India is clear in its support to the Sri Lankan Government -Cmde. R.S.Vasan

An Exclusive Interview with Commodore R.S. Vasan Indian Navy (Retd)

(October, 29, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Commodore RS Vasan IN Retd has rendered distinguished military service of over 34 years .His shore assignments include command of two naval air stations, Maritime Air Squadron, Air Crew Examiner, member of the faculty at the College of Naval Warfare and Chief Staff Officer of the Southern Naval Command at Kochin.

He commanded a patrol vessel for the IPKF. Prior to his retirement he was the Regional Commander of the Eastern Region of the Indian Coast Guard. Presently he is steering the Maritime Security Programme at the Observer Research Foundation a major Indian think-tank.

By: Nilantha Ilangamuwa with Commodore RS Vasan (Retd)

Q. Could you please explain to us the current political and military developments in Sri Lanka and their implications?

A. For any observer and analyst it would be quite clear that the SL military has an upper hand now despite some daring attacks of the Anuradhapura kind by the LTTE. The LTTE undoubtedly is militarily weak. However, any additional pressure applied by the SL Military would invite more such suicidal attacks by the black tigers. It is perhaps the ripe time to ensure that there is some kind of concrete acceptable proposal that is both face saving for the LTTE and is practical enough to be considered and speedily implemented. If this time were missed out, the agony of this struggle would be prolonged. Both Sri Lanka and the LTTE would then be responsible for not utilizing the opportunity to break the ice.

Q. Who in your opinion are the persons with responsibility for the growth of military capabilities within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam?

A. This question has answers in the historical aspects of whatever has happened since the struggle for Eelam began. The impressive growth in the initial stages is obviously due to the massive support received from expatriate Tamils in Western countries. The LTTE leadership was well aware of the need to strengthen its capability primarily at sea, then land and of course in the air dimension. If it was the late Mr. Balasingham who orchestrated the cause and found support in the UK and the EU, closer home, it was the team of KP, late Kittu, Soosai, Colonel Shankar ably guided by Mr Prabhakaran himself.

Activities of KP in procuring high-end technology weapons and sensors are too well known to bear repetition. If he succeeded it was also largely due to both the easy availability of military hardware from diverse sources across the globe at that time. It was also possible to procure second hand ships to be registered as Flags of Convenience (FOC) to promote both legal and illegal sea trade. The primary market apparently remained in the Southeastern countries.

As per reports, money came from donations, taxes, extortion and even drug trafficking. It must be acknowledged that the LTTE has outsmarted its adversary in the past by thinking out of the box and coming out with innovative ways to deal with the SL Military and the Government. The LTTE by and large scouted for highly sophisticated equipment to outwit the security forces. The break up of the Soviet Union and the Afghan war also threw up many sources for illegal arms procurement.

The only reason why it is becoming increasingly difficult for the LTTE to procure freely and transport essentially required military hardware is the scenario post- 9/11. This has brought in so many restrictive regimes across the globe that it has become difficult if not impossible to continue in the same manner for procurement of essential and critical military hardware. The implementation of security regimes such as the International Ship and Port Security code (ISPS) in July 2004, Maritime Security Operations (MSO), Regional Maritime Security Initiatives (RMSI), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Container Security Initiative has succeeded in plugging loopholes in the entire maritime domain where mischiefs are better detected and handled. In addition the strict surveillance control on financial transactions of large-scale has rendered it difficult for such transactions to go unnoticed.

Q. What exactly is the air threat that seems to have sent a shiver down the spines of the countries of South Asia?

A. First of all it must be understood that the air assets that the LTTE has acquired are not of the highly sophisticated variety nor do they have high payload carrying capacity to make a difference. The aircraft as now established are the Czeck built Zlin 142, which has been modified to undertake both night missions and attack missions. The dropping of a few hundred pound bombs on three occasions has unnerved the observers. Acquisition of air capability does add a new dimension to the ongoing warfare. However, the limited numbers and the type of aircraft do not pose such grave danger. The aircraft procured are no match for the SLAF. The only reason for the success is some excellent planning based on sound intelligence and well coordinated simultaneous /advance ground commando operations as in the case of the recent attack on Anuradha pura.

Q. What are the weaknesses of Government of Sri Lanka from the perspective of their own security?

A. From the military point of view, in fact the Sri Lankan military is in a much better position today due to the sustained operations against the LTTE, which have nullified the claim of invincibility of the LTTE. However, any conventional military would suffer losses due to the guerilla operations once in a while. The aspect of suicide attacks has the most damaging effect on the military as such attacks are dramatic and cause extensive damage to life and property.

The suicide squads as in Iraq are already ready to die so they are not inhibited by the nature of the target or terrain or other obstacles. On the part of the LTTE this would continue to bring down the number of able-bodied youth who can sustain the guerilla operations or suicide missions.

Q. One day you mentioned that the aircrews of the LTTE would have been trained abroad in one of the flying schools. Can you tell us more about the skills of the LTTE aircrews and when and where they might have finished their training?

A. Acquiring basic flying skills to fly the type of aircraft acquired by the LTTE is relatively an easy task. Any of the flying schools today could train an aspirant to fly an aircraft in a matter of months if not weeks. However, the consolidation of flying skills and particularly night flying skills would require little more application and training. The ingenuity of the LTTE in modifying a simple aircraft for use against well-defended targets needs to be appreciated.

As I have brought out elsewhere, it is clear that the foundations laid for the growth of the air tigers by late Col Shankar are really strong. Due to the spurt in aviation growth worldwide, there has been a proliferation of aviation training schools in the US, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Singapore, Southeastern countries and many more corners of the world. After acquiring the basic skills some advanced training to meet the standards set by air tigers could be undertaken in any of the flying schools on payment.

Q. So many times the Sri Lanka Air Force has been found to use Israel made K-Fir in bombing LTTE areas. Also they have claimed to destroy LTTE military targets. What do you think of their Air Strikes against the LTTE? Are they effective?

A. The success of any air attack is dependent on the precise knowledge of the targets and enemy movement at the time of such attacks. In addition the training level of the air crew, the capability of the aircraft and the enemy’s air defence would decide, indeed largely dictate the success or otherwise of an air mission. The SLAF has been successful on many of the missions undertaken. Both the Kfirs and the Migs are good aircraft and have the potential to take on identified targets. There would be always claims and counterclaims about the efficacy and effectiveness of the attacks. It is clear that the SLAF has made a great difference to the course of the war against LTTE which has not been able to shore up its anti-aircraft capability. The skies are virtually ruled by the SLAF.

Q. What are the differences between LTTE Air Wing attacks and Sri Lanka Air Force Attacks?

A. The difference essentially in the nature of attacks. The attacks by the SLAF are largely conventional against targets identified for attack. Such identification could be based on intelligence, surveillance and or on request of the ground forces that are advancing. The Air tigers have been innovative, motivated, daring in their exploits and yet extremely careful thus far in preventing neutralization of their assets both in the air and on the ground.
08. LTTE have for the first time used Black Tigers and their light aircraft together in their latest attack on the Air Force base in Anuradhapura. Is there any significance to this?

This is what led to the success of the LTTE. The rest of the world was led to believe in the initial stages that it was the air attack of the LTTE that destroyed the aircraft and helicopters on the ground. It is only some hours later that the actual picture emerged. It just brought out the excellent way in which this attack was planned. The destruction of the aircraft was on the ground by the commandos of LTTE and not by the air attacks. The aircraft arrived on the scene only after the commandos were in control and had given a green signal for the aircraft to attack. In fact, after the success of the black tigers, which caused such extensive damage, the air attack would be viewed by the LTTE itself as only an icing on the cake in an operation that was executed to perfection.

Q. Please comment on the government of Sri Lanka’s implementing strategy behind the war against the LTTE .

A. As I have indicated earlier in an answer to another question, at this time, militarily the Sri Lanka Military has an upper hand. From that point of view, the Government has succeeded in weakening the LTTE. The strategy was essential if the Government had to negotiate from a position of strengthen. In the past it has been observed that the LTTE normally comes to the negotiating table only if it is perceived to be in a powerful position. It is necessary therefore to avoid a stalemate situation. However, the present spate of successes should only pave way for a dialogue that would enable some devolution of power and cessation of hostilities so that Sri Lanka can concentrate on its welfare, social and economic progress of all its integrated citizens.

Q. Can Government of Sri Lanka ever annihilate the LTTE?

A. Theoretically yes. However, this is something that is not dependent on the SL Government alone. As long as there is support for the Tamil cause, however weak, it would be difficult. There is perhaps a need to allow the LTTE to change its face and give it an opportunity to participate in the political process. There is a misconception that the LTTE alone represents the viewpoint of all the Tamils. This is hardly the position. Other moderates who are willing to bring about peace by other alternative methods need to be encouraged.

Q. Please comment on India’s role in Sri Lanka under the present situation? Is India playing any role at all? How should India’s position change?

A. India has looked at this as an internal problem to be sorted out by the Sri Lankans themselves. Despite some voices of support from some political parties in Tami Nadu, the ruling party is not interested in supporting the LTTE which itself stands banned in India. There is definitely lot of behind the scene activity to facilitate the process of normalization. As long as the LTTE is at the head of the political process, India would not be in a position to accept a mediatory role even if invited. It would choose to support the actions of the SL Government to come out with a package that would protect the interests of the Tamils in a united unified Sri Lanka without any division.

India is clear in its support to the Sri Lankan Government on the need to find a solution soon. India can only wait and watch while the elected Government in Sri Lanka headed by the President is indirectly helped to expedite the peace process.