Nevertheless, the situation is problematic in a crucial way. Visiting Myanmar meant lending economic support to the junta. But campaigning for boycotting Burma leading to decreased visitations meant adding to the miseries of vulnerable communities, particularly marginalized women who probably have no other economic avenue to depend on. Tourism is a major source of income for rural communities and millions depended on it for their everyday survival. This is the micro political economy of Burmese freedom struggle.(October, 02, Singapore, Lanka Guardian) India’s lukewarm response to the current crackdown on the democracy movement in Myanmar is explained by diplomatic circles as conditioned by a compelling need to protect India’s interests in the changing regional politics characterized by growing Chinese hegemony. The explanation begs two interrelated questions: What do we normally mean by India's interest and how do we understand/situate the China factor in India's foreign policy?
If the logic of India's reluctance to support the democracy movement is guided by the motivation of protecting its own interest as a reaction to Chinese policy, then it looks quite contradictory and beckons to unpack the whole 'China factor' in India's contemporary foreign policy practices.
'China factor' has also been highlighted as playing a role in India's attempts to move away from the non alignment politics of the post colonial period as much as the fall of USSR, and of cold war and emergence of uni-polar US hegemony. Most recently, in the discourses on the Indo-US nuclear deal's implications, coalition of the left parties have been put to task for their failure to explain the stand taken by China on the nuclear issue. India's position, it is argued, should be analyzed in the context of China's nuclear ambitions and military strategies.
However, the way in which Indian regime negotiates the China factor, whether imaginary or real, has been contradictory. This has become evident in its diverging positions on the democracy movements in two neighboring countries Nepal and Burma.
In Nepal, when Beijing in an intriguing maneuvering of regional politics, supported the Gyanedra Dictatorship, invited him to Beijing and extended military support to the monarchy, covert and overt support from India was given to the democracy movement. US support to the movement was then viewed as a positive development, disregarding its long run consequences for the political and economic integrity of the countries in South Asia.
If we depend on an adhoc and post facto framework to justify India's foreign policy, the incoherence and contradictions can probably be wished away. Otherwise there are important inconsistencies and ironies that require further explanation. It is both in the interest of India and the people of Burma, that India should support the democracy movement as it did in the case of Nepal. What does one mean by India's interest? The ethical question is ultimately more important if by 'India's interest' one means furthering democracy in the region as well in India. This has both a macro and micro dimension. Systematically building up deep economic ties with a country that has a questionable political record and later using this newfangled relationship as a justification for the silences against its increasingly unbearable atrocities, is a tactics that can at best be seen as a pale imitation of the US super power policy everywhere in the world.
The 'micro' dimension is also ethically significant. I have myself felt this while finally deciding to visit Myanmar sometime back. Civil society organizations challenging inequitable tourism practices had been debating the whole issue of the implications of 'visiting Myanmar. The junta was carefully opening its doors for tourists to show the world that everything is normal in the country. Moreover, the dilemma was accentuated by the fact the income from tourism is emerging as a crucial source of foreign exchange when sanctions were straggling its threateningly fragile economic base. Indigenous communities are paraded- literally-it is called indigenous fashion parade-for the gaze of the tourist. Myanmar's dependence on tourism is further exacerbated by the relative retardation of other productive sectors. Kachin, Kayyan, Palong, Wa, Bao, Rawang, Moon, Lahoo, Lushan. Lisoo and even the Shan from China are paraded in a blatant commoditization of culture and space in contemporary Myanmar.
Nevertheless, the situation is problematic in a crucial way. Visiting Myanmar meant lending economic support to the junta. But campaigning for boycotting Burma leading to decreased visitations meant adding to the miseries of vulnerable communities, particularly marginalized women who probably have no other economic avenue to depend on. Tourism is a major source of income for rural communities and millions depended on it for their everyday survival. This is the micro political economy of Burmese freedom struggle.
This is precisely the context where India's silence becomes objectionable from the point of view of global civil society. India has to recognize the right of the Burmese people to oppose the military junta and help them regain 'Burma' from 'Myanmar'. This is a responsibility that cannot be compromised either in the name of ties with the junta or the Chinese factor. This is not only in the interest of India, but also in the best interest of building stable democracies in the region.
Interestingly, China and ASEAN have also now come down heavily on the crackdown. How long can India remain silent?
(The writer is an Assistant Professor, Communication & New Media Programme ,Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences ,National University of Singapore. Email-sreekumartt@gmail.com .)
PS:The new column "Asian Mirror” will be written by Dr.T.T. Sreekumar. Our editorial team chose the name of the column in consultation with Dr. T.T. Sreekumar, who sent his good wishes to the Lanka Guardian.
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