Complacency Our Blight

By: Defencewire

(October, 20, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Complacency was setting in the Deep South when the calm was suddenly disturbed last Monday by an LTTE attack on the southernmost border of ‘Tamil Eelam’. The attack on the Army detachment at Yala National Park was quite unexpected. Nothing ever happened in Thalgasmankada except for (alleged) illegal felling of trees by Dewa Horu or Timber Racketeers. It was known as a ‘privileged’ duty post. But things were about to change.

Close to around 5.30pm, a small group of LTTE cadres launched an attack on the detachment. Despite all the propaganda about the LTTE unit being a reckless, trapped unit, making a desperate attack, the defence establishment was clearly shaken to its roots by the attack. Elements in the Special Task Force had ensured the political leadership that operations against the remaining LTTE cadres in Ampara were ‘on track’. At first, some top-ranking STF officers dismissed reports of the attack claiming they were rumors. By the time truth dawned on everyone and reinforcements located the remains of six men, over ten hours had passed.

The LTTE operation had all the signs of a carefully planned guerilla operation. Launched four days after the conclusion of the Full Moon period, the guerillas knew Army reinforcements would find it very difficult to trace their path in the jungle in total darkness. They had done their homework. Tamil pilgrims to Katharagama from the East and even Jaffna had made annual pilgrimage along jungle routes inside Yala, Kumana and Lahugala for centuries. For the Eastern LTTE cadres, finding their way in and out of these areas was not that difficult.

The attack also signaled a return by the LTTE to guerilla tactics. Semi-conventional war would have to wait until it replenishes its stocks devastated by Navy attacks on its floating warehouses. Waiting does not however mean that the war is over for the LTTE. In fact, guerillas are better at the waiting game than governments. They never work to a timetable. Governments often work to political deadlines set by elections. Pripaharan is also a man who is not concerned with the Cost of Living, Subsidies, political outbidding and outflanking by opposition political parties etc. For the time-being, the organization will focus its attention on guerilla operations, intelligence gathering, and planned tactical attacks on identified economic, military and political targets.

The Yala attack was also an attack with enormous economic and political significance. Not only had the LTTE struck the Deep Sinhala South, they had also struck at its most important livelihood; tourism. Some Western government representatives almost recommended their governments impose travel advisories to the South, the heartland of coastal tourism in Sri Lanka. We are lucky that they managed to stop short of travel warnings instead. It’s a great shame for Lanka’s premier National Park which was to reopen the next day. Next day brought more bad news. Retreating LTTE cadres had placed a pressure mine and several Jhonny mines, which killed a soldier on that day.

Last Wednesday saw a new face at the Security Council Meeting. It was Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka who had just returned from a visit to Yala. His visit resulted in the airdropping of a platoon of Commandos and regular infantry that began a search in Yala. They couldn’t find any trace of the LTTE unit. Yesterday was also an eventful day in Yala. Around 25 men detected a boat moving close to the shore with another boat following the first. They fired at the first boat after which both boats vanished. What happened next raised some eyebrows. It also raised concerns about possible competition between the top leaders of the two Armed Forces. For the sake of the morale of our troops, we will limit our discussion to that.

Another serious question has emerged with regard to large numbers of LTTE casualties being reported from the Northern theatre of operations. It could mean two things, the most serious of which, to an unassuming foreign gaze for example, would mean that the LTTE is recruiting more people that it is losing.

The main point of all this is that complacency, political agendas and intentional information failures are serious disadvantages when combating insurgents, guerillas and terrorists. In the LTTE’s case, it is all that rolled into one, plus an ethnic conflict, requiring some sort of a political solution as well. Let’s hope our leaders in the government, military, civil society and Diaspora community realize these things before it’s too late!