concerned the CFA [Cease Fire Agreement] can be used but there have to be amendments to the CFA. One important issue is the fact that three of the nations that formed the SLMM [Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission] have listed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. There has to be provision for other countries to be brought in. The ground situation has changed.
Then, in February 2006, the government agreed to allow only the legally constituted forces of Sri Lanka to operate in the east. That was part of the discussions held in Geneva between the government and the LTTE. In the light of recent developments and our past experiences, it will be necessary to amend some of the clauses of the CFA.
A section of the media has speculated that you would like the CFA to be redrafted.
No, I’ve used the term ‘amend’ the CFA. So take the sections that have to be amended. We mentioned that even in the manifesto issued during the presidential election [in November 2005]. There we looked at the security issues that arose in the eastern province. It’s different now. Once the LTTE was listed in EU [European Union], the relationship between the LTTE and three of the countries has changed. You can’t run this only with Iceland and Norway. What is the role of the SLMM? It has to be more specific. Those aspects have to be gone into and once agreement is reached, the CFA can be amended accordingly.
The strategic situation changed during your government, when you were Prime Minister. Karuna broke away from the LTTE in the east. How has it affected the overall picture?
Karuna broke away in February 2004 when we were facing the general election. It has certainly changed the picture because, on the one hand, Karuna and his supporters are working with the government forces. And on the other hand, there are allegations that the Karuna group is also responsible for the suppression of human rights and democracy in the east. It’s not merely a question of dealing with the LTTE — but with the rights of the people in general. We have got complaints even from Polanaruwa. Okay, the government got some intelligence on the east which they didn’t have earlier — they have the support of Karuna’s cadres — but that became a thorn in the relationship between the government and the LTTE both during the time of President [Chandrika] Kumaratunga and subsequently during this administration. Then President Rajapaksa had to concede this point in the talks in Geneva in February 2007. I think this will remain a major issue between the LTTE and the government.
The impression is that the present military operations have put tremendous pressure on the LTTE, riding on top of the Karuna breakaway faction. But at what cost?
My view always has been that the LTTE’s main battleground is in the north, in the Wanni. Karuna’s group and the LTTE’s operations in the east helped to tie down certain number of army units. Subsequently, after Karuna defected and Kaushalyan was killed, the LTTE didn’t have good commanders in the east. Nevertheless, a large number of army units are now in the east and they’ve got tied down in the east. But the main operations are going to be in the north and there the LTTE seems to be gathering its forces, mobilising its forces. The government has said that they will complete [military operations in] the north by the end of the year. I do not know if that will happen.
What is your view on holding elections in the east, disarming the militant groups?
I don’t think the ground situation is there for holding of elections in the east. It’s not just the political parties. The law and order situation has not been restored. It is only when the police can operate and be responsible for law and order that we can hold elections in the east. This is a matter of great concern not only to the UNP. It has been raised by other political parties also.
Meanwhile there are indications that some interim arrangement could be put in place for the east as well as the north.
I don’t know because in the situation in the east there have been a lot of low-intensity attacks going on. The issue is how an interim administration can function either for the east or the north. The Chief Secretary for the east was assassinated just a few weeks ago. The ground situation has not settled. But what the government is doing, no one knows. They’re talking of interim arrangements, their proposals seem to be changing from week to week. I don’t think we’ll see anything practical in the next few months.
And the disarming of militant groups?
Well, that has to take place. The law and order situation must settle down before there can be elections.
You don’t see them coming any time soon? Within months?
I don’t know, at the moment we can’t say. We are getting ready for elections in the east. As to whether they will come immediately, we don’t know. The rains have come anyway.
The JVP has expressed its opinion: “we want elections in the east but you must create conditions for peaceful and fair elections.”
We agree with the JVP that we haven’t the environment for free and fair elections in the east.
Their view is that you can create a situation, an incentive, for people for self-governance. It serves as an example for people in the north as well.
Well, they are looking beyond the question of elections. As to that issue, the government must first say what they’re going to do. They have not told us what their proposals are, what they plan to do. And you have to have some solution. They have claimed that they’re going to have a military solution by the end of this year. We must know if that’s going to work out.
If we may go back to the question of a political solution eventually, we have the Indo-Lanka Agreement, the 13th Amendment and President JR’s contribution to this — you were also part of that — and we have what is in place in India. What is the relevance of these experiences to a future political solution in Sri Lanka?
The experiences of President J.R. Jayawardene are very useful for today. That’s the main point I made in the JRJ commemoration lecture. But we’ve got to adapt it to today’s environment. What he did was…the 13th amendment was really a merger of the 1978 Constitution with the system of State administration in India. While we’re all debating what exactly the nature of this amendment is, the Provincial Councils are functioning. And there you’ve got the experience of many other countries. So we have to finally have a model that is unique to Sri Lanka. That’s the main point of my speech. But we can draw on certain Indian experiences also in this regard.
Do you think the north and the Tamil areas in the east can have more devolution than other areas in Sri Lanka? At one point you were considering that.
The UNP has not been opposed to the idea of different levels of devolution. It has happened even in the United Kingdom. But finally whatever the proposal is, it must be accepted by the people. We have taken a position that any negotiated solution must be accepted by the people at a referendum. Thereafter you can bring in a constitutional amendment, and it is likely that a constitutional amendment will also require approval at a referendum.
How do you look at the current state of the APRC [the All Parties Representative Conference constituted by the President to evolve consensus on the ethnic question]?
The APRC is virtually dead. It couldn’t come to an agreement. The UNP has left the APRC, so we are no longer involved in the work of the APRC. If the government wanted to come up with a solution, they should have come up with it earlier. This whole question of a solution after the budget doesn’t work — because everyone will want to know what type of solution. Then you might as well have announced it earlier! Otherwise you antagonise everyone. If you need to wait to get the budget passed before you get the core solution, that is not a point accepted by us. We know the differences among the parties with regard to the solution. Either the government could have come up with some proposal and reconcile these differences; otherwise they’ve got to opt for one of the models. And that has to be done before the budget. Every party now wants to know what the proposal is going to be.
The role of India in this context: what do you expect from India?
I think India’s help is required to get a political solution. We must have a political solution that has the backing of India. Politically, it’s a model that no one can wink at; even the LTTE had to sit down and talk about it. But if you don’t get this support from India, you can’t resolve this whole conflict. The government has to finally bring in a solution acceptable to the majority of the people in all the communities and also accepted by the international community. They know the parameters; they can suggest alternative parameters. But they must be accepted. Without acceptance, the solution is of no use.
You have worked with Mahinda Rajapaksa for a long time, much before he became President. What is the level of your engagement with him and what is the present chemistry?
Nil.
Courtesy- The Hindu
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