How far is peace in the land of serendipity?

"Given the background, the government of Mr. Rajapakse has really two options open to it. One is to go whole-hog militarily and seek the complete annihilation of the LTTE, and two, seek a political solution of the problem."

By: Brig Gen Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd)

(October, 26, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sri Lankan (SL) government is very concerned about the way LTTE terrorism is taking a new turn, regrettably some feel, for the worst, since the peace accord with the LTTE fell through in 2005 after four years of relative peace.

Not only is the government concerned, it is also anxious to share its experience and learn from its friends and neighbours, so that the problems that centre on the Tamil issue and LTTE could be resolved to the satisfaction of all.

This was made evident by its holding of an international conference on countering terrorism attended by more than 50 participants form 23 different countries, apart from a very large number of local experts, scholars and serving and retired military officers.

SL is feeling the brunt of LTTE's offensive once again; although not of the intensity that one saw prior to the 2001 agreement but definitely with enhanced scope of its operation. LTTE actions against the government, particularly targeting of SL military installations in recent times, starting from April 2006, have brought it in the limelight once again.

The most recent attack was on the air force base in Anuradhapura, the ancient capital, far removed from the LTTE operational base. Yet, the LTTE was able to carry out an air/ground operation where its ground elements infiltrated inside a very well protected military base.

The attacks bear out the fact that the LTTE, as an ethnic group fighting for an autonomous region in the north and the east of SL (the demand for a separate homeland for the SL Tamils has been dropped by the LTTE since the peace accord of 2001, that fell through in 2005), no longer depends on terrorism as a strategic tool in pursuit of its political goal, although terrorism is still used as a tactical expedient, like attacking soft targets like public transports, farmers etc.

The LTTE has graduated to a sizeable force, particularly over the last three decades, to a point where it has come to possess aerial platforms for weapons delivery on military targets with a degree of impunity (the planes involved in the attack got away, as they did after three air raids earlier this year), although the Anuradhapura operation has cost it in terms of manpower casualty.

Not only does the LTTE possess conventional weapons including medium artillery and several Czech-made two-seater, propeller driven, aircraft which it managed to smuggle in knockdown condition, it has also managed to acquire sea vessels of both military and civil descriptions to conduct operations against the SL navy.

Reportedly, it had attempted to acquire a submarine, but the idea was scuttled eventually. In recent times, the SL navy has taken a heavy toll of the LTTE naval resources. All these actions indicate that the LTTE is resuming its posture of open hostility i.e. taking on the SL state machinery including its armed forces in conventional warfare, a capability it had acquired only a decade after it emerged as a terrorist group, and employed quite successfully against the IPKF. The Indians lost almost 1500 men.

It might surprise many that, as the situation currently stands, the LTTE is not really a terrorism problem for Sri Lanka (SL). Neither is a military option the only strategy open to the government in addressing the LTTE threat.

If this reality is not comprehended properly there is a good chance that strategy formulation and operational plans would both be faulty, and the prospect of resolution of the conflict would recede further.

A brief background will help explain my assertion. The LTTE is a classic case of transformation of an insurrectionary group moving through the various phases of a revolutionary warfare starting with insurgency, right up to the point where it acquired enough military strength to confront the state and its military machine in open hostility.

It had resorted to terrorist acts to announce its presence to start with, going for soft targets and gradually making the military its target. Eventually, the SL military was confronted on the battlefield, and the two were involved in many battles for real estate.

Territories exchanged hands and, after a brief stalemate, the SL military was able to wrest a large portion of the Eastern region from the LTTE. However, the LTTE remains a terrorist organisation since it still resorts to terrorist acts against unarmed civilians.

Much of the Tamil held areas were no-go areas for the government forces at one time, and although they were actually under the control of the LTTE it was the SL government that provided food and other supplies to these areas; a remarkable act of fulfilling state responsibility even under most trying circumstances.

In recent times, the LTTE has been on the defensive, particularly after the military's victory in the East in an offensive that started in July 2006. The army moved against the LTTE's remaining strongholds in the North in September this year, and the situation remains fluid as of now.

Given the background, the government of Mr. Rajapakse has really two options open to it. One is to go whole-hog militarily and seek the complete annihilation of the LTTE, and two, seek a political solution of the problem.

The former is very tempting because a military provides the urge for more military operations without realising its political ramifications. On the other hand, the political option may involve treading on tortuous paths and, therefore, appear less attractive.

The redeeming part is that there is tremendous awareness among both the civilian and military leadership in SL of the dangers of an exclusively military solution. The LTTE problem needs to be detached from the issue of genuine Tamil grievances and their demands.

End of the LTTE as an armed entity will not automatically address the underlying causes of Tamil grievances and resolve the Tamil issue. And there is great resistance to yielding to LTTE demands and their claim to be fighting for Tamil rights on the grounds that it is itself a most repressive and fascists organisation that does not brook any opposition, and has seen to it that all prospective opposition from within the LTTE and Tamil ranks in general are done away with.
There is also consensus that the LTTE must be pursued vigorously militarily so that its capacity to perpetrate violence is reduced.

That tackling the LTTE will tackle terrorism there is little doubt. But there is no alternative to a political solution of the present unrest in Sri Lanka. And this realisation is encapsulated in a recent remark of President Rajapakse that: "While we are trying to find a negotiated political solution so that all the communities could live in harmony, the government will not tolerate terrorism and it would be fought until total elimination."

One would like to wish the people of Sri Lanka and its leadership the very best in their peace venture. No one has got so little of peace in the last three decades and no one deserves it more.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.