NO critique on devolution could afford to ignore the strong confirmation provided by international experiences of the past few decades to the generalisation that devolution through constitutional devices (‘quasi-federal’, ‘federal’, ‘confederal’ or whatever) in nation-states plagued by ethnic conflict have not restored inter-ethnic harmony and that, on the contrary, it has had a tendency to imperil democracy, and could constitute an irreversible step towards national disintegration. Moreover, as the related evidence also shows, these risks were averted only in situations where the Centre had the capacity – usually in terms of military strength – to overcome the challenges to democratic governance and national integrity. “Gathering Storm” of Radical Revolt
An appraisal of the Indian system of devolution from the viewpoint of its adoptability in Sri Lanka should also take into account the increasing trend of collapse of formal government in many parts of that country in the face of a rising tide of insurrection supposedly based on ‘Maoist ideology’. Scholars have attributed this phenomenon to increasing oppression, deprivation and socio-economic marginalisation of groups of people living in conditions of dire poverty and want. The present study cannot venture into a detailed analysis of the causal connections between poverty and political unrest (of the type attempted in Peiris, 1999). However, the passage from a recent writing by one of the leading authorities on insurrectionary politics in rural India (Mehra, 2006: 36) presented below would suffice to underscore the fact that devolution, and even other forms of consociational power-sharing in India, are featured not only by the achievements highlighted by their exponents, but also by phenomenal failures.
“The Maoist expansion in the past few years has been impressive – from 55 districts in nine states in 2003 to 156 districts in 13 states in 2004 to 170 districts in 15 states in 2006. In their strongholds in about 55 districts in 12 states, they run parallel governments, which is not surprising given the retreat, if not collapse, of the state in key social sectors such as education and health in many States and stranglehold on political power of those who control land and other economic resources. However, only thing prominently known about their parallel government so far is the jan adalat, basically kangaroo courts, and their brutal summary punishments that keep the people in the area adequately terrified. The expansion of their area of influence in 170 out of 604 districts of the country and the ‘parallel’ government they have been able to establish, give them sustenance in a dubious way, give them a territory to train on and plan their ‘revolutionary’ foray against the state and the people” (emphasis added).
(Mehra, 2006: 36)
Devolution and Conflict Resolution
No critique on devolution could afford to ignore the strong confirmation provided by international experiences of the past few decades to the generalisation that devolution through constitutional devices (‘quasi-federal’, ‘federal’, ‘confederal’ or whatever) in nation-states plagued by ethnic conflict have not restored inter-ethnic harmony and that, on the contrary, it has had a tendency to imperil democracy, and could constitute an irreversible step towards national disintegration. Moreover, as the related evidence also shows, these risks were averted only in situations where the Centre had the capacity – usually in terms of military strength – to overcome the challenges to democratic governance and national integrity.
The following extracts from major writings on the subject conform closely to the observations made above. In introducing these studies mention should be made of the fact that they are empirically based on wide spectra of case studies of conflict situations. They are not aimed at authenticating one or another conceptual postulate. All of them have paradigmatic similarities in their commitments to peaceful resolution of inter-group conflict and in their concern for safeguarding the rights of minority groups.
“Even if power-sharing can avert potential ethnic conflicts or dampen mild ones, our concern here is whether it can bring peace under the conditions of intense violence and extreme ethnic mobilisation that are likely to motivate intervention. The answer is no. … The core reason why power-sharing cannot resolve ethnic civil wars is that it is inherently voluntaristic; it requires conscious decisions by elites to cooperate to avoid ethnic strife. Under conditions of hypernationalist mobilisation and real security threats, group leaders are unlikely to be receptive to compromise, and even if they are, they cannot act without being discredited and replaced by harder-line rivals”.
KAUFMANN Chaim ,1997: 265-304
“Proposals for devolution abound, but more often than not devolution agreements are difficult to reach, and once reached, soon abort. Most such agreements are concluded against a background of secessionist warfare or terrorist violence. Where central authority is secure, as in India, the appropriate decisions can be made and implemented by the centre. But, where the very question is how far the writ of the centre will run, devolution is a matter of bilateral agreement, and an enduring agreement is an elusive thing”.
HOROWITZ Donald L ,1985: 622-3
“(I)n ethnically divided societies after intense conflicts they (i.e. power-sharing institutions) typically have a set of unintended but perverse consequences. They empower ethnic elites from previously warring groups, create incentives for these elites to press radical demands once peace is in place, and lower the costs for these elites to escalate conflict in ways that threaten democracy and peace. These dangers can be avoided when power-sharing institutions operate under very special conditions such as a political culture of accommodation, economic prosperity and equality, demographic stability, strong governmental institutions, stable hierarchical relations within ethnic communities, and a supportive international environment. Yet those conditions are unlikely to be present or difficult to sustain after severe conflicts such as civil wars.”
ROTHCHILD Donald & ROEDER Philip G, 2005: 29
In the entire mass of research literature on this subject one could find only a few cases of successful resolution of ethnic conflict through the constitutional device of territorial power-sharing – surprisingly few, given the fact that, as an approach to negotiated settlement of inter-group conflict in Third World countries, it has tended to be prescribed by peace-makers from both within and outside far more frequently than any other. For example, a recent study (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2005), presents what purports to be a comprehensive list containing 38 “civil wars” of the period 1945-1998 that were ended through negotiation. Of this total, 18 had territorial power-sharing agreements. A careful perusal of the latter category in the list would show, however, that four were agreements involving successor states of the former Soviet Union and their respective ethnic minorities, eleven have failed to achieve durable peace, one culminated in secession, and that even qualified success could be claimed only in respect of five. It is also of interest that none of the five successful cases are comparable to the Sri Lankan conflict in respect of power, ferocity and the global reach of the insurgents.
During the more recent past (i.e. after the period covered by the foregoing study) there have been three other peace settlements that contained ‘regional autonomy’ dimensions – the agreement between Dhaka and the Chittagong Hill-Tribes of Bangladesh, the Jakarta-Aceh Peace Accord of Indonesia, and the so-called ‘Belfast Agreement’ Northern Ireland. The agreements in Bangladesh and Indonesia, it should be noted, were achieved under exceptional circumstances and in the aftermath of devastating calamities. In both, the political concessions granted to the rebel groups in the form of “autonomy over local affairs” and “representation at the Centre” in return for disarmament have also been extremely meagre. And, in both situations, persistent rumblings of discontent continue forming a gloomy shadow of doubt on the durability of peace.
In Northern Ireland armed confrontations between the ‘Unionists’ (drawn from the predominantly Protestant segment of Northern Ireland’s population, desiring continuing union with Britain) and the ‘Nationalists’ (comprising almost exclusively Roman Catholics, who desire merger of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland) had defied many attempts at negotiated settlement, and had, for long, been associated with both fierce armed confrontations (between the militant groups on either side of the ethno-political divide, and between the militants and the law-enforcement agencies) as well as terrorist attacks on civilian targets by the paramilitary groups. The ‘Belfast Agreement’ of 1998 (a.k.a. ‘Good Friday Agreement’) that marked the conversion of the existing uneasy truce (declared in 1994) between the two sides into a peace accord, entailed, among other things, the initiation of several institutional measures that were intended to facilitate: (a) various forms of power-sharing among the participants of the conflict and (b) the decommissioning of arms, large stockpiles of which were believed to be held by the paramilitary groups. The agreement, though widely hailed as a major breakthrough towards ending a seemingly intractable and never-ending conflict, has hitherto fallen short of the expectations with which it was forged. Thus, the ‘Northern Ireland Assembly’ which was intended to facilitate the establishment of a government in Northern Ireland that accommodated all segments of its population (i.e. all political parties) and, at the same time, maintain links with the governments of Britain and Ireland, was suspended in 2002 due mainly to the non-compliance of certain paramilitary groups with the stipulated procedures of disarmament. In September 2005, the ‘Independent Commission’ entrusted the task of monitoring disarmament reported that, while the decommissioning of arms by the ‘Nationalist’ militant groups has been satisfactorily accomplished, several pro-‘Unionist’ groups of militants were yet to abide by the related terms of the agreement of 1998. Meanwhile violent clashes and acts of terrorism have continued to occur, albeit at a lower level of intensity than in earlier times. From perspectives of the present study, the feature of the Belfast Agreement that needs to be highlighted is that its main focus was on power-sharing through various consociational modalities, and not on the devolution of power.
Concluded
G.H. Peiris is Professor Emeritus, University of Peradeniya .If you have any comments on this series of article of articles please send editorazad@gmail.com.
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