By Nuwan Peiris
Overview
Writer in this Article analyses the intervention of two Asian superpowers in Sri Lanka, namely China and India, in a bid to gain supremacy in the case of the former, and a proxy-battle to maintain it’s natural defense-perimeter in the case of latter. Chinese involvement in a harbour project (Hambantota) in the down-south of the island has given this battle a renewed intensity. This Article further examines the geopolitical background that led to this battle, and looks how “energy security” becomes the core for geopolitical change in the South Asian landscape.
Background
“You must never believe that the enemy does not know how to conduct his own affairs. Indeed, if you want to be deceived less and want to bear less danger, the more the enemy is weak or the less the enemy is cautious, so much more must you esteem him.”
Art of War - Niccolò Machiavelli
In Machiavellian sense the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka became weak when ruling UNP (United National party) was ousted by political maneuver by President Chandrika Kumaratunge by taking over three Ministries in 2003. Why did it happen? Did anyone predict it? Is there an oil-factor in it? How would all this have a say in Hambantota Harbour? So far, no one has given a detailed account on the underlying geopolitical waves.
Sri Lanka is small island placed in the tip of the Indian Peninsular just 32 miles off the South Indian coast of India, to the southwest of the Bay of Bengal and to the southeast of the Arabian Sea; and affectionately known as the “pearl of the Indain Ocean”.
Prime Minster Wickremesinghe of UNP who was on an official visit to Washington at time of the maneuver realized that his wings were clipped, yet he was spared as the Prime Minister. (Prime Minster and President are from two parties who had formed a ruling alliance). The background to this remains complex and at best speculative. Some speculate the hand of India. Wickremesinghe Administration played their cards wrong when they tried to get China involved in the petroleum sector. Not for the first time, South Asian geopolitics played a decisive role in the domestic power balance.
How did this problem start? The Indian Oil Corporation entered the petroleum retail sector in Sri Lanka. Out of nearly 360 Government petroleum retail outlets in Sri Lanka, 100 now belong to the Indian Oil Corporation. In the meanwhile, Sinopec (Hong Kong) Ltd, a Chinese owned company, sought entry to the petroleum retail sector but failed.
At the time of President Kumaratunge – Wickremesinghe clash, the Chinese involvement in petrochemical industry was growing. Delhi knew if they loose their petroleum foothold in Sri Lanka, it would bring the energy hungry Beijing dragon close to Indian shores. This is perhaps what Washington wanted – to balance the geopolitical scales in the region through Beijing.
What was the petrochemical-climax? The then Pro-Chinese UNP regime lost substantial political ground when the then President took over three ministries belonging to UNP. This virtually marked the way out for China. Then came the rise of Indian petrochemical dinosaurs in Lankan landscape. The Hindustan Petroleum, meanwhile, was eyeing the petroleum retail sector in the island despite assertive opposition of some Lankan quarters. Had these initiatives succeeded, India would have ended up as Sri Lanka’s petrochemical emperor, controlling the entire retail and wholesale sector; and finally monopolizing the exploration and development of oil reserves off Jaffna/Mannar.
Writer would give two reasons for the later diminishing role of China in Sri Lanka:
1. US$ 3 Billion post-tsunami reconstruction grants and pledges – we could see no assertive Chinese role. (No post-tsunami politics for them!)
2. India’s involvement in the clearing/mapping of the Trincomalee and Colombo harbours after the tsunami.
Was this the geopolitical anti-climax? Yes. China-factor, by this time, was a distant memory.
Did the exile come back? Yes. Recollect what Kissinger said:
“By geopolitical, I mean an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium. Henry Kissinger in Colin S Gray, G R Sloan. Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999.
Hambantota and the Geopolitical Net
A silver-line appeared in the Chinese sky with President Rajapakse’s visit to China in late February. China and Sri Lanka signed an agreement on an "establishment of friendship city relationship" centering Hambantota district. The agreed Hambantota Development Zone includes developing a harbour in Hambantota with a tank farm and a bunkering system.
The small town of Hambantota is located in the far down-south of the island. In 2 A.D. it was part of the Kingdom of Ruhuna, and was home to a busy harbour called “Godapavata Pattana” just few miles west of Hambantota. Ships sailing from west/east and vice versa used Godapavata Pattana as a commercial maritime hub. It formed part of the maritime silk-route and continues to unearth its past wonders today thanks to a collaborative German-Lankan archeological research team.
At present, this small town has lost its former political glory and economic vibrancy. The present President whose political epicenter is this small town is determined to bring back the lost glory to his native village. Hambantota, in addition, is the geographic margin between the East and the South, and the last stronghold Sinhala city of the South with several military bases including the Weeravilla Airport; and further serves as a strategic logistical-military base to Sri Lankan East – say like centrally situated town of Anuradhapura to Jaffna Peninsular.
Back in 2005, attempts were made by then President Chandrika to implement the construction of Hambantota Bunkering and a Tank Farm Project by the Chinese government during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Sri Lanka. The project was to be undertaken by Chinese Harbour Engineering Company and an estimated sum of Rs.1.5 billion (US $ 15m) was to be then invested. In 2007, the present incumbent, Mahinda Rajapakse, took a renewed interest in carrying the project forward.
The US$360 million contract agreement was signed on March 12th, 2007 for the construction of the Hambantota Harbour between the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) and the Consortium of China Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHEC) and Sino Hydro Corporation Limited. During the first phrase of the project is the construction of a jetty and an oil terminal. Later the Port would be developed to handle 20 million containers annually. The first phase would be completed in 3 years and the whole project would be completed in 15 years. Many question the economic wisdom of this project, especially attracting new generation vessels with draft exceeding 18 m. China may not see any economic advantage from this project. Yet she has decided to grant 85% of the total amount under a special subsidized loan scheme.
Delhi has taken the role of China rather nonchalantly. An account in the Hindustan Times in 2005 said that "India feels that it is unnecessary to bid for it [Hambantota] given the fact that it is already refurbishing the World War II-vintage oil-tank farm at Trincomalee with 99 giant tanks. Out of these, only 35 can be put to use in the near future." It was further noted "There isn't enough business in Sri Lanka to make expansion worthwhile even in Trincomalee. India also does not consider the Hambantota project to be of a great strategic value, either. For India, a presence in Trincomalee makes much more strategic sense." (Trincomalee (Trinco) is situated towards north of the island)
Asia Times Online quoting a Delhi official said “that while the Hambantota project gives the Chinese a foothold in Sri Lanka, this cannot be interpreted as a decline in India's role on the island. Geographic proximity, ethnic links and close ties between India and Sri Lanka cannot be eroded by a few projects and agreements with other countries.” Seemly, it is a benign neglect on the Indian part.
The Port deal inked would bring China to the doorstep of India. Though China has no grip on Trincomalee, they have quite swiftly moved much closer to Trinco and Rameshwaram.
(Writer is a Sri Lankan. He is also an Attorney, a Research Analyst, and a Freelance Journalist. The views expressed by the author are his own. For comments on this article write to nuwan20044@yahoo.com)
Home Unlabelled Hambantota Harbour and an Exile’s Return (Part One)
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