By: DeshapalanaAll the hullabaloo on the MiG 27 deal aside, it is heartening to note that fundamentals have remained intact in the Sri Lankan Security Establishment and that the bickering has been left to the bureaucrats. The latest success of the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) against three LTTE logistics vessels off Sri Lanka's southern coast indicates the potency of planned assaults on the supply chain of the enemy, versus the purchase of multi-million dollar MiGs. Success against the LTTE on the strategic level has clearly rested with decapitating the supply chain, both financially and logistically, not with reactionary ambitions for surface to surface warfare that would cost the nation disproportionate sums atop an already inflated budget. The arrests in the United States in August 2006 instigated a widespread international investigation into the financial activities of the LTTE. Its assets were frozen and the noose was tightened. Within the time-frame of a year between May 2006 and 2007, arrests were made in Asia Pacific countries such as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Australia, severely curtailing the revenue of the organisation. An investigation currently underway in Cambodia into large scale human smuggling also seemingly has the hallmarks of the Tigers. Indeed, the proprietor of Raani Restaurant in Phnom Penh, also known as the Raani Curry Leaf Restaurant, noted as an LTTE front organisation, is among the suspects. Further, despite denials from the Thai authorities, the GOSL has revealed the arrest of the head of the procurement arm of the LTTE (the K.P Department), the 52 year old Tharmalingam Shanmugam Kumaran, alias Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias KP in Thailand. Indeed this could be among the biggest blows to have been dealt to the LTTE yet.
With the military success in the east, the external pressure would undoubtedly have had a compounding effect. A virtual absence of anti-aircraft fire in Eelam War IV provided the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) with effective free reign in its battles in the east and on the aerial assault dealt to Sea Tiger bases in the first half of this year. Evidently, since the thwarting of a USD 3 million deal for weaponry to the LTTE in the US in September 2006 that included Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), the LTTE have had difficulty in obtaining the much needed lifeline. This would explain the importance of the latest consignment of SAM that was allegedly on board the vessels at the time they were destroyed by the SLN.
The alleged presence of parts for light aircraft among the cargo carried by the sunken vessels lends to confirmation of a further factor, which is the LTTE's intention to once again shift the theatre of war from the maritime domain in which it had been so successful in the past, to the skies. Its unprecedented aerial strikes against the Government in the first half of this year provided the first indication of this desire, which is understandable, given the heavy losses suffered by them in the east. Sea Tiger bases at strategic eastern locations such as Verugal and Vakarai were rendered inoperable by the SLAF in January 2007, with this success consolidated on with the capture of the east. Such bases which were crucial to the LTTE in the past in operations such as the assault on the SLN's Dakshina Naval Base in Galle in October 2006 were, as far as the Sea Tigers were concerned, a heavy price to have paid.
Now that the reign of impunity is an image of the past, a consolidated GOSL military effort in the north is only a matter of time. For eradicating the LTTE, this is certainly a necessity. What must now be borne in mind is that application of a similar logic with regard to the supply chain must also be applied to LTTE recruits. Specifically, in order for the supply of new recruits to the LTTE to be stemmed, a consorted effort to win over the hearts and minds of the northern Tamils is an absolute must. A tree cannot be cut at its branches and not be expected to grow back. As with the material supplies, the tree of recruits must also be eradicated at its roots. Thus what needs to be noted is that offering soft drinks to those who have lost loved ones in collateral damage and suffered untold hardship as a result of the war (a GOSL official was captured on video in the east, bragging about soft drink hand outs) is as much good as providing a dead man with a bottle of arrack. Greater coordination between military/security and social policy is therefore a hard requirement. In such a case, heavy blunders such as the 'repatriation' of Tamils, who have "no business to be in Colombo," back to the north will have no room in the socio-security lexicon.
In the meantime, it must be borne in mind that terrorism is a tactic best utilised in asymmetric conditions. Attacks on economic and iconic installations should thus be expected, as from a depleted position, it would perhaps be the LTTE's best option. However, given the dismal human rights record of the GOSL at present, a racial backlash similar to 1983 would perhaps also consolidate a case for genocide and strengthen the cases for refugees such as the fasting Sri Lankans in Britain and the 72 'boat people' presently encamped in Nauru. Indeed in the past, the LTTE have utilised precisely such means to transport their agents to chosen centres of operations overseas. Hence the possible option to attack soft targets. Tough times are ahead but for the moment, the military gains are tangible. What remains to be seen is how the GOSL would coalesce national defence policy with a wider socially integrative outlook.
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