By: N. Sathiya Moorthy
With revived hopes of a political process to try to end the ethnic strife up on the anvil all over again, it is time for the Sri Lankan society in general and the Sinhala polity in particular, to think in terms of an 'inclusive' national agenda, and not an 'exclusivist scheme' at least for the future – and for all time to come. Included in such a scheme should be not only solutions to the concerns attending on the ethnic Tamils, but also on all sections of the national community, including the 'left-out' sections of the Sinhalas, not to mention the Muslims and Plantation Tamils.
There is no denying that much of the current problems facing the Sri Lankan nation owe to the 'exclusivist' agenda from the past, taken to ethnic extremes. At the height of the ethnic strife and subsequent war was the 'JVP militancy', first of the early Seventies and later of the late Eighties. The former flowed from a denial of equity and equality in education and employment, the latter to the inadequacy of very means of survival.
It is anybody's guess how the Sri Lankan State would have handled the 'JVP militancy' but for the coincidental presence of the IPKF. The induction of the IPKF, which ended up tackling the LTTE militarily, relieved the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) for deployment in the deep South, to neutralize the JVP militancy, for good. That the process did help domesticate the JVP to a very great degree should be welcome, but that does not automatically imply that all the societal issues and socio-economic problems thrown up at the time have since been addressed and solved.
If anything, the lager 'national problem' pertaining to ethnicity may have pushed survival issues of the individual to the background. They are sure to come overboard as and when permanent peace returns to the troubled island-nation. The Sinhala polity and the Sri Lankan State need to look only at the East to learn their lessons.
It is now safe to assume that the 'Karuna rebellion' within the monolith LTTE would have occurred, when it did or later, as and when a sense of achievement had settled down on the Tamil community. The cease-fire agreement (CFA) indicated precisely as much, particularly after the LTTE had come to represent the Tamil political and military leadership, both rolled into one. The LTTE was also in physical control of territory and ran a parallel administration
If all these bolstered the sense of achievement felt by the militant youth, war-fatigue had already overtaken the larger Tamil community. Under the circumstances, the unity that the moderate Tamil leadership of the late S J V Chelavanayagam introduced though a conscious and conscientious accommodation of the Eastern Tamils in the politics of the Federal Party first, and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) later, was bound to snap after a time.
Whatever be the cause, and whoever the protagonist, the 'Karuna rebellion' kind of split was bound to happen – as much in a monolith militant outfit as in a democratic political umbrella organization. With the result, the emergence of the 'Karuna faction' has thrown up issues that need to be addressed alongside the rest while formulating a power-devolution package. These relate to socio-economic issues pertaining not only to the East, but also to the North, at times.
Then, there is the question of the 'Muslims', particularly of the East, who feel orphaned by the existing scheme and system, despite forming a sizeable segment of the Sri Lankan population, particularly the of Tamil-speaking segment. If concentration of the Tamils in the North and the East helped the community to consolidate itself politically and militarily, the demographic distribution of the Muslim community, in small packets across the Tamil-speaking regions, has proved to be a burden for the political leadership – which again is a divided lot, to say the least.
The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian policy think-tank headquartered in New Delhi. [Courtesy – Daily Mirror]
With revived hopes of a political process to try to end the ethnic strife up on the anvil all over again, it is time for the Sri Lankan society in general and the Sinhala polity in particular, to think in terms of an 'inclusive' national agenda, and not an 'exclusivist scheme' at least for the future – and for all time to come. Included in such a scheme should be not only solutions to the concerns attending on the ethnic Tamils, but also on all sections of the national community, including the 'left-out' sections of the Sinhalas, not to mention the Muslims and Plantation Tamils.
There is no denying that much of the current problems facing the Sri Lankan nation owe to the 'exclusivist' agenda from the past, taken to ethnic extremes. At the height of the ethnic strife and subsequent war was the 'JVP militancy', first of the early Seventies and later of the late Eighties. The former flowed from a denial of equity and equality in education and employment, the latter to the inadequacy of very means of survival.
It is anybody's guess how the Sri Lankan State would have handled the 'JVP militancy' but for the coincidental presence of the IPKF. The induction of the IPKF, which ended up tackling the LTTE militarily, relieved the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) for deployment in the deep South, to neutralize the JVP militancy, for good. That the process did help domesticate the JVP to a very great degree should be welcome, but that does not automatically imply that all the societal issues and socio-economic problems thrown up at the time have since been addressed and solved.
If anything, the lager 'national problem' pertaining to ethnicity may have pushed survival issues of the individual to the background. They are sure to come overboard as and when permanent peace returns to the troubled island-nation. The Sinhala polity and the Sri Lankan State need to look only at the East to learn their lessons.
It is now safe to assume that the 'Karuna rebellion' within the monolith LTTE would have occurred, when it did or later, as and when a sense of achievement had settled down on the Tamil community. The cease-fire agreement (CFA) indicated precisely as much, particularly after the LTTE had come to represent the Tamil political and military leadership, both rolled into one. The LTTE was also in physical control of territory and ran a parallel administration
If all these bolstered the sense of achievement felt by the militant youth, war-fatigue had already overtaken the larger Tamil community. Under the circumstances, the unity that the moderate Tamil leadership of the late S J V Chelavanayagam introduced though a conscious and conscientious accommodation of the Eastern Tamils in the politics of the Federal Party first, and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) later, was bound to snap after a time.
Whatever be the cause, and whoever the protagonist, the 'Karuna rebellion' kind of split was bound to happen – as much in a monolith militant outfit as in a democratic political umbrella organization. With the result, the emergence of the 'Karuna faction' has thrown up issues that need to be addressed alongside the rest while formulating a power-devolution package. These relate to socio-economic issues pertaining not only to the East, but also to the North, at times.
Then, there is the question of the 'Muslims', particularly of the East, who feel orphaned by the existing scheme and system, despite forming a sizeable segment of the Sri Lankan population, particularly the of Tamil-speaking segment. If concentration of the Tamils in the North and the East helped the community to consolidate itself politically and militarily, the demographic distribution of the Muslim community, in small packets across the Tamil-speaking regions, has proved to be a burden for the political leadership – which again is a divided lot, to say the least.
The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian policy think-tank headquartered in New Delhi. [Courtesy – Daily Mirror]
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